fix: cross-browser sync import corrupting local encryption + v2.0.9
Root cause: when importing an encrypted sync code from another device, _decryptFromSync was replacing the local encryption config (salt) with the source device's salt. This caused: 1. Local key cache derived from wrong salt 2. Local data (encrypted with local salt) became unreadable 3. _applyData tried to write with the wrong key Fixed with a complete refactor of cross-device decryption: - authenticateForSync() derives a TEMPORARY key using the source salt - Temporary key stored separately as 'tempSyncKey' in IndexedDB - Local encryption config and cached key are NEVER modified - After decryption, _applyData writes via _writeSecure using the LOCAL key (which uses the local salt) - _handleDecryptedMeta extracted for code reuse Also: - Options.js auth handler detects pending sync import and routes to authenticateForSync instead of regular authenticate - After auth success, automatically retries the import - README updated: imported passwords are protected (dots in UI, vault password to reveal, AES-256 encrypted at rest) - Bumped to v2.0.9 https://claude.ai/code/session_01SWSwDfMVij53bCTNSCLMwn
This commit is contained in:
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ Import your existing data from password managers and browser autofill to pre-pop
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| Plain CSV (2 columns) | Real → substitute pairs |
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| Plain text (1 per line) | Auto-categorized values needing substitutes |
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Passwords are imported as exact-match mappings (e.g. `MyS3cret!` → `[REDACTED-PASSWORD-1]`) so they get caught in any context — not just `password=value` patterns.
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Passwords are imported as exact-match mappings (e.g. `MyS3cret!` → `[REDACTED-PASSWORD-1]`) so they get caught in any context — not just `password=value` patterns. Imported passwords are protected: they're shown as dots in the UI and require your vault encryption password to reveal. When at-rest encryption is enabled, imported passwords are AES-256 encrypted in storage like all other sensitive data.
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Go to **Options** → **Transfer Data** → **Import CSV / Password Export**.
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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{
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"manifest_version": 3,
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"name": "Silent Send",
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"version": "2.0.7",
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"version": "2.0.9",
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"description": "Intercepts personal info and substitutes it with user-defined replacements before sending to AI services.",
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"browser_specific_settings": {
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"gecko": {
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+1
-1
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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{
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"manifest_version": 3,
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"name": "Silent Send",
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"version": "2.0.7",
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"version": "2.0.9",
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"description": "Intercepts personal info and substitutes it with user-defined replacements before sending to AI services.",
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"permissions": [
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"storage",
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+1
-1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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{
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"name": "silent-send",
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"version": "2.0.7",
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"version": "2.0.9",
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"private": true,
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"license": "BSL-1.1",
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"description": "Browser extension that substitutes personal data before sending to AI services",
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+89
-36
@@ -460,47 +460,100 @@ const SilentSendSync = {
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async _decryptFromSync(data) {
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if (!data?._ssEncrypted) return { data, decrypted: false };
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// Always use the sync envelope's salt/verificationBlob for decryption,
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// not the local config. Different devices have different salts, so the
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// local key won't decrypt data encrypted with another device's salt.
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let config = await this._getSyncEncryption();
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// Decrypt using the SOURCE device's salt (embedded in the sync envelope).
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// We derive a TEMPORARY key — never modify the local config or cached key,
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// because the local data is encrypted with the LOCAL salt.
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const sourceSalt = data._encConfig?.salt;
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const sourceVerification = data._encConfig?.verificationBlob;
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if (data._encConfig) {
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// Use the source's salt for this decryption, but don't overwrite
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// the local config permanently yet — only if decryption succeeds
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config = {
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...(config || {}),
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enabled: true,
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salt: data._encConfig.salt,
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verificationBlob: data._encConfig.verificationBlob,
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};
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}
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if (!config?.enabled) {
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return { data: null, decrypted: false, needsAuth: true };
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}
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// Try to get a key using the sync envelope's salt
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// First check if we have a cached key that matches
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let keyInfo = await SilentSendCrypto.getCachedKey();
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// If the cached key's salt doesn't match the sync data's salt,
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// we need to re-derive from the password
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if (keyInfo && data._encConfig && keyInfo.salt !== data._encConfig.salt) {
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keyInfo = null; // force re-auth with the correct salt
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}
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if (!keyInfo) {
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// Need the user to enter the password — save the sync salt temporarily
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// so authenticate() uses it to derive the correct key
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if (data._encConfig) {
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await this._saveSyncEncryption(config);
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if (!sourceSalt) {
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// No embedded config — try local key (same-device sync like browser.storage.sync)
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const keyInfo = await SilentSendCrypto.getCachedKey();
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if (!keyInfo) return { data: null, decrypted: false, needsAuth: true };
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try {
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const decrypted = await SilentSendCrypto.decryptWithKey(data.payload, keyInfo.key);
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return this._handleDecryptedMeta(decrypted);
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} catch {
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return { data: null, decrypted: false, needsAuth: true };
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}
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return { data: null, decrypted: false, needsAuth: true };
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}
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const decrypted = await SilentSendCrypto.decryptWithKey(data.payload, keyInfo.key);
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// Cross-device: need to derive a temporary key from the source salt.
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// Check if we have a stored password-derived key for this source salt.
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const tempKeyStore = await this._getTempSyncKey(sourceSalt);
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if (tempKeyStore) {
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try {
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const decrypted = await SilentSendCrypto.decryptWithKey(data.payload, tempKeyStore.key);
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return this._handleDecryptedMeta(decrypted);
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} catch { /* wrong key, fall through to prompt */ }
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}
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// Need the user's password to derive a key with the source salt.
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// Store the source salt temporarily so the auth prompt can use it.
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this._pendingSyncSalt = sourceSalt;
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this._pendingSyncVerification = sourceVerification;
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return { data: null, decrypted: false, needsAuth: true, syncSalt: sourceSalt };
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},
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/**
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* Authenticate specifically for a cross-device sync import.
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* Derives a temporary key with the source device's salt.
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* Does NOT modify the local encryption config or cached key.
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*/
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async authenticateForSync(password) {
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const salt = this._pendingSyncSalt;
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const verification = this._pendingSyncVerification;
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if (!salt) return { success: false, reason: 'No pending sync import.' };
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// Derive key with the source salt
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const { key } = await SilentSendCrypto.deriveAndReturnKey(password, salt);
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// Verify password against the source's verification blob
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if (verification) {
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try {
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await SilentSendCrypto.decryptWithKey(verification, key);
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} catch {
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return { success: false, reason: 'Wrong password.' };
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}
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}
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// Store this temporary key for the source salt (NOT in the main cache)
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await this._storeTempSyncKey(salt, key);
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this._pendingSyncSalt = null;
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this._pendingSyncVerification = null;
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return { success: true };
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},
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async _storeTempSyncKey(salt, key) {
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try {
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const db = await SilentSendCrypto._openCacheDB();
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await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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const tx = db.transaction('keys', 'readwrite');
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tx.objectStore('keys').put({ key, salt, storedAt: Date.now() }, 'tempSyncKey');
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tx.oncomplete = resolve;
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tx.onerror = () => reject(tx.error);
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});
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} catch { /* non-fatal */ }
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},
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async _getTempSyncKey(salt) {
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try {
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const db = await SilentSendCrypto._openCacheDB();
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return new Promise((resolve) => {
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const tx = db.transaction('keys', 'readonly');
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const req = tx.objectStore('keys').get('tempSyncKey');
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req.onsuccess = () => {
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const entry = req.result;
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if (entry?.key && entry.salt === salt) resolve(entry);
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else resolve(null);
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};
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req.onerror = () => resolve(null);
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});
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} catch { return null; }
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},
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async _handleDecryptedMeta(decrypted) {
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// Restore full encryption config from inner metadata
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if (decrypted._encMeta) {
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const fullConfig = await this._getSyncEncryption();
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@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@
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</section>
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<footer>
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<p>Silent Send v2.0.7</p>
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<p>Silent Send v2.0.9</p>
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</footer>
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</div>
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+14
-9
@@ -1016,24 +1016,29 @@ async function initSyncEncryptionUI() {
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return;
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}
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// Check if this is re-verification (key exists) or first-device (needs full auth)
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const cached = await SilentSendCrypto.getCachedKey();
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let result;
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if (cached) {
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// Re-verification — password alone is enough
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result = await SilentSendSync.reverifyWithPassword(password);
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// If there's a pending sync import, use authenticateForSync
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// (derives a temporary key with the source salt, doesn't touch local config)
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if (window.__ssPendingSyncImport) {
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result = await SilentSendSync.authenticateForSync(password);
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} else {
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// First device — full auth with password + TOTP if configured
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result = await SilentSendSync.authenticate(password, totpCode || undefined);
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// Normal auth: check if re-verification or first-device
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const cached = await SilentSendCrypto.getCachedKey();
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if (cached) {
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result = await SilentSendSync.reverifyWithPassword(password);
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} else {
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result = await SilentSendSync.authenticate(password, totpCode || undefined);
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}
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}
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if (result.success) {
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$('#syncAuthPrompt').style.display = 'none';
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$('#syncAuthPassword').value = '';
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$('#syncAuthTOTPForPassword').value = '';
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setSyncEncStatus(cached ? 'Re-verified with password.' : 'Authenticated. Sync data unlocked.', 'ok');
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setSyncEncStatus('Authenticated.', 'ok');
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// If there's a pending sync import, retry it now that auth succeeded
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// If there's a pending sync import, retry it now
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if (window.__ssPendingSyncImport) {
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const retry = window.__ssPendingSyncImport;
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window.__ssPendingSyncImport = null;
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