- ea_device_sipnetic_string() now sets Sipnetic's documented st= field to
an explicit turn:user:pass@host:port URI built from the same
TURN_SERVER/TURN_USERNAME/TURN_PASSWORD Asterisk itself reads from its
.env (the shared VPS coturn on a droplet, or whichever coturn Asterisk
is actually configured against). Previously the QR carried no TURN
info at all, silently falling back to Sipnetic's own default STUN
server instead -- registration/media then depends on whatever got
typed in by hand instead of what Asterisk is actually using.
- Popup widened (192px content -> 320px card) and the QR rendered at 3x
its displayed resolution (physical size unchanged): the longer
TURN-inclusive account string needs a denser code, and verified via a
headless render + OpenCV/pyzbar decode that the extra module density
needs the resolution bump to stay reliably scannable.
- Restored (and expanded) the plain-text-credentials warning that was
dropped when the box became a modal, now covering TURN creds too.
The QR popup's code was unreadable by real scanners: qrcodejs draws
modules edge-to-edge with no margin of its own, so the code sat directly
against the modal's dark background with no quiet zone. Verified with a
headless render + pyzbar/OpenCV decode that the raw generated image had
the code running to its edge and failed OpenCV's detector outright, while
wrapping it in a 20px white padded frame (still ~2in overall) fixed it.
Converts the existing inline QR toggle on the Extensions tab's detail
panel into a small (2in square) modal popup with an X close button,
click-outside, and Escape-to-close, instead of an expanding inline box.
Extends the security-dashboard prototype to the shared-coturn trio, since
these three are exactly the case that pattern was built for — a fresh
reinstall of any of them today just overwrote files in place without
stopping old containers first, and coturn's own fresh path never made an
informed choice about the consumer credentials/database it happens to
leave alone (safe today, but by omission rather than design).
- asterisk.sh / mattermost.sh: "Full reinstall" now stops the existing
containers (`docker compose down`) before falling through to the normal
install flow, and asks a single explicit question — delete stored data
(PBX config/spool/voicemail for Asterisk; Postgres db/uploads/config/
plugins for Mattermost) — defaulting to preserve. Their shared-coturn
TURN credential is deliberately left alone either way (reused from
cache via ensure_coturn_user(), same as update) — it's not this
service's own data, and coturn already handles that continuity.
Mattermost's existing "_db_has_data" check already reads the
filesystem to decide whether to reuse or regenerate DB_PASS, so the
wipe/preserve choice composes with that for free — no separate flag
needed. Asterisk's warns to re-run pstn-trunk afterward if data is
wiped, since that's what actually goes stale (its dialplan patch),
not the fabricated "AMI secret" framing an earlier draft of this
warning used before I checked the actual code.
- coturn.sh: "Full reinstall" now lists which consumers are currently
registered (from users/*.env) and asks explicitly whether to also
wipe TURN credentials and the user database, instead of silently
preserving them as an unexamined side effect of never deleting the
directory. Defaults to preserve. If the operator does choose to wipe,
the running container is restarted afterward — it holds the old,
now-deleted turndb file open, so new turnadmin writes to the fresh
file would otherwise go unseen until a restart anyway. Every affected
consumer already self-heals a missing credential on its own next
Update run via ensure_coturn_user()'s existing cache-miss path — no
changes needed there, just confirmed it covers this case.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
Two-part change discussed and scoped in this session before touching
anything:
1. Rename "Reinstall in place" (r) -> "Update" (u) and "Full install" (f)
-> "Full reinstall" everywhere the prompt appears: lib/common.sh's
shared prompt_reinstall_mode(), plus the three services that carry
their own duplicated standalone-stub copy of it for standalone
execution (asterisk.sh, coturn.sh, wordpress.sh — per this repo's
documented standalone-bootstrap pattern). Internal state values
(update/fresh/cancel) are unchanged, so no other service's case
statement needed touching. docs/anveo-direct-setup-guide.md's `r`
reference updated to `u` to match. attic/asterisk-digital-ocean.sh
deliberately left alone — this repo's own policy is to not backport
fixes into attic/.
2. security-dashboard.sh's "Full reinstall" now does a real teardown
before reinstalling — stops and removes the systemd unit, sudoers
grant, Caddy site block, and secdash system user, then proceeds
through the normal fresh-install flow — instead of just overwriting
files in place while leaving the old service running underneath.
Prototype for a pattern discussed for other services later: split the
destructive question out explicitly ("also delete
dashboard-admins.conf — per-admin extension scoping?", default n) so
full reinstall doesn't silently discard state a plain "start over"
request wouldn't expect to lose. Verified the backup/restore mechanics
(mktemp, copy out before teardown, copy back after) against a mock
under `set -u` for both the preserve and wipe paths before shipping.
Update mode was already the strongest existing example of surfacing
newer optional prompts (its "Reconfigure Caddy protection?" /
"Reconfigure per-admin scoping?" sub-prompts already cover every setting
fresh-install offers) — no changes needed there for this service.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
Direct follow-up to the previous commit's ensure_coturn_user() fix: that
fix is useless for Asterisk specifically unless something actually calls
ensure_coturn_user("asterisk") again, and the update ("Reinstall in
place") branch returns 0 well before the fresh-install path's call to it
— only "Full install" reached it, which re-prompts everything (droplet
detection, domain, etc.) just to fix a credential re-registration.
Added the same call to the update path, gated on NOT having an embedded
coturn (checked via the existing _HAD_EMBEDDED_COTURN detection) — calling
it unconditionally would silently chain-install the shared coturn service
for a box deliberately running Asterisk's own dedicated coturn, exactly
the kind of silent update-time migration CLAUDE.md's coturn guidance
warns against. .env stays untouched either way (self-heal re-registers
with the same cached password, never generates a new one).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
Answers a direct question from this session: no, reinstalling
asterisk/mattermost did NOT fix a coturn user missing from the live
database, because ensure_coturn_user() only ever calls turnadmin -a in
the else branch — reached only when the cache file (users/<consumer>.env)
is MISSING. A stale-but-present cache file (exactly what a coturn
container/volume recreation without preserving ./db leaves behind, per
this session's real diagnosis) looked identical to a healthy one and was
trusted blindly, so every consumer's installer kept silently reusing
credentials that no longer existed in coturn's database.
Now checks the cached username against coturn's actual live user list on
every call, and re-registers it with the same cached password if it's
missing — the same self-heal pattern this repo already applies elsewhere
(Beszel's compose patch, Vaultwarden's SMTP half-state, FMD's chown).
Re-uses the turnadmin -l log-noise filter from tools/coturn-test-check.sh
(a real "user[realm]" line never contains a space; at least one coturn
build writes its own startup log lines to stdout, not stderr, so a bare
2>/dev/null doesn't catch them).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
Live run surfaced it: this coturn build writes its own startup log lines
("INFO SQLite connection was closed.", "INFO log file opened: ...") to
turnadmin -l's STDOUT, not stderr — 2>/dev/null never caught them, so
they got parsed as if they were usernames, producing nonsensical
"Database has user '2026-...INFO SQLite connection was closed.'" warnings
on a real run. A genuine "user[realm]" line never contains a space; every
log line does, so filtering on that is a simple, build-independent fix.
Also diagnosed the actual underlying failure this surfaced: coturn's live
user database was genuinely empty (both 'asterisk' and 'mattermost' had
cached credential files but neither was registered in the DB) — exactly
the container/volume-recreated-without-db drift this script's consumer
cross-check exists to catch, confirmed against a real run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
Latest live run showed the test getting killed by its own `timeout 10`
before turnutils_uclient printed any result — just two startup INFO
lines, no error. That's the coturn/coturn Docker image's turnutils_uclient
(apparently a newer build with structured "LEVEL component: message"
logging, different from the older packaged version available for local
testing) taking longer than 10s to complete, not a real failure.
Bumped both scripts' timeout to 20s, and now check for timeout(1)'s own
exit code (124) separately from a real reported error — reported as WARN
with a suggested manual command to re-run with more time and see the full
result, instead of lumping "still running" in with "actually failed."
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
Not another guess: installed coturn locally (apt-get install coturn) and
ran the actual server + turnutils_uclient against it to verify this
before shipping, since the last two rounds shipped based on reading the
usage text alone and both turned out incomplete.
-e 127.0.0.1 satisfies turnutils_uclient's "-e or -y required" check, but
then fails allocation with "channel bind: error 403 (Forbidden IP)" —
services/coturn.sh never sets --allow-loopback-peers, so loopback as a
peer address is correctly rejected by a real coturn instance, and the
previous fix's own comment about "loopback is always reachable" missed
that reachable and permitted aren't the same thing.
-y ("client-to-client") sidesteps this: it negotiates both ends of a real
relay through the server itself, needs no separate peer address, and
works fine over loopback. Verified directly against a real local
instance: exits 0 with real packet-loss/RTT stats on valid credentials,
and correctly fails ("Cannot complete Allocation", exit 255) on a wrong
password — so it's still a meaningful pass/fail, not just "didn't crash."
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
Another real failure from a live run: turnutils_uclient refuses to run at
all without either -e <peer> or -y — a bare auth-only invocation isn't
enough for it to actually attempt anything. Add -e 127.0.0.1 to both
tools/pstn-test-check.sh's and tools/coturn-test-check.sh's invocations;
loopback is always reachable since the test already runs via `docker exec`
inside the coturn container itself, and it lets the test actually prove
data relays through the allocation, not just that auth succeeded.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
Real bug caught from a live run: the coturn allocation test passed -t -T
(TCP/TLS) to turnutils_uclient, but services/coturn.sh always starts
coturn with --no-tls --no-dtls — requesting an encrypted/TCP transport
against a server that never offered one fails the allocation outright
("Cannot complete Allocation"), misreporting a config problem that didn't
exist. Dropped both flags in both tools/pstn-test-check.sh and
tools/coturn-test-check.sh so the test matches what the server actually
supports (plain UDP).
Also, from user feedback on the same run:
- warn()/fail() now collect their messages into arrays; the Summary
section prints a "Needs attention" recap of every FAIL/WARN together
at the end, instead of leaving the user to scroll back through a long
run to find what needs fixing.
- The softphone-setup block now offers to reprint itself one extension
at a time (paced with a keypress between each) after the main run, so
a long device list isn't lost in the scrollback either. Factored the
per-extension print into print_ext_info() so the full run and this
reprint can't drift apart. Guarded with `[ -t 0 ]` so it's skipped
automatically when the script isn't run interactively.
Verified via a fuller mock harness (fake docker/curl/systemctl/getent,
non-TTY stdin) that: the corrected turnutils_uclient invocation reports
success, the recap correctly lists FAIL before WARN, and the interactive
reprint prompt is skipped without hanging when stdin isn't a terminal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
Two follow-ups on the PSTN health check:
- New "coturn (TURN relay for Asterisk)" section reads Asterisk's own
TURN_* values from its .env (not re-derived) and runs a live TURN
allocation against whichever coturn Asterisk is actually configured to
use — the shared instance, or its own embedded per-Asterisk coturn if
that's what this box has (detected via the same "grep -q '^ coturn:'
docker-compose.yml" check CLAUDE.md's migration guidance describes).
Proves what Asterisk itself would use at call time, complementing
tools/coturn-test-check.sh's broader multi-consumer check.
- New "Softphone setup" section parses pjsip.conf directly and prints
per-extension SIP server/username/password/port/transport, plus TURN
credentials for any extension with ice_support=yes — the same values
Sipnetic's "Add Account" screen needs, computed here so a client isn't
installed just to read them out of the Security Dashboard.
Also fixed a bug caught while building a mock test harness to verify both
additions: the extension-registration parser grabbed state via a fixed
field position ($3), silently truncating multi-word states like "Not in
use" down to "Not". Replaced with a regex that captures everything
between the extension and the trailing "N of inf" — verified against both
single- and multi-word states.
And a real syntax bug caught by bash -n before this ever shipped: an
apostrophe inside a ${VAR:-default} expansion ("this box's IP") opens an
unterminated single-quote context even inside double quotes — reworded
to avoid the apostrophe entirely rather than fight bash's parser.
Full mock run (fake docker/curl/systemctl/getent, real pjsip.conf/.env
fixtures matching the actual generated format) confirmed both new
sections and the registration fix all produce correct output end to end.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
Three follow-ups from live testing on this session's actual VPS:
- tools/pstn-test-check.sh's SMS section printed the Forward-to-URL value
to configure but never said what to do next — add the "text this DID,
then watch journalctl -u sms-inbound -f" step right after it.
- docs/pstn-sms-test-checklist.md: the "which box actually handled this"
question has a simple answer (a DID's inbound routing targets exactly
one IP:port, so there's no ambiguity to resolve, only a portal setting
to confirm) — written up so it doesn't need re-deriving. Also fixed the
--list example to cd into the repo first; ./setup.sh is a relative path
and silently fails with "command not found" from any other directory,
confirmed live in this session.
- New tools/coturn-test-check.sh: health-checks the shared coturn instance
(services/coturn.sh) and every consumer registered against it (Asterisk,
any number of Mattermost instances) — container/identity, each cached
consumer credential cross-checked against coturn's own live user
database (catches the container/volume-recreated-without-db drift case),
UFW rules for both the TURN port and the relay range, a capacity
explanation reasoned from the actual port-range math instead of a guess,
and a real TURN allocation test per consumer via turnutils_uclient —
the only way to prove credentials + port range + firewall all actually
work together, not just that each looks right in isolation. Deliberately
does not attempt a concurrent load test, since that would consume real
relay ports other services may be actively using.
Verified the turnadmin -l output parsing, UFW rule matching, and the
empty-array-under-set–u loop pattern against mock data before shipping.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
Server-side config was fully verifiable already; what wasn't is the
provider-account side (Anveo's authorized-IP list, DID routing, SMS
forward-URL) since that lives entirely outside this box. Rather than
leave "go check the portal" as a vague pointer, compute and print the
exact values each portal field needs to match: this box's public IP,
the trunk DID (from .pstn-trunk.env), and the SMS forward URL read
straight from /opt/sms-inbound/settings.env (SMS_FORWARD_URL) instead of
making the user reconstruct or hunt for a value the installer already
generated and stored. Anveo-specific field-by-field checklist when
PROVIDER_NAME matches; generic fallback otherwise.
Verified the .pstn-trunk.env / settings.env sourcing against mock files
matching the real generated format, including the literal $[from]$-style
Anveo placeholders in SMS_FORWARD_URL, which must survive `source` under
`set -u` without triggering bash's legacy $[...] arithmetic expansion —
same guard pattern services/pstn-trunk.sh's own update path already uses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
docs/pstn-sms-test-checklist.md's manual steps (registration, trunk
reachability, dialplan contexts, kill-switch state, usage-alert timer
health, recent call/message activity) are all things a script can check
directly instead of re-typed by hand each time — and re-typing them is
exactly what led to the container-name mistake in the prior commit.
tools/pstn-test-check.sh auto-detects the container/directory the same
way the checklist doc now does, runs every automatable check, and prints
PASS/WARN/FAIL per item plus a summary. What it can't cover — actually
placing a call or sending a text — still needs the checklist doc.
Caught during testing against real command output pasted in this
session: the endpoint-parsing loop matched pjsip's own column-header
line ("<Endpoint/CID...> <State...>") as if it were a real endpoint row,
producing a bogus result. Fixed by skipping any row whose parsed
extension starts with "<".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
$CONTAINER/$EA_DIR only lived in the shell session where they were typed
by hand — a new terminal or enough time between test steps left them
empty, and an empty $CONTAINER silently collapsed
"docker exec -it $CONTAINER asterisk -rx ..." into "docker exec -it
asterisk -rx ...", failing with "No such container: asterisk" instead of
an obviously-unset-variable error. Confirmed live. Replaced the manual
pick with a docker ps auto-detect so a stale/forgotten variable can't
silently break every command in the checklist.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
docs/pstn-calling-voipms-plan.md (design log) and
docs/anveo-direct-setup-guide.md (account + droplet setup) already cover
getting a trunk/DID/SMS working from scratch, but neither is a quick
top-to-bottom checklist for verifying an already-installed setup still
works — registration, trunk reachability, tiers, outbound/inbound calls
(shared DID and personal DID), the spend-cap kill-switch, international
calling, internal SIP messaging, and SMS inbound, in order, with what to
check when each step fails. Pulls known gotchas (Commit Changes required
after dashboard tier edits, mobile vs geographic DIDs for verification
codes, the SIP-based SMS path Anveo doesn't actually offer) from the
existing docs so they're not missed mid-test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
The fresh-install path called _secdash_configure_caddy directly with no
prior removal, unlike the update/reconfigure path which already calls
_secdash_remove_caddy_block first. Re-running a "Full install" over an
existing dashboard on the same domain therefore appended a second site
block instead of replacing the first — and since Caddy serves whichever
block comes first in the file, the old one (old Authelia address, old
Basic Auth settings) kept winning even after answering the prompts with
new values. Confirmed live: reconfiguring a dashboard from a local to a
remote Authelia address left the old forward_auth target still in effect
until the stale block was deleted by hand.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
install_beszel() and install_beszel-agent()'s "update" branches only
did a pull+restart, never touching docker-compose.yml — so an
already-installed box would never pick up the systemd/dbus/sensor
mounts or apparmor:unconfined fixes without a manual edit or a
disruptive fresh reinstall.
Add _beszel_patch_agent_compose(), called from both update branches,
that idempotently patches an existing docker-compose.yml with
whichever of the two fixes it's still missing. Anchors on
`network_mode: host` and the docker.sock mount line, both unique to
the beszel-agent service and present in either compose shape
(combined hub+agent or agent-only), so one function covers both
install paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
The systemd/dbus mounts added last commit aren't sufficient by themselves
on an AppArmor-enabled host (Ubuntu/Debian by default): the dbus "Hello"
handshake fails with "An AppArmor policy prevents this sender from sending
this message to this recipient", since the container has no AppArmor label
the host's dbus-daemon profile recognizes. Only visible at LOG_LEVEL=debug
- silent otherwise, which is why the mounts alone looked like they should
have worked but didn't. Confirmed live against a real box hitting exactly
this error.
security_opt: apparmor:unconfined is Beszel's own documented fix
(beszel.dev/guide/systemd#apparmor-error) for this exact error string.
Added to both Docker-based agent compose generators (install_beszel's
combined hub+agent, and install_beszel-agent's remote-only variant).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
The hub's "Services" column is systemd unit monitoring (CPU/memory per
unit), and "Temp" is hardware sensor readings — neither is Docker container
stats, which is what the existing docker.sock mount actually provides. A
container is isolated from the host's systemd/dbus and most of /sys by
default, so a Docker-deployed agent silently showed both columns empty,
with nothing anywhere pointing at why. Confirmed live: a natively-installed
agent (no Docker, a plain systemd service) gets both for free just by
running as a normal host process, which is what surfaced the gap — a
Docker-deployed agent sitting right next to it on another box showed
nothing in either column.
Added read-only mounts for /var/run/systemd/private, dbus's
system_bus_socket, and /sys/class/hwmon + /sys/class/thermal to both
Docker-based agent compose generators (install_beszel's combined hub+agent,
and install_beszel-agent's remote-only variant). All four are best-effort:
if a path doesn't exist on a given host, Docker mounts an empty directory
rather than failing the container, so the worst case on an unusual host is
an empty column, not a regression or a crash risk.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
fmd-server's image runs as a fixed, non-configurable UID:GID 1000:1000
baked into its own Dockerfile (useradd --uid 1000 fmd-server) - nothing
like PUID/PGID to override it. The install script chowned the bind-mounted
./data dir to $ACTUAL_USER instead, which only happens to work when that
user's host UID is coincidentally 1000. Confirmed live: the container
crash-loops forever on "permission denied" creating its sqlite db
otherwise - same root-cause shape as the Mattermost UID/GID bug fixed
earlier this session, different fixed UID.
Fixed at both points a container start can happen: the fresh-install path
(chown -R 1000:1000 "$FMD_DIR/data" right after the existing $ACTUAL_USER
chown, ordered after it since that one is recursive over the whole
directory and would otherwise overwrite this) and the update path
(previously unguarded - re-asserted before every docker compose up so a
box already stuck in this state self-heals on next update instead of
staying broken forever, same self-heal precedent as the Vaultwarden SMTP
fix earlier this session).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
Authelia's forward_auth (what this repo already sets up) gates a whole site
behind a login page before the request reaches it. This is the opposite
direction: an app with its own "Enable OpenID"/SSO setting delegating ITS
login to Authelia, via Authelia's separate OIDC PROVIDER feature, which
this repo had no support for at all.
_authelia_ensure_oidc_provider() enables it once, idempotently: generates
an HMAC secret (injected via a _FILE env var, same convention as the
existing jwt/session/storage secrets) and an RSA signing keypair, then
writes identity_providers.oidc into configuration.yml. The RSA private key
has to be inlined as PEM directly in that file — Authelia's jwks schema has
no file-path or env-var option for it — so configuration.yml gets chmod 600
once OIDC is enabled, unlike before when it held no raw secrets.
_authelia_add_oidc_client() registers an app: presets for ActualBudget
(/openid/callback) and Vaultwarden (/identity/connect/oidc-signin, and
confirmed its SSO support is now native/upstream, not fork-only) fill in
the redirect URI automatically; "Other/custom" covers anything else. Each
app gets its own Client ID and a random secret (shown once, only the
pbkdf2 hash is stored), and the output tells the operator exactly what to
paste back into that app's own OpenID dialog or .env — including
Vaultwarden's exact SSO_* env vars, not just generic OIDC endpoint URLs.
Wired into the existing "Authelia already exists" menu as a new option,
alongside "add another protected domain" and "reconfigure from scratch".
Exact CLI output formats, default filenames, and YAML schema were verified
against Authelia's own CLI source/docs (crypto rand's "Random Value: "
label, crypto hash generate pbkdf2's "Random Password:"/"Digest:" labels,
crypto pair rsa generate's private.pem/public.pem defaults) rather than
guessed, since a wrong assumption here means a cryptic startup failure or
broken secret extraction. The YAML manipulation (client-list insertion,
domain extraction from session.cookies) was tested end-to-end against the
real mikefarah/yq binary against a realistic mock config, which caught a
real bug (extracting the wrong awk field for the domain, "domain:" instead
of the actual value) before it shipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
Vaultwarden crash-loops outright if exactly one of SMTP_HOST/SMTP_FROM is
set ("Both SMTP_HOST and SMTP_FROM need to be set for email support
without USE_SENDMAIL"). The fresh-install prompt flow already avoids ever
writing that half-state, but "update" mode deliberately never touches
.env (same rule as everywhere else in this repo), so a box whose .env was
written before that prompt-side fix existed - or hand-edited since - stays
stuck crash-looping on every future update too, since nothing ever
re-checked it. Confirmed live on a real box.
New _vaultwarden_fix_smtp_halfstate() detects the half-set state and
blanks the whole SMTP block (matching what the fresh-install prompt does
when SMTP is skipped) rather than leaving it broken. Called right before
every docker compose up this file does - the update path (previously
unguarded) and the fresh-install start prompt (defense in depth, since
that path is already safe by construction) - so it self-heals regardless
of how a box got into this state.
Audited every other services/*.sh for the same half-set-required-pair
pattern (SMTP, MAIL_*, SMTP_HOST-style naming) - Vaultwarden is the only
one that actually writes paired config where a partial state crashes the
container. Authelia's SMTP is mandatory-with-defaults (a different,
non-crashing risk); Mattermost/frigate-notify only mention SMTP in
generated docs, never in config they write.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01H4k6J1qXXyYxhGEgnJaMvn
Outis