Claude
78456e6a3a
"cscli scenarios remove crowdsecurity/asterisk_bf crowdsecurity/asterisk_user_enum" was failing silently (stderr suppressed, "|| true" swallowed the non-zero exit) because these scenarios are members of the crowdsecurity/asterisk collection, and cscli refuses to remove/disable a collection member without --force. The un-exempted hub originals kept running side-by-side with the ASN-exempt local forks the entire time, independently banning the same traffic with no ASN awareness at all - confirmed live by a ban showing scenario "crowdsecurity/asterisk_bf" (the hub original) rather than "local/asterisk_bf" (the fork) for an ASN that had just been exempted. Fixed in two places: - crowdsec.sh's initial setup now passes --force and surfaces a clear warning (with the manual fix command) if it still fails, instead of silently continuing. - security-dashboard's set-asn-exempt.sh helper now re-asserts the forced disable on every ASN-list save, so an install already affected by this (from before this fix, or where the step failed for any other reason) self-heals the next time the ASN list is edited via the dashboard, without needing to re-run the full CrowdSec installer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ho9mZgAkVpdz7S5wJkg8Nf
1503 lines
67 KiB
Bash
1503 lines
67 KiB
Bash
#!/bin/bash
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# services/security-dashboard.sh — Security dashboard: Asterisk failed-connection
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# log + CrowdSec decisions (view/unban/ASN-exempt management), Authelia-protected.
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# Part of the modular post-install system (sourced by setup.sh).
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#
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# Can also be run standalone on any machine:
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# sudo bash security-dashboard.sh
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# (Docker must already be installed when run standalone — Caddy fronts this,
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# even though the dashboard itself runs natively on the host, not in Docker)
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#
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# Why native, not Docker: it needs to run `cscli` (a host binary — CrowdSec is
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# a system service, not a container, see services/crowdsec.sh) and read
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# Asterisk's security log directly off disk. Running natively avoids bridging
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# the container/host boundary entirely — no LAPI credentials to expose to a
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# containerized frontend, no Docker socket mount. Same reasoning as why
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# CrowdSec itself is a system service in this repo, not a docker-compose one.
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# ── Standalone bootstrap ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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if [[ "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" == "${0}" ]]; then
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[[ "$(id -u)" == "0" ]] || { echo "Run with sudo: sudo bash $0"; exit 1; }
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_SELF_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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_COMMON="$_SELF_DIR/../lib/common.sh"
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if [[ -f "$_COMMON" ]]; then
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# shellcheck source=../lib/common.sh
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source "$_COMMON"
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else
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log_info() { echo -e "\033[0;34m[INFO]\033[0m $*"; }
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log_success() { echo -e "\033[0;32m[OK]\033[0m $*"; }
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log_warning() { echo -e "\033[1;33m[WARN]\033[0m $*"; }
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log_error() { echo -e "\033[0;31m[ERROR]\033[0m $*" >&2; }
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prompt_text() {
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local _q="$1" _def="$2" _var="$3" _r
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[[ "${UNATTENDED:-false}" == "true" ]] && { eval "$_var='$_def'"; return; }
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read -r -p " $_q " _r
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eval "$_var='${_r:-$_def}'"
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}
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prompt_yn() {
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local _q="$1" _def="$2" _var="$3" _r
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[[ "${UNATTENDED:-false}" == "true" ]] && { eval "$_var='$_def'"; return; }
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read -r -p " $_q " _r
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eval "$_var='${_r:-$_def}'"
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}
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write_readme() {
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local _dir="$1"; shift
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mkdir -p "$_dir"
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cat > "$_dir/README.md"
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}
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fi
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ACTUAL_USER="${ACTUAL_USER:-${SUDO_USER:-$USER}}"
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ACTUAL_HOME="$(getent passwd "$ACTUAL_USER" 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f6 || echo "${HOME:-/root}")"
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DOCKER_DIR="${DOCKER_DIR:-$ACTUAL_HOME/docker}"
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DRY_RUN="${DRY_RUN:-false}"
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UNATTENDED="${UNATTENDED:-false}"
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SITE_DOMAIN="${SITE_DOMAIN:-example.com}"
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register_service() { :; }
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_RUN_STANDALONE=1
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fi
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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register_service security-dashboard homelab "Security dashboard: Asterisk failed-connections + CrowdSec bans (Authelia-protected)" 8092
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install_security-dashboard() {
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local APP_DIR="/opt/security-dashboard"
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local DASHBOARD_PORT=8092
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local SVC_USER="secdash"
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# Either Asterisk flavor works — prefer asterisk-digital-ocean if both
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# happen to be installed, matching services/pstn-trunk.sh's own
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# preference order for consistency.
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local ASTERISK_EA_DIR=""
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if [ -d "$DOCKER_DIR/asterisk-digital-ocean" ]; then
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ASTERISK_EA_DIR="$DOCKER_DIR/asterisk-digital-ocean"
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elif [ -d "$DOCKER_DIR/asterisk" ]; then
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ASTERISK_EA_DIR="$DOCKER_DIR/asterisk"
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fi
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local ASTERISK_LOG_DIR="${ASTERISK_EA_DIR:+$ASTERISK_EA_DIR/logs}"
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local ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR="${ASTERISK_EA_DIR:+$ASTERISK_EA_DIR/config/asterisk}"
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local ASTERISK_ADMIN_URL=""
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if [ -n "$ASTERISK_EA_DIR" ] && [ -f "$ASTERISK_EA_DIR/.env" ]; then
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local _ea_domain
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_ea_domain="$(grep -E '^DOMAIN_NAME=' "$ASTERISK_EA_DIR/.env" | cut -d= -f2-)"
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[ -n "$_ea_domain" ] && ASTERISK_ADMIN_URL="https://${_ea_domain}"
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fi
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echo ""
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echo "┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐"
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echo "│ SECURITY DASHBOARD │"
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echo "│ Asterisk failed-connection log + CrowdSec decisions + PSTN │"
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echo "│ trunk permissions, one page. Runs natively on the host (not │"
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echo "│ Docker) so it can call cscli and read Asterisk's files │"
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echo "│ directly. Authelia-protected. │"
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echo "└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘"
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echo ""
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if [ -z "$ASTERISK_EA_DIR" ]; then
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log_warning "No asterisk-digital-ocean or asterisk install detected."
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log_warning "The Security Log and PSTN Trunk tabs will just be empty — CrowdSec's tab still works fine."
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fi
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if [ "$DRY_RUN" = true ]; then
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echo "[DRY-RUN] Would create system user $SVC_USER"
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echo "[DRY-RUN] Would write $APP_DIR/app.py"
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echo "[DRY-RUN] Would write /etc/sudoers.d/security-dashboard (scoped cscli/systemctl/set-asn-exempt.sh only)"
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echo "[DRY-RUN] Would write a systemd unit and start it on 0.0.0.0:$DASHBOARD_PORT (firewalled via UFW, not interface binding)"
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echo "[DRY-RUN] Would grant read/write access to the detected Asterisk config dir (for the PSTN Trunk tab)"
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echo "[DRY-RUN] Would configure Caddy + Authelia for a domain you'll be prompted for"
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return 0
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fi
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if [ -f "$APP_DIR/app.py" ]; then
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local MODE=""
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prompt_reinstall_mode MODE 2>/dev/null || {
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# prompt_reinstall_mode isn't defined in the standalone stub — fall
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# back to a plain yes/no when run outside the full repo.
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local _r=""
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prompt_yn " Security dashboard already exists at $APP_DIR — reconfigure? (y/n):" "n" _r
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[ "$_r" = "y" ] || [ "$_r" = "Y" ] && MODE="fresh" || MODE="cancel"
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}
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case "$MODE" in
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update)
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log_info "Refreshing app code + sudoers rule + systemd unit (no Caddy/domain changes)..."
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_secdash_grant_asterisk_access "$SVC_USER" "$ASTERISK_LOG_DIR" "$ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR"
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_secdash_write_app "$APP_DIR"
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_secdash_write_asn_helper "$APP_DIR"
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_secdash_write_sudoers "$SVC_USER"
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_secdash_write_systemd_unit "$APP_DIR" "$SVC_USER" "$DASHBOARD_PORT" "$ASTERISK_LOG_DIR" "$ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR" "$ASTERISK_ADMIN_URL"
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systemctl restart security-dashboard 2>/dev/null \
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&& log_success "security-dashboard restarted" \
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|| log_warning "Restart failed — check: systemctl status security-dashboard"
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echo ""
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local _reconf=""
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prompt_yn "Reconfigure this dashboard's Caddy protection (Authelia domain, or add/rotate an independent Basic Auth layer)? (y/n):" "n" _reconf
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if [[ "$_reconf" =~ ^[Yy]$ ]]; then
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_secdash_remove_caddy_block "$DASHBOARD_PORT"
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_secdash_configure_caddy "$DASHBOARD_PORT"
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fi
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return 0
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;;
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cancel)
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log_info "Leaving the existing install as-is."
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return 0
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;;
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fresh) ;;
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esac
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fi
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# ── System user (no login, no home directory needed) ────────────────────
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if ! id "$SVC_USER" &>/dev/null; then
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useradd --system --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin "$SVC_USER"
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log_success "Created system user $SVC_USER"
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fi
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_secdash_grant_asterisk_access "$SVC_USER" "$ASTERISK_LOG_DIR" "$ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR"
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mkdir -p "$APP_DIR"
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_secdash_write_app "$APP_DIR"
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chown -R "$SVC_USER:$SVC_USER" "$APP_DIR"
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_secdash_write_asn_helper "$APP_DIR"
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_secdash_write_sudoers "$SVC_USER"
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_secdash_write_systemd_unit "$APP_DIR" "$SVC_USER" "$DASHBOARD_PORT" "$ASTERISK_LOG_DIR" "$ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR" "$ASTERISK_ADMIN_URL"
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systemctl daemon-reload
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systemctl enable security-dashboard >/dev/null 2>&1
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if systemctl restart security-dashboard; then
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log_success "security-dashboard started on port $DASHBOARD_PORT (all interfaces — UFW scopes actual access)"
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else
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log_warning "Failed to start — check: systemctl status security-dashboard"
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fi
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# ── Caddy + Authelia (+ optional independent Basic Auth) ────────────────
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# This is deliberately more insistent about auth than most services — it
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# can delete active CrowdSec bans, so an unauthenticated exposure here is
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# a real security hole, not just an inconvenience. Factored into
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# _secdash_configure_caddy so "update" mode can also offer to reconfigure
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# it later (e.g. to add Basic Auth to an already-deployed dashboard)
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# without duplicating this logic — see that function for the rest.
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_secdash_configure_caddy "$DASHBOARD_PORT"
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write_readme "$APP_DIR" << README_MD
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# Security Dashboard
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Asterisk failed-connection log + CrowdSec ban management, one Authelia-
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protected page. Runs natively on the host (systemd service \`security-dashboard\`),
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not in Docker — it needs to call \`cscli\` and read Asterisk's log directly.
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## Tabs
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- **Security Log** — parses \`$ASTERISK_LOG_DIR/full\` for SIP auth failures
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(wrong password, unknown extension, etc.) with timestamp/account/remote IP.
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- **CrowdSec** — current bans (\`cscli decisions list\`), a delete/unban button
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per entry, carrier/ASN + country columns, and management of the ASN-exempt
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Asterisk brute-force scenarios (see \`services/crowdsec.sh\`'s "Exempt
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specific carrier ASNs" option) without SSHing in:
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- **Currently-exempt ASNs** are listed with carrier name (resolved from
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current bans, falling back to alert history for ASNs with no active ban
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right now) regardless of when they were added.
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- **Unwhitelist** removes an ASN from the exemption list — future Asterisk
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auth failures from it are evaluated normally again.
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- **Unwhitelist + Ban** does that *and* immediately bans (24h) every IP
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CrowdSec has ever recorded for that ASN, for accidental-whitelist cases
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where you don't want to wait for it to misbehave again.
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- **PSTN Trunk** — detects whether \`services/pstn-trunk.sh\`'s dialplan is
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actually installed (\`pstn-trunk-dialplan.conf\` present) and shows a clear
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"not installed" message instead of the caps/tiers editor if not, so it
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never shows real-looking-but-unenforced defaults. When installed: the
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outbound/inbound concurrent-call caps, and every known extension (parsed
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from \`pjsip.conf\`) with its current permission tier (internal /
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restricted / full) and, for restricted, its approved numbers — all
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editable live, no Asterisk restart, no reinstall. Writes directly to
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\`pstn-limits.conf\` / \`pstn-permissions.conf\`, which the dialplan reads
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fresh on every call. The spend-cap kill-switch and international-calling
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allow-list are deliberately **not** managed here — CLI-only, via
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\`sudo ./setup.sh pstn-trunk\` — since both are more security-sensitive
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than what this tab already exposes.
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- Link to the Asterisk web admin itself (doesn't embed it, just links out).
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## Manage
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\`\`\`
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sudo systemctl status security-dashboard
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sudo systemctl restart security-dashboard
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sudo journalctl -u security-dashboard -f
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\`\`\`
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## Security notes
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- Runs as a dedicated, unprivileged system user (\`secdash\`), not root.
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- Sudo access is scoped to exactly six commands via
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\`/etc/sudoers.d/security-dashboard\`: \`cscli decisions delete --id <digits>\`,
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\`cscli decisions list -o json\`, \`cscli alerts list -o json\` (read-only,
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used to label ASN exemptions with a carrier name from past alerts and to
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find known offending IPs for the "Ban" action), \`cscli decisions add --ip
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<ip> --duration <dur> --type ban --reason <text>\` (used only by "Ban"),
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\`systemctl restart crowdsec\`, and \`set-asn-exempt.sh\` (root:root, mode
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700, installed alongside \`app.py\` — the one thing that edits CrowdSec's
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Asterisk-scenario YAMLs, since \`secdash\` has no write access to those
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root-owned files directly and shouldn't). Nothing else.
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- Listens on all interfaces (Caddy reaches it via \`host.docker.internal\`, a
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Docker bridge IP — a loopback-only bind refuses that). Access is scoped by
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UFW instead, allowed only from Caddy's internal network, not the internet.
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- **This page can delete active security bans.** It's protected by Authelia
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(or a remote instance) by default, and the installer offers a second,
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independent HTTP Basic Auth layer in front of that — a request must pass
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Basic Auth *and* Authelia before it ever reaches the app, so an Authelia
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bug or misconfiguration alone isn't enough to expose this page. Re-run the
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installer ("update" mode → reconfigure Caddy protection) to add, rotate, or
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remove that Basic Auth layer later.
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README_MD
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echo ""
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echo " Local access: http://localhost:$DASHBOARD_PORT"
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echo " README: $APP_DIR/README.md"
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echo ""
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}
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# Grants secdash read/write access to wherever Asterisk's config lives
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# without running the dashboard as root or the actual user — added to the
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# group that already owns those directories (ensure_docker_dir_ownership
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# elsewhere in this repo sets both owner AND group to ACTUAL_USER, so the log
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# dir and config dir normally share one group already; handled separately
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# anyway in case that ever changes). Separate function, called from both
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# "update" and fresh-install, so a PSTN trunk installed *after* this
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# dashboard (or an asterisk-digital-ocean/asterisk swap) reaches an existing
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# install on its next update instead of silently only applying to new ones.
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_secdash_grant_asterisk_access() {
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local _svc_user="$1" _log_dir="$2" _config_dir="$3"
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local _dir
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for _dir in "$_log_dir" "$_config_dir"; do
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[ -n "$_dir" ] && [ -d "$_dir" ] || continue
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local _group
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_group="$(stat -c '%G' "$_dir" 2>/dev/null || echo "$ACTUAL_USER")"
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usermod -aG "$_group" "$_svc_user" 2>/dev/null || true
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chmod 750 "$_dir" 2>/dev/null || true
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done
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# pstn-permissions.conf specifically needs group WRITE (750 above is
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# read+execute for the group, not write) — the file itself is written
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# group-writable (664) by services/pstn-trunk.sh, but the containing
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# directory also needs the group execute+write bit for a new file save
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# (configparser writes a fresh temp file then renames it into place) to
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# succeed. 770 only on the config dir, not the log dir (no reason for
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# secdash to ever create files in the log dir).
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if [ -n "$_config_dir" ] && [ -d "$_config_dir" ]; then
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chmod 770 "$_config_dir" 2>/dev/null || true
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fi
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}
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# Systemd unit — separate function so "update" mode can refresh it too
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# (Environment= vars and ReadWritePaths depend on which Asterisk flavor is
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# detected, which can change between installs — e.g. a PSTN trunk or a
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# different Asterisk flavor installed after this dashboard's first setup).
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# ProtectSystem=strict makes the whole filesystem read-only for this unit
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# except the paths explicitly listed below, regardless of Unix permissions —
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# both layers (this AND the group access above) need to agree, or writes
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# fail even when Unix permissions alone would have allowed them.
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_secdash_write_systemd_unit() {
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local _app_dir="$1" _svc_user="$2" _port="$3" _log_dir="$4" _config_dir="$5" _admin_url="$6"
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local _read_only_paths="" _read_write_paths="/etc/crowdsec/scenarios"
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[ -n "$_log_dir" ] && _read_only_paths="$_log_dir"
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[ -n "$_config_dir" ] && _read_write_paths="$_read_write_paths $_config_dir"
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cat > /etc/systemd/system/security-dashboard.service << SDSVC
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[Unit]
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Description=Security dashboard (Asterisk security log + CrowdSec decisions + PSTN trunk permissions)
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After=network.target
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[Service]
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Type=simple
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User=$_svc_user
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Group=$_svc_user
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Environment=DASHBOARD_PORT=$_port
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Environment=ASTERISK_LOG=${_log_dir:+$_log_dir/full}
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Environment=ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR=$_config_dir
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Environment=ASTERISK_ADMIN_URL=$_admin_url
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ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 $_app_dir/app.py
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Restart=on-failure
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RestartSec=3
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NoNewPrivileges=false
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ProtectSystem=strict
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ReadOnlyPaths=$_read_only_paths
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ReadWritePaths=$_read_write_paths
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[Install]
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WantedBy=multi-user.target
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SDSVC
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}
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# Scoped sudo — only the exact commands the app needs, nothing else. Numeric-
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# only glob on the decision ID; Python subprocess calls always pass args as a
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# list (no shell=True anywhere), so there's no shell-metachar injection
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# surface even before sudoers' own pattern match kicks in — the server-side
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# ID validation (must be all-digits) happens before this is ever reached,
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# this is defense in depth, not the only check. Separate function, called
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# from both "update" and fresh-install, so adding a new permission later
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# (like alerts list, added after ASN-exempt entries with no currently-active
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# ban had no carrier name to show) reaches existing installs on their next
|
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# update instead of silently only applying to new ones.
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_secdash_write_sudoers() {
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local _svc_user="$1"
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cat > /etc/sudoers.d/security-dashboard << SUDOERS
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$_svc_user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/cscli decisions delete --id [0-9]*
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$_svc_user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/cscli decisions list -o json
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$_svc_user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/cscli alerts list -o json
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$_svc_user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/cscli decisions add --ip * --duration * --type ban --reason *
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$_svc_user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/systemctl restart crowdsec
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$_svc_user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /opt/security-dashboard/set-asn-exempt.sh *
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SUDOERS
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chmod 440 /etc/sudoers.d/security-dashboard
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visudo -c -f /etc/sudoers.d/security-dashboard >/dev/null 2>&1 \
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&& log_success "Sudoers rule installed and validated" \
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|| { log_error "Sudoers rule failed validation — removing it (dashboard's CrowdSec tab won't work until fixed)"; rm -f /etc/sudoers.d/security-dashboard; }
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}
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|
|
# Caddy + Authelia (+ optional independent Basic Auth) for the dashboard.
|
|
# Separate function so "update" mode can call _secdash_remove_caddy_block +
|
|
# this to reconfigure an already-deployed dashboard (e.g. to add Basic Auth
|
|
# retroactively) using the exact same code path as a fresh install, instead
|
|
# of hand-patching a live Caddyfile block in place.
|
|
_secdash_configure_caddy() {
|
|
local DASHBOARD_PORT="$1"
|
|
|
|
echo ""
|
|
if ! command -v docker &>/dev/null || ! docker ps --format '{{.Names}}' 2>/dev/null | grep -q "^caddy$"; then
|
|
log_info "Caddy not running — dashboard stays on http://localhost:$DASHBOARD_PORT until you set it up."
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
local _default_domain=""
|
|
if [ -n "${SITE_DOMAIN:-}" ] && [ "$SITE_DOMAIN" != "example.com" ]; then
|
|
_default_domain="security.${SITE_DOMAIN}"
|
|
fi
|
|
local SD_DOMAIN=""
|
|
prompt_text " Domain for the dashboard (e.g. security.yourdomain.com), you'll need to point DNS at this droplet yourself [${_default_domain:-required}]:" "$_default_domain" SD_DOMAIN
|
|
|
|
if [ -z "$SD_DOMAIN" ]; then
|
|
log_warning "No domain entered — dashboard stays on http://localhost:$DASHBOARD_PORT only (not reachable from outside this box)."
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
local EXTRA_BLOCK=""
|
|
if [ -d "$DOCKER_DIR/authelia" ]; then
|
|
EXTRA_BLOCK=" import authelia"
|
|
log_info "Local Authelia detected — protecting with it."
|
|
else
|
|
log_warning "No local Authelia found. This dashboard can delete active security"
|
|
log_warning "bans — strongly recommend protecting it before exposing it publicly."
|
|
local _use_remote=""
|
|
prompt_yn " Protect with a remote Authelia instance (e.g. on a homelab)? (y/n):" "y" _use_remote
|
|
if [[ "$_use_remote" =~ ^[Yy]$ ]]; then
|
|
local _remote_authelia=""
|
|
prompt_text " Remote Authelia address (bare host:port on a private network, or a full https:// URL on its own public domain+TLS):" "" _remote_authelia
|
|
if [ -n "$_remote_authelia" ]; then
|
|
# See services/asterisk-digital-ocean.sh for why
|
|
# X-Forwarded-Host must be a literal domain here, not
|
|
# the {host} placeholder — confirmed live that the
|
|
# placeholder still evaluates to the upstream
|
|
# Authelia's own hostname for a scheme-qualified
|
|
# remote upstream, not the original site's.
|
|
EXTRA_BLOCK=" forward_auth ${_remote_authelia} {
|
|
uri /api/authz/forward-auth
|
|
copy_headers Remote-User Remote-Groups Remote-Name Remote-Email
|
|
header_up X-Forwarded-Method {method}
|
|
header_up X-Forwarded-Proto {scheme}
|
|
header_up X-Forwarded-Host ${SD_DOMAIN}
|
|
header_up X-Forwarded-Uri {uri}
|
|
}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# ── Independent Basic Auth layer (defense-in-depth on top of Authelia) ──
|
|
# Authelia already gates this page, but it's still one piece of software
|
|
# this dashboard trusts completely — this repo already hit one real
|
|
# Authelia forward_auth header bypass (see services/authelia.sh's
|
|
# header_up X-Forwarded-Host fix). This dashboard can delete active
|
|
# security bans, so it's worth a second, genuinely independent gate that
|
|
# doesn't depend on Authelia (or its session store, or its config) at
|
|
# all. basicauth is written before EXTRA_BLOCK below, so a request must
|
|
# clear it before ever reaching Authelia's forward_auth call.
|
|
local BASICAUTH_BLOCK=""
|
|
local _use_basicauth=""
|
|
prompt_yn " Add an independent Basic Auth login in front of Authelia, as a second, separate layer? (y/n):" "y" _use_basicauth
|
|
if [[ "$_use_basicauth" =~ ^[Yy]$ ]]; then
|
|
local BA_USER="" BA_PASS="" BA_HASH=""
|
|
prompt_text " Basic Auth username [admin]:" "admin" BA_USER
|
|
BA_PASS="$(generate_password 20)"
|
|
log_info "Generating Basic Auth password hash (via the running Caddy container)..."
|
|
BA_HASH="$(docker exec caddy caddy hash-password --plaintext "$BA_PASS" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
if [ -z "$BA_HASH" ]; then
|
|
log_warning "Could not generate the Basic Auth hash — skipping this layer. Authelia alone will protect the dashboard."
|
|
else
|
|
BASICAUTH_BLOCK=" basicauth {
|
|
${BA_USER} ${BA_HASH}
|
|
}
|
|
"
|
|
log_success "Basic Auth username: ${BA_USER}"
|
|
log_success "Basic Auth password: ${BA_PASS}"
|
|
log_warning "Save that password now — only the bcrypt hash is written to the Caddyfile, it is not stored anywhere in plaintext."
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ -z "$EXTRA_BLOCK" ] && [ -z "$BASICAUTH_BLOCK" ]; then
|
|
log_error "Proceeding WITHOUT any auth protection — anyone who finds this domain"
|
|
log_error "can view and delete active security bans. Strongly reconsider."
|
|
local _confirm_unsafe=""
|
|
prompt_yn " Really continue without auth protection? (y/n):" "n" _confirm_unsafe
|
|
if [[ ! "$_confirm_unsafe" =~ ^[Yy]$ ]]; then
|
|
log_info "Skipping Caddy setup. Re-run this installer once Authelia is available."
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
local CADDY_FILE="$DOCKER_DIR/caddy/Caddyfile"
|
|
if [ -f "$CADDY_FILE" ] && ! grep -q "^${SD_DOMAIN} {" "$CADDY_FILE"; then
|
|
cat >> "$CADDY_FILE" << CADDYBLOCK
|
|
|
|
# Security Dashboard
|
|
${SD_DOMAIN} {
|
|
${BASICAUTH_BLOCK}${EXTRA_BLOCK}
|
|
reverse_proxy host.docker.internal:${DASHBOARD_PORT}
|
|
|
|
header {
|
|
Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload"
|
|
X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
|
|
X-Frame-Options "DENY"
|
|
Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log {
|
|
output file /var/log/caddy/${SD_DOMAIN}.log
|
|
format json
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
CADDYBLOCK
|
|
docker exec caddy caddy fmt --overwrite /etc/caddy/Caddyfile 2>/dev/null || true
|
|
docker compose -f "$DOCKER_DIR/caddy/docker-compose.yml" restart caddy 2>/dev/null \
|
|
&& log_success "Caddy restarted — dashboard at https://${SD_DOMAIN}" \
|
|
|| log_warning "Restart Caddy manually: cd $DOCKER_DIR/caddy && docker compose restart"
|
|
elif [ -f "$CADDY_FILE" ]; then
|
|
log_warning "$SD_DOMAIN already in Caddyfile — leaving the existing entry alone."
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# This port never needs to be open to the internet — only Caddy (local,
|
|
# via host.docker.internal) ever needs to reach it.
|
|
if command -v ufw &>/dev/null; then
|
|
ufw delete allow "${DASHBOARD_PORT}/tcp" 2>/dev/null || true
|
|
if declare -f ufw_allow_from_caddy_net >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
ufw_allow_from_caddy_net "${DASHBOARD_PORT}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Removes the dashboard's existing Caddyfile site block (found via its
|
|
# unique reverse_proxy line, walking backward to the nearest "<domain> {"
|
|
# open and forward to the matching unindented "}" close) so
|
|
# _secdash_configure_caddy can regenerate it fresh on "update" mode's
|
|
# reconfigure path, rather than trying to surgically patch a live Caddyfile
|
|
# in place — a whole-block delete-and-regenerate is much harder to get
|
|
# subtly wrong than in-place editing of a file this security-critical.
|
|
_secdash_remove_caddy_block() {
|
|
local port="$1"
|
|
local caddy_file="$DOCKER_DIR/caddy/Caddyfile"
|
|
[ -f "$caddy_file" ] || return 0
|
|
|
|
local marker=" reverse_proxy host.docker.internal:${port}"
|
|
local marker_line domain_line end_line
|
|
marker_line="$(grep -nF "$marker" "$caddy_file" | head -1 | cut -d: -f1)"
|
|
if [ -z "$marker_line" ]; then
|
|
return 0 # nothing deployed yet — fine, the fresh flow will just append
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
domain_line="$(head -n "$marker_line" "$caddy_file" | grep -nE '^[^[:space:]#].* \{$' | tail -1 | cut -d: -f1)"
|
|
if [ -z "$domain_line" ]; then
|
|
log_warning "Could not find the start of the existing dashboard Caddy block — leaving it as-is."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
# Pull in the "# Security Dashboard" comment line right above it too, if present
|
|
if [ "$domain_line" -gt 1 ] && sed -n "$((domain_line - 1))p" "$caddy_file" | grep -qx '# Security Dashboard'; then
|
|
domain_line=$((domain_line - 1))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
end_line="$(tail -n "+$marker_line" "$caddy_file" | grep -nx '}' | head -1 | cut -d: -f1)"
|
|
if [ -z "$end_line" ]; then
|
|
log_warning "Could not find the end of the existing dashboard Caddy block — leaving it as-is."
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
end_line=$((marker_line + end_line - 1))
|
|
|
|
sed -i "${domain_line},${end_line}d" "$caddy_file"
|
|
log_info "Removed the existing dashboard Caddy block (regenerating it fresh)."
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Root-owned helper for editing CrowdSec's Asterisk-scenario YAMLs — the
|
|
# secdash service user (--shell /usr/sbin/nologin, no special file grants)
|
|
# cannot write /etc/crowdsec/scenarios/*.yaml directly (root:root, mode
|
|
# 644): confirmed live, a direct write from app.py failed with "[Errno 13]
|
|
# Permission denied". Rather than loosen those files' own permissions,
|
|
# route the edit through this one whitelisted root helper via sudo — same
|
|
# pattern every other CrowdSec-touching action here already uses (cscli via
|
|
# run_sudo), just for a plain file edit instead of a cscli subcommand.
|
|
# Mode 700 root:root: secdash can still invoke it (sudoers grants running
|
|
# it AS root regardless of the file's own permission bits), but nothing
|
|
# else on the box can execute it directly.
|
|
_secdash_write_asn_helper() {
|
|
local _app_dir="$1"
|
|
cat > "$_app_dir/set-asn-exempt.sh" << 'ASNHELPER'
|
|
#!/bin/bash
|
|
# Auto-generated by services/security-dashboard.sh — do not edit directly,
|
|
# re-run the installer instead. Invoked ONLY via sudo, by app.py's
|
|
# set_asn_exempt() (see /etc/sudoers.d/security-dashboard for the exact
|
|
# grant). Args are ASN numbers (already validated by the caller, but
|
|
# re-validated here too since this runs as root — never trust the caller
|
|
# alone for a root-executed script).
|
|
set -uo pipefail
|
|
|
|
SCENARIO_FILES=(
|
|
/etc/crowdsec/scenarios/local-asterisk_bf.yaml
|
|
/etc/crowdsec/scenarios/local-asterisk_user_enum.yaml
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
clean_asns=()
|
|
for a in "$@"; do
|
|
[[ "$a" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] && clean_asns+=("$a")
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
expr="" sep=""
|
|
for a in "${clean_asns[@]}"; do
|
|
expr="${expr}${sep}'${a}'"
|
|
sep=", "
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
found=0
|
|
for f in "${SCENARIO_FILES[@]}"; do
|
|
if [[ -f "$f" ]]; then
|
|
found=1
|
|
sed -i "s/ASNNumber in \[[^]]*\])/ASNNumber in [${expr}])/" "$f" || exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$found" != "1" ]]; then
|
|
echo "No CrowdSec scenario files found to update" >&2
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Self-healing: the hub-original crowdsecurity/asterisk_bf /
|
|
# asterisk_user_enum scenarios have no ASN awareness at all, so if they're
|
|
# still enabled alongside the exempt forks above, they independently ban
|
|
# the same traffic regardless of anything just written — the exemption
|
|
# above would silently do nothing. crowdsec.sh's original install is
|
|
# supposed to disable them (--force, since they're crowdsecurity/asterisk
|
|
# collection members), but an install from before that fix shipped (or one
|
|
# where that step failed silently) would still have them active. Re-assert
|
|
# it on every save rather than trusting it was ever done correctly once —
|
|
# confirmed live: an install where this step had silently failed kept
|
|
# banning an exempted ASN under the hub-original scenario name.
|
|
cscli scenarios remove crowdsecurity/asterisk_bf crowdsecurity/asterisk_user_enum --force 2>/dev/null || true
|
|
|
|
if ! systemctl restart crowdsec; then
|
|
echo "Wrote ASN list but failed to restart CrowdSec" >&2
|
|
exit 2
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
echo "OK"
|
|
ASNHELPER
|
|
chown root:root "$_app_dir/set-asn-exempt.sh"
|
|
chmod 700 "$_app_dir/set-asn-exempt.sh"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Writes the Python app. Separate function so "update" mode (refresh code,
|
|
# keep config) and fresh installs share one copy instead of drifting apart.
|
|
_secdash_write_app() {
|
|
local _app_dir="$1"
|
|
mkdir -p "$_app_dir"
|
|
cat > "$_app_dir/app.py" << 'PYAPP'
|
|
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
|
"""Security dashboard: Asterisk failed-connection log + CrowdSec decisions.
|
|
|
|
Stdlib only, deliberately — this runs on a small droplet alongside Asterisk,
|
|
Caddy, and CrowdSec, and shouldn't add a framework's worth of RAM overhead.
|
|
"""
|
|
import configparser
|
|
import json
|
|
import os
|
|
import re
|
|
import subprocess
|
|
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
|
|
|
|
PORT = int(os.environ.get("DASHBOARD_PORT", "8092"))
|
|
ASTERISK_LOG = os.environ.get("ASTERISK_LOG", "")
|
|
ASTERISK_ADMIN_URL = os.environ.get("ASTERISK_ADMIN_URL", "")
|
|
ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR = os.environ.get("ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR", "")
|
|
ASN_SCENARIO_FILES = [
|
|
"/etc/crowdsec/scenarios/local-asterisk_bf.yaml",
|
|
"/etc/crowdsec/scenarios/local-asterisk_user_enum.yaml",
|
|
]
|
|
# Root-owned helper for the one write (edit + crowdsec restart) — this
|
|
# service user (--shell /usr/sbin/nologin) has no write access to
|
|
# ASN_SCENARIO_FILES (root:root, mode 644) and shouldn't; see
|
|
# _secdash_write_asn_helper in services/security-dashboard.sh for why this
|
|
# goes through sudo instead of loosening those files' permissions.
|
|
ASN_HELPER_SCRIPT = "/opt/security-dashboard/set-asn-exempt.sh"
|
|
|
|
TS_RE = re.compile(r"^\[([^\]]+)\]")
|
|
KV_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)="([^"]*)"')
|
|
ASN_FILTER_RE = re.compile(r"ASNNumber in \[([^\]]*)\]\)")
|
|
ID_RE = re.compile(r"^\d+$")
|
|
ASN_RE = re.compile(r"^\d+$")
|
|
IP_RE = re.compile(r"^\d{1,3}(\.\d{1,3}){3}$")
|
|
DEVICE_MARKER_RE = re.compile(r"^; === Device: (.+?)(?:\s*\[AA:(?:yes|no)\])?\s*\((.+?)\)\s*===\s*$")
|
|
EXT_HEADER_RE = re.compile(r"^\[(\d+)\]")
|
|
EXTEN_RE = re.compile(r"^\d+$")
|
|
TIER_RE = re.compile(r"^(internal|restricted|full)$")
|
|
NUMBER_RE = re.compile(r"^\d{11}$")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def parse_security_log(limit=200):
|
|
"""Tail ASTERISK_LOG and return the most recent SecurityEvent lines,
|
|
newest first, as dicts. Missing file / no lines -> empty list, never an
|
|
error — this is a convenience view, not load-bearing."""
|
|
if not ASTERISK_LOG or not os.path.isfile(ASTERISK_LOG):
|
|
return []
|
|
events = []
|
|
try:
|
|
with open(ASTERISK_LOG, "r", errors="replace") as f:
|
|
lines = f.readlines()[-5000:] # cap how much we ever scan
|
|
except OSError:
|
|
return []
|
|
for line in lines:
|
|
if "SecurityEvent=" not in line:
|
|
continue
|
|
ts_match = TS_RE.match(line)
|
|
fields = dict(KV_RE.findall(line))
|
|
if not fields.get("SecurityEvent"):
|
|
continue
|
|
events.append({
|
|
"timestamp": ts_match.group(1) if ts_match else "",
|
|
"event": fields.get("SecurityEvent", ""),
|
|
"severity": fields.get("Severity", ""),
|
|
"account": fields.get("AccountID", ""),
|
|
"remote": fields.get("RemoteAddress", ""),
|
|
"reason": fields.get("SecurityEvent", ""),
|
|
})
|
|
events.reverse()
|
|
return events[:limit]
|
|
|
|
|
|
def run_sudo(args, timeout=15):
|
|
"""Runs a whitelisted sudo command. Always list-form args, never
|
|
shell=True — no shell metacharacter interpretation is possible regardless
|
|
of what's in the arguments, on top of the sudoers-side restriction."""
|
|
try:
|
|
result = subprocess.run(
|
|
["sudo"] + args, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout
|
|
)
|
|
return result.returncode == 0, result.stdout, result.stderr
|
|
except (subprocess.TimeoutExpired, OSError) as e:
|
|
return False, "", str(e)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def get_decisions():
|
|
ok, out, err = run_sudo(["/usr/bin/cscli", "decisions", "list", "-o", "json"])
|
|
if not ok or not out.strip():
|
|
return []
|
|
try:
|
|
data = json.loads(out)
|
|
except json.JSONDecodeError:
|
|
return []
|
|
decisions = []
|
|
for alert in data or []:
|
|
# AS number/name and country live on the parent alert's "source"
|
|
# object, not on the individual decision — confirmed against real
|
|
# output (source.as_number, source.as_name, source.cn) rather than
|
|
# guessed, after getting evt.Enriched.ASNNumber's type wrong earlier
|
|
# tonight for the same underlying data.
|
|
source = alert.get("source") or {}
|
|
for d in alert.get("decisions") or []:
|
|
decisions.append({
|
|
"id": d.get("id"),
|
|
"value": d.get("value"),
|
|
"scenario": d.get("scenario"),
|
|
"duration": d.get("duration"),
|
|
"origin": d.get("origin"),
|
|
"as_number": source.get("as_number", ""),
|
|
"as_name": source.get("as_name", ""),
|
|
"country": source.get("cn", ""),
|
|
})
|
|
return decisions
|
|
|
|
|
|
def delete_decision(decision_id):
|
|
if not ID_RE.match(str(decision_id)):
|
|
return False, "Invalid decision ID"
|
|
ok, out, err = run_sudo(["/usr/bin/cscli", "decisions", "delete", "--id", str(decision_id)])
|
|
return ok, (err or out or ("deleted" if ok else "failed"))
|
|
|
|
|
|
def get_alert_history_names():
|
|
"""ASN -> as_name map built from historical alerts (cscli alerts list,
|
|
unlike decisions list, includes expired/resolved ones). A successfully
|
|
exempted ASN (e.g. T-Mobile once its bans stop firing) has no *active*
|
|
decision left to source a name from — this is the fallback that still
|
|
finds one, from the alert that was raised before the exemption took
|
|
effect."""
|
|
ok, out, err = run_sudo(["/usr/bin/cscli", "alerts", "list", "-o", "json"])
|
|
if not ok or not out.strip():
|
|
return {}
|
|
try:
|
|
data = json.loads(out)
|
|
except json.JSONDecodeError:
|
|
return {}
|
|
names = {}
|
|
for alert in data or []:
|
|
source = alert.get("source") or {}
|
|
asn = source.get("as_number")
|
|
name = source.get("as_name")
|
|
if asn and name:
|
|
names.setdefault(str(asn), name)
|
|
return names
|
|
|
|
|
|
def get_asn_exempt(known_names=None):
|
|
"""known_names: optional {asn: as_name} lookup, built from current
|
|
decisions, to label already-exempt ASNs that aren't actively generating
|
|
bans right now (and so wouldn't otherwise have a name available)."""
|
|
known_names = known_names or {}
|
|
asns = set()
|
|
for path in ASN_SCENARIO_FILES:
|
|
try:
|
|
with open(path) as f:
|
|
content = f.read()
|
|
except OSError:
|
|
continue
|
|
m = ASN_FILTER_RE.search(content)
|
|
if m:
|
|
for tok in m.group(1).split(","):
|
|
tok = tok.strip().strip("'").strip('"')
|
|
if tok:
|
|
asns.add(tok)
|
|
ordered = sorted(asns, key=lambda x: int(x) if x.isdigit() else 0)
|
|
return [{"asn": a, "name": known_names.get(a, "")} for a in ordered]
|
|
|
|
|
|
def set_asn_exempt(asn_list):
|
|
# Empty is valid and means "no ASNs exempted" — ASNNumber in [] is valid
|
|
# expr-language and always evaluates false, so the exclusion filter
|
|
# !(... in []) is always true and every Asterisk auth failure is
|
|
# evaluated normally again. Needed so removing the last remaining
|
|
# exempt ASN (the "unwhitelist" action) can actually reach zero instead
|
|
# of being stuck refusing an empty save.
|
|
clean = sorted(set(a.strip() for a in asn_list if ASN_RE.match(a.strip())))
|
|
# Editing ASN_SCENARIO_FILES directly from this process used to fail
|
|
# with "[Errno 13] Permission denied" (root:root, mode 644, this
|
|
# service user has no write grant) — every ASN whitelist attempt was
|
|
# silently a no-op as far as CrowdSec was concerned. Routed through the
|
|
# sudoers-whitelisted root helper instead, same pattern every other
|
|
# CrowdSec-touching action here already uses.
|
|
ok, out, err = run_sudo([ASN_HELPER_SCRIPT] + clean)
|
|
if not ok:
|
|
return False, "Failed updating ASN exemption: %s" % (err or out or "unknown error")
|
|
if not clean:
|
|
return True, "Cleared — no ASNs exempted, all Asterisk traffic is evaluated normally again."
|
|
return True, "Updated: %s" % ", ".join(clean)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def get_asn_source_ips(asn):
|
|
"""Every source IP CrowdSec has ever recorded for a given ASN, from alert
|
|
history (includes expired/resolved alerts) — used so "ban" can act on
|
|
previously-seen offenders immediately, not just future ones."""
|
|
ok, out, err = run_sudo(["/usr/bin/cscli", "alerts", "list", "-o", "json"])
|
|
if not ok or not out.strip():
|
|
return []
|
|
try:
|
|
data = json.loads(out)
|
|
except json.JSONDecodeError:
|
|
return []
|
|
ips = set()
|
|
for alert in data or []:
|
|
source = alert.get("source") or {}
|
|
if str(source.get("as_number", "")) == str(asn):
|
|
ip = source.get("ip")
|
|
if ip and IP_RE.match(ip):
|
|
ips.add(ip)
|
|
return sorted(ips)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def ban_ip(ip, reason, duration="24h"):
|
|
if not IP_RE.match(ip):
|
|
return False, "Invalid IP"
|
|
ok, out, err = run_sudo([
|
|
"/usr/bin/cscli", "decisions", "add",
|
|
"--ip", ip, "--duration", duration, "--type", "ban", "--reason", reason,
|
|
])
|
|
return ok, (err or out or ("banned" if ok else "failed"))
|
|
|
|
|
|
def ban_asn(asn):
|
|
"""For an accidental whitelist: drop the ASN from the exempt list (so
|
|
future traffic from it is evaluated normally again) and immediately ban
|
|
every IP CrowdSec has on record for it, so the response isn't limited to
|
|
"wait for it to misbehave again."""
|
|
asn = str(asn).strip()
|
|
if not ASN_RE.match(asn):
|
|
return {"ok": False, "message": "Invalid ASN"}
|
|
|
|
current = [d["asn"] for d in get_asn_exempt()]
|
|
if asn in current:
|
|
remaining = [a for a in current if a != asn]
|
|
unexempt_ok, unexempt_message = set_asn_exempt(remaining)
|
|
else:
|
|
unexempt_ok, unexempt_message = True, "ASN was not currently exempt"
|
|
|
|
banned, failed = [], []
|
|
for ip in get_asn_source_ips(asn):
|
|
ok, _msg = ban_ip(ip, "manual: AS%s exemption removed, known offender re-banned" % asn)
|
|
(banned if ok else failed).append(ip)
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
"ok": unexempt_ok,
|
|
"unexempt_message": unexempt_message,
|
|
"banned_ips": banned,
|
|
"failed_ips": failed,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
def list_extensions():
|
|
"""Extension numbers + display names, parsed from pjsip.conf the same
|
|
way Easy Asterisk's own rebuild_dialplan() finds them: a
|
|
"; === Device: NAME (category) ===" comment immediately followed (once
|
|
other lines are skipped) by that device's "[extnum]" section header.
|
|
Read-only, best-effort — an unparseable/missing file just means an empty
|
|
list, not an error, same convention as parse_security_log."""
|
|
if not ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR:
|
|
return []
|
|
path = os.path.join(ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR, "pjsip.conf")
|
|
if not os.path.isfile(path):
|
|
return []
|
|
try:
|
|
with open(path, "r", errors="replace") as f:
|
|
lines = f.readlines()
|
|
except OSError:
|
|
return []
|
|
extensions = []
|
|
pending_name = None
|
|
for line in lines:
|
|
line = line.rstrip("\n")
|
|
m = DEVICE_MARKER_RE.match(line)
|
|
if m:
|
|
pending_name = m.group(1).strip()
|
|
continue
|
|
m = EXT_HEADER_RE.match(line)
|
|
if m and pending_name is not None:
|
|
extensions.append({"ext": m.group(1), "name": pending_name})
|
|
pending_name = None
|
|
return extensions
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _permissions_path():
|
|
return os.path.join(ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR, "pstn-permissions.conf") if ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR else None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _read_permissions_cp():
|
|
cp = configparser.ConfigParser(delimiters=("=",))
|
|
path = _permissions_path()
|
|
if path and os.path.isfile(path):
|
|
try:
|
|
cp.read(path)
|
|
except configparser.Error:
|
|
pass
|
|
return cp
|
|
|
|
|
|
def get_all_permissions():
|
|
"""{ext: {"tier": ..., "allowed_numbers": "num|num|..."}} for every
|
|
extension with a non-internal tier on record. Extensions with no section
|
|
are implicitly "internal" — the dialplan's AST_CONFIG() lookup treats a
|
|
missing section as empty/denied the same way, so there's nothing to
|
|
return for them here; the UI fills in "internal" as the default for any
|
|
known extension (from list_extensions()) not present in this dict."""
|
|
cp = _read_permissions_cp()
|
|
result = {}
|
|
for section in cp.sections():
|
|
if not EXTEN_RE.match(section):
|
|
continue
|
|
result[section] = {
|
|
"tier": cp.get(section, "tier", fallback="internal"),
|
|
"allowed_numbers": cp.get(section, "allowed_numbers", fallback=""),
|
|
}
|
|
return result
|
|
|
|
|
|
def write_permission(ext, tier, numbers_raw):
|
|
"""Saves one extension's tier + (for restricted) approved-number list.
|
|
Numbers are normalized to a pipe-separated list of 11-digit US numbers —
|
|
pipe, not comma, because the dialplan uses this value directly as a
|
|
REGEX() alternation pattern (see services/pstn-trunk.sh's file-level
|
|
comment on why the untrusted call data is always the string being
|
|
tested, never interpolated into the pattern side)."""
|
|
if not ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR:
|
|
return False, "No Asterisk install detected on this box"
|
|
ext = str(ext).strip()
|
|
if not EXTEN_RE.match(ext):
|
|
return False, "Invalid extension"
|
|
if not TIER_RE.match(tier):
|
|
return False, "Invalid tier"
|
|
|
|
tokens = re.split(r"[,\s|]+", (numbers_raw or "").strip())
|
|
clean_numbers = [t for t in tokens if NUMBER_RE.match(t)]
|
|
numbers = "|".join(clean_numbers)
|
|
|
|
cp = _read_permissions_cp()
|
|
if tier == "internal":
|
|
if cp.has_section(ext):
|
|
cp.remove_section(ext)
|
|
else:
|
|
if not cp.has_section(ext):
|
|
cp.add_section(ext)
|
|
cp.set(ext, "tier", tier)
|
|
if tier == "restricted":
|
|
cp.set(ext, "allowed_numbers", numbers)
|
|
elif cp.has_option(ext, "allowed_numbers"):
|
|
cp.remove_option(ext, "allowed_numbers")
|
|
|
|
path = _permissions_path()
|
|
tmp_path = path + ".tmp"
|
|
try:
|
|
with open(tmp_path, "w") as f:
|
|
f.write(
|
|
"; PSTN permission tiers - internal / restricted / full.\n"
|
|
"; Read LIVE by the dialplan on every call (AST_CONFIG()) - no\n"
|
|
"; Asterisk restart needed. Managed here (Security Dashboard); also\n"
|
|
"; safe to edit by hand. 'sudo ./setup.sh pstn-trunk' update mode\n"
|
|
"; never touches this file, only a fresh reinstall does.\n"
|
|
"; Any extension not listed here is internal-only (no PSTN) by default.\n\n"
|
|
)
|
|
cp.write(f)
|
|
os.replace(tmp_path, path)
|
|
except OSError as e:
|
|
try:
|
|
os.remove(tmp_path)
|
|
except OSError:
|
|
pass
|
|
return False, "Failed writing %s: %s" % (path, e)
|
|
|
|
if tier == "restricted" and not clean_numbers:
|
|
return True, "Saved as restricted with an EMPTY approved list — no PSTN number can reach/be reached by it yet."
|
|
return True, "Saved"
|
|
|
|
|
|
LIMIT_RE = re.compile(r"^\d+$")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def pstn_installed():
|
|
"""True only once services/pstn-trunk.sh has actually wired the dialplan
|
|
in (pstn-trunk-dialplan.conf existing), not just because base Asterisk is
|
|
present — pjsip.conf/extensions.conf exist either way, so extension names
|
|
alone can't tell us this. Without this check the tab would show a real
|
|
extension list and a default-but-unenforced 10/10 cap even when there is
|
|
no PSTN trunk at all."""
|
|
if not ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR:
|
|
return False
|
|
return os.path.isfile(os.path.join(ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR, "pstn-trunk-dialplan.conf"))
|
|
|
|
|
|
def get_limits():
|
|
"""Current outbound/inbound concurrent-call caps. Defaults (10/10) match
|
|
what the dialplan itself falls back to (via AST_CONFIG()+IF()) if this
|
|
file is missing or a key is absent, so a display here is never wrong
|
|
even before pstn-limits.conf exists."""
|
|
if not ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR:
|
|
return {"max_outbound": 10, "max_inbound": 10}
|
|
path = os.path.join(ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR, "pstn-limits.conf")
|
|
cp = configparser.ConfigParser(delimiters=("=",))
|
|
if os.path.isfile(path):
|
|
try:
|
|
cp.read(path)
|
|
except configparser.Error:
|
|
pass
|
|
return {
|
|
"max_outbound": cp.getint("limits", "max_outbound", fallback=10),
|
|
"max_inbound": cp.getint("limits", "max_inbound", fallback=10),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
def write_limits(max_outbound, max_inbound):
|
|
if not ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR:
|
|
return False, "No Asterisk install detected on this box"
|
|
max_outbound, max_inbound = str(max_outbound).strip(), str(max_inbound).strip()
|
|
if not LIMIT_RE.match(max_outbound) or not LIMIT_RE.match(max_inbound):
|
|
return False, "Both caps must be whole numbers"
|
|
|
|
path = os.path.join(ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR, "pstn-limits.conf")
|
|
tmp_path = path + ".tmp"
|
|
try:
|
|
with open(tmp_path, "w") as f:
|
|
f.write(
|
|
"; PSTN concurrent-call caps, both directions.\n"
|
|
"; Read LIVE by the dialplan on every call (AST_CONFIG()) - no Asterisk\n"
|
|
"; restart needed. Managed here (Security Dashboard); also safe to edit\n"
|
|
"; by hand. 'sudo ./setup.sh pstn-trunk' update mode never touches this\n"
|
|
"; file, only a fresh reinstall does.\n\n"
|
|
"[limits]\n"
|
|
"max_outbound=%s\n"
|
|
"max_inbound=%s\n" % (max_outbound, max_inbound)
|
|
)
|
|
os.replace(tmp_path, path)
|
|
except OSError as e:
|
|
try:
|
|
os.remove(tmp_path)
|
|
except OSError:
|
|
pass
|
|
return False, "Failed writing %s: %s" % (path, e)
|
|
return True, "Saved"
|
|
|
|
|
|
INDEX_HTML = """<!doctype html>
|
|
<html><head><meta charset="utf-8">
|
|
<title>Security Dashboard</title>
|
|
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
|
|
<style>
|
|
body { font-family: system-ui, sans-serif; margin: 0; background: #0f1115; color: #e6e6e6; }
|
|
header { padding: 1rem 1.5rem; background: #171a21; border-bottom: 1px solid #2a2e38; display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 1rem; }
|
|
header h1 { font-size: 1.1rem; margin: 0; flex: 1; }
|
|
nav button { background: none; border: none; color: #9aa4b2; padding: 0.6rem 1rem; cursor: pointer; font-size: 0.95rem; border-bottom: 2px solid transparent; }
|
|
nav button.active { color: #fff; border-bottom-color: #4f8cff; }
|
|
main { padding: 1.5rem; max-width: 1100px; margin: 0 auto; }
|
|
table { width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; font-size: 0.85rem; }
|
|
th, td { text-align: left; padding: 0.5rem 0.6rem; border-bottom: 1px solid #23262f; }
|
|
th { color: #9aa4b2; font-weight: 600; }
|
|
th.sortable { cursor: pointer; user-select: none; }
|
|
th.sortable:hover { color: #e6e6e6; }
|
|
th.sortable .arrow { opacity: 0.5; font-size: 0.75em; margin-left: 0.25em; }
|
|
.sev-Error { color: #ff6b6b; }
|
|
.sev-Warning { color: #f5b342; }
|
|
.sev-Informational { color: #7fbf7f; }
|
|
button.action { background: #2a2e38; color: #e6e6e6; border: 1px solid #3a3f4b; border-radius: 4px; padding: 0.3rem 0.7rem; cursor: pointer; }
|
|
button.action:hover { background: #3a3f4b; }
|
|
.card { background: #171a21; border: 1px solid #2a2e38; border-radius: 8px; padding: 1rem; margin-bottom: 1rem; }
|
|
input[type=text] { background: #0f1115; border: 1px solid #3a3f4b; color: #e6e6e6; padding: 0.4rem 0.6rem; border-radius: 4px; width: 100%; box-sizing: border-box; }
|
|
.row { display: flex; gap: 0.5rem; align-items: center; }
|
|
.muted { color: #9aa4b2; font-size: 0.85rem; }
|
|
a { color: #4f8cff; }
|
|
#msg { margin-top: 0.5rem; font-size: 0.85rem; }
|
|
</style>
|
|
</head>
|
|
<body>
|
|
<header>
|
|
<h1>Security Dashboard</h1>
|
|
<nav>
|
|
<button class="tab-btn active" data-tab="security">Security Log</button>
|
|
<button class="tab-btn" data-tab="crowdsec">CrowdSec</button>
|
|
<button class="tab-btn" data-tab="pstn">PSTN Trunk</button>
|
|
</nav>
|
|
<a id="admin-link" href="#" target="_blank" style="display:none">Asterisk Web Admin ↗</a>
|
|
</header>
|
|
<main>
|
|
<div id="tab-security">
|
|
<div class="card">
|
|
<p class="muted">Recent Asterisk SIP security events, newest first. Errors/warnings are real auth failures; informational lines are normal registration traffic.</p>
|
|
<table id="sec-table"><thead><tr><th>Time</th><th>Event</th><th>Account</th><th>Remote</th><th>Severity</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table>
|
|
</div>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<div id="tab-crowdsec" style="display:none">
|
|
<div class="card">
|
|
<h3 style="margin-top:0">Active bans</h3>
|
|
<table id="dec-table"><thead><tr>
|
|
<th class="sortable" data-sort="value">IP/Range</th>
|
|
<th class="sortable" data-sort="scenario">Scenario</th>
|
|
<th class="sortable" data-sort="carrier">Network / Carrier</th>
|
|
<th class="sortable" data-sort="country">Country</th>
|
|
<th class="sortable" data-sort="duration">Duration</th>
|
|
<th class="sortable" data-sort="origin">Origin</th>
|
|
<th></th>
|
|
</tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<div class="card">
|
|
<h3 style="margin-top:0">Asterisk brute-force ASN exemptions</h3>
|
|
<p class="muted">Carrier ASNs exempted from the Asterisk brute-force scenarios only — SSH/web/geo protection is unaffected. See CLAUDE.md / services/crowdsec.sh for background.</p>
|
|
<div class="row">
|
|
<input type="text" id="asn-input" placeholder="e.g. 21928, 14593">
|
|
<button class="action" id="asn-save">Save</button>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<table id="asn-table" style="margin-top:0.75rem"><thead><tr><th>ASN</th><th>Carrier</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table>
|
|
<div id="msg"></div>
|
|
</div>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<div id="tab-pstn" style="display:none">
|
|
<div class="card" id="pstn-not-installed" style="display:none">
|
|
<h3 style="margin-top:0">PSTN trunk not installed</h3>
|
|
<p class="muted">No PSTN trunk dialplan was found on this box — <code>sudo ./setup.sh pstn-trunk</code> hasn't been run (or its config was removed). Nothing below is enforced yet; install it first, then this tab will manage the real permission tiers and concurrency caps.</p>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<div id="pstn-installed-cards" style="display:none">
|
|
<div class="card">
|
|
<h3 style="margin-top:0">Concurrent-call caps</h3>
|
|
<p class="muted">A call over either cap gets a busy signal (and an ntfy alert, if enabled) — existing calls are never affected. Changes apply live, on the next call.</p>
|
|
<div class="row">
|
|
<label class="muted" style="white-space:nowrap">Max outbound<br><input type="text" id="limit-out" style="width:5rem"></label>
|
|
<label class="muted" style="white-space:nowrap">Max inbound<br><input type="text" id="limit-in" style="width:5rem"></label>
|
|
<button class="action" id="limits-save" style="align-self:flex-end">Save</button>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<div id="limits-msg" class="muted" style="margin-top:0.5rem"></div>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<div class="card">
|
|
<h3 style="margin-top:0">PSTN permission tiers</h3>
|
|
<p class="muted">
|
|
<b>internal</b> — no PSTN, can still call/receive other extensions and internal ring groups.
|
|
<b>restricted</b> — internal, plus only pre-approved US numbers.
|
|
<b>full</b> — internal, plus any US number.
|
|
Changes apply live, on the next call — no Asterisk restart needed.
|
|
</p>
|
|
<table id="pstn-table"><thead><tr><th>Ext</th><th>Name</th><th>Tier</th><th>Approved numbers (restricted only)</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table>
|
|
<div id="pstn-msg" class="muted" style="margin-top:0.5rem"></div>
|
|
</div>
|
|
</div>
|
|
</div>
|
|
</main>
|
|
<script>
|
|
function esc(s) { return (s || "").replace(/[&<>"]/g, c => ({"&":"&","<":"<",">":">",'"':"""}[c])); }
|
|
|
|
const TABS = ["security", "crowdsec", "pstn"];
|
|
document.querySelectorAll(".tab-btn").forEach(btn => {
|
|
btn.addEventListener("click", () => {
|
|
document.querySelectorAll(".tab-btn").forEach(b => b.classList.remove("active"));
|
|
btn.classList.add("active");
|
|
TABS.forEach(t => { document.getElementById("tab-" + t).style.display = btn.dataset.tab === t ? "" : "none"; });
|
|
if (btn.dataset.tab === "pstn") { loadPstnStatus(); }
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
async function loadSecurity() {
|
|
const res = await fetch("/api/security-events");
|
|
const events = await res.json();
|
|
const tbody = document.querySelector("#sec-table tbody");
|
|
tbody.innerHTML = events.map(e => `<tr>
|
|
<td>${esc(e.timestamp)}</td>
|
|
<td>${esc(e.event)}</td>
|
|
<td>${esc(e.account)}</td>
|
|
<td>${esc(e.remote)}</td>
|
|
<td class="sev-${esc(e.severity)}">${esc(e.severity)}</td>
|
|
</tr>`).join("") || "<tr><td colspan=5 class=muted>No events found.</td></tr>";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let lastDecisions = [];
|
|
let decSort = { key: null, dir: 1 };
|
|
|
|
// Go-style duration strings ("3h59m59.62s", "-1" for permanent) don't sort
|
|
// correctly as text, so parse to seconds for the Duration column; permanent
|
|
// bans (-1 or unparseable) sort as Infinity, i.e. last in ascending order.
|
|
function durationSeconds(s) {
|
|
if (!s || s === "-1") return Infinity;
|
|
const m = String(s).match(/^(-?\d+h)?(\d+m)?(\d+(?:\.\d+)?s)?$/);
|
|
if (!m || !(m[1] || m[2] || m[3])) return Infinity;
|
|
const h = parseFloat(m[1]) || 0, mi = parseFloat(m[2]) || 0, se = parseFloat(m[3]) || 0;
|
|
return h * 3600 + mi * 60 + se;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function decSortValue(d, key) {
|
|
switch (key) {
|
|
case "carrier": return (d.as_name || d.as_number || "").toLowerCase();
|
|
case "duration": return durationSeconds(d.duration);
|
|
default: return (d[key] || "").toString().toLowerCase();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function renderDecisions() {
|
|
let rows = lastDecisions.slice();
|
|
if (decSort.key) {
|
|
rows.sort((a, b) => {
|
|
const av = decSortValue(a, decSort.key), bv = decSortValue(b, decSort.key);
|
|
if (av < bv) return -1 * decSort.dir;
|
|
if (av > bv) return 1 * decSort.dir;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
document.querySelectorAll("#dec-table th.sortable .arrow").forEach(a => a.remove());
|
|
if (decSort.key) {
|
|
const th = document.querySelector(`#dec-table th[data-sort="${decSort.key}"]`);
|
|
if (th) th.insertAdjacentHTML("beforeend", `<span class="arrow">${decSort.dir === 1 ? "▲" : "▼"}</span>`);
|
|
}
|
|
const tbody = document.querySelector("#dec-table tbody");
|
|
tbody.innerHTML = rows.map(d => `<tr>
|
|
<td>${esc(d.value)}</td>
|
|
<td>${esc(d.scenario)}</td>
|
|
<td>${d.as_number ? esc(d.as_number) + (d.as_name ? " — " + esc(d.as_name) : "") : ""}</td>
|
|
<td>${esc(d.country)}</td>
|
|
<td>${esc(d.duration)}</td>
|
|
<td>${esc(d.origin)}</td>
|
|
<td>
|
|
<button class="action" onclick="unban(${d.id})">Unban</button>
|
|
${d.as_number ? `<button class="action" onclick="exemptAsn('${esc(d.as_number)}')">Exempt ASN</button>` : ""}
|
|
</td>
|
|
</tr>`).join("") || "<tr><td colspan=7 class=muted>No active bans.</td></tr>";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
document.querySelectorAll("#dec-table th.sortable").forEach(th => {
|
|
th.addEventListener("click", () => {
|
|
const key = th.dataset.sort;
|
|
decSort.dir = (decSort.key === key) ? -decSort.dir : 1;
|
|
decSort.key = key;
|
|
renderDecisions();
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
async function loadDecisions() {
|
|
const res = await fetch("/api/decisions");
|
|
lastDecisions = await res.json();
|
|
renderDecisions();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function unban(id) {
|
|
if (!confirm("Unban decision #" + id + "?")) return;
|
|
const res = await fetch("/api/decisions/delete", {method: "POST", headers: {"Content-Type": "application/json"}, body: JSON.stringify({id: id})});
|
|
const data = await res.json();
|
|
alert(data.message || (data.ok ? "Unbanned" : "Failed"));
|
|
loadDecisions();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function exemptAsn(asn) {
|
|
const current = document.getElementById("asn-input").value.split(",").map(s => s.trim()).filter(Boolean);
|
|
if (current.includes(asn)) { alert("ASN " + asn + " is already exempt."); return; }
|
|
if (!confirm("Add ASN " + asn + " to the Asterisk brute-force exemption list? This only affects Asterisk auth-failure detection — SSH/web/geo protection is unaffected.")) return;
|
|
current.push(asn);
|
|
document.getElementById("asn-input").value = current.join(", ");
|
|
document.getElementById("asn-save").click();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function loadAsnExempt() {
|
|
const res = await fetch("/api/asn-exempt");
|
|
const data = await res.json();
|
|
const asns = data.asns || [];
|
|
document.getElementById("asn-input").value = asns.map(a => a.asn).join(", ");
|
|
const tbody = document.querySelector("#asn-table tbody");
|
|
tbody.innerHTML = asns.map(a => `<tr>
|
|
<td>${esc(a.asn)}</td>
|
|
<td>${esc(a.name) || '<span class="muted">(unknown)</span>'}</td>
|
|
<td>
|
|
<button class="action" onclick="unexemptAsn('${esc(a.asn)}')">Unwhitelist</button>
|
|
<button class="action" onclick="banAsn('${esc(a.asn)}')">Unwhitelist + Ban</button>
|
|
</td>
|
|
</tr>`).join("") || "<tr><td colspan=3 class=muted>No ASNs currently exempted.</td></tr>";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
document.getElementById("asn-save").addEventListener("click", async () => {
|
|
const raw = document.getElementById("asn-input").value;
|
|
const asns = raw.split(",").map(s => s.trim()).filter(Boolean);
|
|
const res = await fetch("/api/asn-exempt", {method: "POST", headers: {"Content-Type": "application/json"}, body: JSON.stringify({asns: asns})});
|
|
const data = await res.json();
|
|
document.getElementById("msg").textContent = data.message || (data.ok ? "Saved" : "Failed");
|
|
loadAsnExempt();
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
async function unexemptAsn(asn) {
|
|
if (!confirm("Remove ASN " + asn + " from the exemption list? Future Asterisk auth failures from it will be evaluated normally again (no immediate ban of past offenders).")) return;
|
|
const current = (document.getElementById("asn-input").value || "").split(",").map(s => s.trim()).filter(s => s && s !== asn);
|
|
const res = await fetch("/api/asn-exempt", {method: "POST", headers: {"Content-Type": "application/json"}, body: JSON.stringify({asns: current})});
|
|
const data = await res.json();
|
|
document.getElementById("msg").textContent = data.message || (data.ok ? "Saved" : "Failed");
|
|
loadAsnExempt();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function banAsn(asn) {
|
|
if (!confirm("Remove ASN " + asn + " from the exemption list AND immediately ban (24h) every IP CrowdSec has ever recorded for it? Use this for an accidental whitelist.")) return;
|
|
const res = await fetch("/api/asn-exempt/ban", {method: "POST", headers: {"Content-Type": "application/json"}, body: JSON.stringify({asn: asn})});
|
|
const data = await res.json();
|
|
const parts = [data.unexempt_message || (data.ok ? "Unwhitelisted" : "Unwhitelist failed")];
|
|
if (data.banned_ips && data.banned_ips.length) parts.push("Banned: " + data.banned_ips.join(", "));
|
|
if (data.failed_ips && data.failed_ips.length) parts.push("Failed to ban: " + data.failed_ips.join(", "));
|
|
if (!data.banned_ips || !data.banned_ips.length) parts.push("No previously-recorded IPs found for this ASN to ban.");
|
|
document.getElementById("msg").textContent = parts.join(" — ");
|
|
loadAsnExempt();
|
|
loadDecisions();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function loadPstnStatus() {
|
|
const res = await fetch("/api/pstn-status");
|
|
const data = await res.json();
|
|
document.getElementById("pstn-not-installed").style.display = data.installed ? "none" : "";
|
|
document.getElementById("pstn-installed-cards").style.display = data.installed ? "" : "none";
|
|
if (data.installed) { loadPstnLimits(); loadPstnPermissions(); }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function loadPstnLimits() {
|
|
const res = await fetch("/api/pstn-limits");
|
|
const data = await res.json();
|
|
document.getElementById("limit-out").value = data.max_outbound;
|
|
document.getElementById("limit-in").value = data.max_inbound;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
document.getElementById("limits-save").addEventListener("click", async () => {
|
|
const maxOut = document.getElementById("limit-out").value;
|
|
const maxIn = document.getElementById("limit-in").value;
|
|
const res = await fetch("/api/pstn-limits", {
|
|
method: "POST", headers: {"Content-Type": "application/json"},
|
|
body: JSON.stringify({max_outbound: maxOut, max_inbound: maxIn}),
|
|
});
|
|
const data = await res.json();
|
|
document.getElementById("limits-msg").textContent = data.message || (data.ok ? "Saved" : "Failed");
|
|
loadPstnLimits();
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
async function loadPstnPermissions() {
|
|
const res = await fetch("/api/pstn-permissions");
|
|
const data = await res.json();
|
|
const exts = data.extensions || [];
|
|
const tbody = document.querySelector("#pstn-table tbody");
|
|
if (!exts.length) {
|
|
tbody.innerHTML = '<tr><td colspan=5 class=muted>No extensions found (no Asterisk install detected, or pjsip.conf has no devices yet).</td></tr>';
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
tbody.innerHTML = exts.map(e => `<tr data-ext="${esc(e.ext)}">
|
|
<td>${esc(e.ext)}</td>
|
|
<td>${esc(e.name)}</td>
|
|
<td>
|
|
<select class="pstn-tier">
|
|
<option value="internal" ${e.tier === "internal" ? "selected" : ""}>internal</option>
|
|
<option value="restricted" ${e.tier === "restricted" ? "selected" : ""}>restricted</option>
|
|
<option value="full" ${e.tier === "full" ? "selected" : ""}>full</option>
|
|
</select>
|
|
</td>
|
|
<td><input type="text" class="pstn-numbers" value="${esc(e.allowed_numbers)}" placeholder="15551234567,15559876543" ${e.tier === "restricted" ? "" : "disabled"}></td>
|
|
<td><button class="action" onclick="savePstnPermission('${esc(e.ext)}')">Save</button></td>
|
|
</tr>`).join("");
|
|
|
|
tbody.querySelectorAll("tr").forEach(row => {
|
|
const tierSel = row.querySelector(".pstn-tier");
|
|
const numsInput = row.querySelector(".pstn-numbers");
|
|
tierSel.addEventListener("change", () => { numsInput.disabled = tierSel.value !== "restricted"; });
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function savePstnPermission(ext) {
|
|
const row = document.querySelector(`#pstn-table tr[data-ext="${ext}"]`);
|
|
const tier = row.querySelector(".pstn-tier").value;
|
|
const numbers = row.querySelector(".pstn-numbers").value;
|
|
const res = await fetch("/api/pstn-permissions", {
|
|
method: "POST", headers: {"Content-Type": "application/json"},
|
|
body: JSON.stringify({ext: ext, tier: tier, allowed_numbers: numbers}),
|
|
});
|
|
const data = await res.json();
|
|
document.getElementById("pstn-msg").textContent = (data.message || (data.ok ? "Saved" : "Failed")) + " (extension " + ext + ")";
|
|
loadPstnPermissions();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const adminUrl = "__ASTERISK_ADMIN_URL__";
|
|
if (adminUrl) {
|
|
const link = document.getElementById("admin-link");
|
|
link.href = adminUrl;
|
|
link.style.display = "";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
loadSecurity();
|
|
loadDecisions();
|
|
loadAsnExempt();
|
|
setInterval(loadSecurity, 30000);
|
|
setInterval(loadDecisions, 30000);
|
|
</script>
|
|
</body></html>
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
|
|
def _json(self, obj, status=200):
|
|
body = json.dumps(obj).encode()
|
|
self.send_response(status)
|
|
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
|
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
|
|
self.end_headers()
|
|
self.wfile.write(body)
|
|
|
|
def _html(self, html, status=200):
|
|
body = html.encode()
|
|
self.send_response(status)
|
|
self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
|
|
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
|
|
self.end_headers()
|
|
self.wfile.write(body)
|
|
|
|
def do_GET(self):
|
|
if self.path == "/" or self.path == "":
|
|
html = INDEX_HTML.replace("__ASTERISK_ADMIN_URL__", ASTERISK_ADMIN_URL)
|
|
self._html(html)
|
|
elif self.path == "/api/security-events":
|
|
self._json(parse_security_log())
|
|
elif self.path == "/api/decisions":
|
|
self._json(get_decisions())
|
|
elif self.path == "/api/asn-exempt":
|
|
decisions = get_decisions()
|
|
known_names = {d["as_number"]: d["as_name"] for d in decisions if d.get("as_number")}
|
|
for asn, name in get_alert_history_names().items():
|
|
known_names.setdefault(asn, name)
|
|
self._json({"asns": get_asn_exempt(known_names)})
|
|
elif self.path == "/api/pstn-permissions":
|
|
perms = get_all_permissions()
|
|
extensions = []
|
|
for e in list_extensions():
|
|
p = perms.get(e["ext"], {"tier": "internal", "allowed_numbers": ""})
|
|
extensions.append({"ext": e["ext"], "name": e["name"],
|
|
"tier": p["tier"], "allowed_numbers": p["allowed_numbers"]})
|
|
self._json({"extensions": extensions})
|
|
elif self.path == "/api/pstn-limits":
|
|
self._json(get_limits())
|
|
elif self.path == "/api/pstn-status":
|
|
self._json({"installed": pstn_installed()})
|
|
else:
|
|
self._json({"error": "not found"}, 404)
|
|
|
|
def do_POST(self):
|
|
length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", 0))
|
|
raw = self.rfile.read(length) if length else b"{}"
|
|
try:
|
|
payload = json.loads(raw or b"{}")
|
|
except json.JSONDecodeError:
|
|
payload = {}
|
|
|
|
if self.path == "/api/decisions/delete":
|
|
ok, message = delete_decision(payload.get("id", ""))
|
|
self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message})
|
|
elif self.path == "/api/asn-exempt":
|
|
ok, message = set_asn_exempt(payload.get("asns", []))
|
|
self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message})
|
|
elif self.path == "/api/asn-exempt/ban":
|
|
self._json(ban_asn(payload.get("asn", "")))
|
|
elif self.path == "/api/pstn-permissions":
|
|
ok, message = write_permission(
|
|
payload.get("ext", ""), payload.get("tier", ""), payload.get("allowed_numbers", "")
|
|
)
|
|
self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message})
|
|
elif self.path == "/api/pstn-limits":
|
|
ok, message = write_limits(payload.get("max_outbound", ""), payload.get("max_inbound", ""))
|
|
self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message})
|
|
else:
|
|
self._json({"error": "not found"}, 404)
|
|
|
|
def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
|
|
pass # systemd journal captures stdout/stderr already; keep it quiet
|
|
|
|
|
|
def main():
|
|
ThreadingHTTPServer.allow_reuse_address = True
|
|
# 0.0.0.0, not 127.0.0.1: Caddy runs in a container and reaches this via
|
|
# host.docker.internal (a Docker bridge gateway IP, not localhost) — a
|
|
# loopback-only bind refuses that connection outright. Confirmed live:
|
|
# "dial tcp 172.17.0.1:8092: connect: connection refused" even though
|
|
# curl from the host itself worked fine on 127.0.0.1. Access is scoped by
|
|
# UFW (see install_security-dashboard), not by which interface this binds
|
|
# to — same pattern every other host-network service in this repo uses.
|
|
with ThreadingHTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", PORT), Handler) as httpd:
|
|
print(f"Security dashboard running on 0.0.0.0:{PORT}")
|
|
httpd.serve_forever()
|
|
|
|
|
|
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
|
main()
|
|
PYAPP
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
[[ "${_RUN_STANDALONE:-0}" == 1 ]] && install_security-dashboard
|