Claude
880bba86ed
Confirmed live: Caddy (in a container) reaches this via
host.docker.internal, a Docker bridge gateway IP, not localhost — a
loopback-only bind refuses that connection outright ("dial tcp
172.17.0.1:8092: connect: connection refused"), even though curl from
the host itself worked fine on 127.0.0.1. Bind to 0.0.0.0 and rely on
UFW for the actual access scoping instead, matching every other
host-network service in this repo (e.g. the Asterisk web admin, which
already binds this way successfully with the same
ufw_allow_from_caddy_net pattern).
694 lines
30 KiB
Bash
694 lines
30 KiB
Bash
#!/bin/bash
|
|
# services/security-dashboard.sh — Security dashboard: Asterisk failed-connection
|
|
# log + CrowdSec decisions (view/unban/ASN-exempt management), Authelia-protected.
|
|
# Part of the modular post-install system (sourced by setup.sh).
|
|
#
|
|
# Can also be run standalone on any machine:
|
|
# sudo bash security-dashboard.sh
|
|
# (Docker must already be installed when run standalone — Caddy fronts this,
|
|
# even though the dashboard itself runs natively on the host, not in Docker)
|
|
#
|
|
# Why native, not Docker: it needs to run `cscli` (a host binary — CrowdSec is
|
|
# a system service, not a container, see services/crowdsec.sh) and read
|
|
# Asterisk's security log directly off disk. Running natively avoids bridging
|
|
# the container/host boundary entirely — no LAPI credentials to expose to a
|
|
# containerized frontend, no Docker socket mount. Same reasoning as why
|
|
# CrowdSec itself is a system service in this repo, not a docker-compose one.
|
|
|
|
# ── Standalone bootstrap ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
if [[ "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" == "${0}" ]]; then
|
|
[[ "$(id -u)" == "0" ]] || { echo "Run with sudo: sudo bash $0"; exit 1; }
|
|
|
|
_SELF_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
|
|
_COMMON="$_SELF_DIR/../lib/common.sh"
|
|
|
|
if [[ -f "$_COMMON" ]]; then
|
|
# shellcheck source=../lib/common.sh
|
|
source "$_COMMON"
|
|
else
|
|
log_info() { echo -e "\033[0;34m[INFO]\033[0m $*"; }
|
|
log_success() { echo -e "\033[0;32m[OK]\033[0m $*"; }
|
|
log_warning() { echo -e "\033[1;33m[WARN]\033[0m $*"; }
|
|
log_error() { echo -e "\033[0;31m[ERROR]\033[0m $*" >&2; }
|
|
|
|
prompt_text() {
|
|
local _q="$1" _def="$2" _var="$3" _r
|
|
[[ "${UNATTENDED:-false}" == "true" ]] && { eval "$_var='$_def'"; return; }
|
|
read -r -p " $_q " _r
|
|
eval "$_var='${_r:-$_def}'"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
prompt_yn() {
|
|
local _q="$1" _def="$2" _var="$3" _r
|
|
[[ "${UNATTENDED:-false}" == "true" ]] && { eval "$_var='$_def'"; return; }
|
|
read -r -p " $_q " _r
|
|
eval "$_var='${_r:-$_def}'"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
write_readme() {
|
|
local _dir="$1"; shift
|
|
mkdir -p "$_dir"
|
|
cat > "$_dir/README.md"
|
|
}
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
ACTUAL_USER="${ACTUAL_USER:-${SUDO_USER:-$USER}}"
|
|
ACTUAL_HOME="$(getent passwd "$ACTUAL_USER" 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f6 || echo "${HOME:-/root}")"
|
|
DOCKER_DIR="${DOCKER_DIR:-$ACTUAL_HOME/docker}"
|
|
DRY_RUN="${DRY_RUN:-false}"
|
|
UNATTENDED="${UNATTENDED:-false}"
|
|
SITE_DOMAIN="${SITE_DOMAIN:-example.com}"
|
|
|
|
register_service() { :; }
|
|
_RUN_STANDALONE=1
|
|
fi
|
|
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
register_service security-dashboard homelab "Security dashboard: Asterisk failed-connections + CrowdSec bans (Authelia-protected)" 8092
|
|
|
|
install_security-dashboard() {
|
|
local APP_DIR="/opt/security-dashboard"
|
|
local DASHBOARD_PORT=8092
|
|
local ASTERISK_LOG_DIR="$DOCKER_DIR/asterisk-digital-ocean/logs"
|
|
local SVC_USER="secdash"
|
|
local ASTERISK_ADMIN_URL=""
|
|
if [ -f "$DOCKER_DIR/asterisk-digital-ocean/.env" ]; then
|
|
local _ea_domain
|
|
_ea_domain="$(grep -E '^DOMAIN_NAME=' "$DOCKER_DIR/asterisk-digital-ocean/.env" | cut -d= -f2-)"
|
|
[ -n "$_ea_domain" ] && ASTERISK_ADMIN_URL="https://${_ea_domain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo "┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐"
|
|
echo "│ SECURITY DASHBOARD │"
|
|
echo "│ Asterisk failed-connection log + CrowdSec decisions, one page. │"
|
|
echo "│ Runs natively on the host (not Docker) so it can call cscli and │"
|
|
echo "│ read Asterisk's security log directly. Authelia-protected. │"
|
|
echo "└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘"
|
|
echo ""
|
|
|
|
if [ ! -d "$ASTERISK_LOG_DIR" ]; then
|
|
log_warning "No asterisk-digital-ocean install detected at $ASTERISK_LOG_DIR."
|
|
log_warning "The Security Log tab will just be empty — CrowdSec's tab still works fine."
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ "$DRY_RUN" = true ]; then
|
|
echo "[DRY-RUN] Would create system user $SVC_USER"
|
|
echo "[DRY-RUN] Would write $APP_DIR/app.py"
|
|
echo "[DRY-RUN] Would write /etc/sudoers.d/security-dashboard (scoped cscli/systemctl only)"
|
|
echo "[DRY-RUN] Would write a systemd unit and start it on 0.0.0.0:$DASHBOARD_PORT (firewalled via UFW, not interface binding)"
|
|
echo "[DRY-RUN] Would configure Caddy + Authelia for a domain you'll be prompted for"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ -f "$APP_DIR/app.py" ]; then
|
|
local MODE=""
|
|
prompt_reinstall_mode MODE 2>/dev/null || {
|
|
# prompt_reinstall_mode isn't defined in the standalone stub — fall
|
|
# back to a plain yes/no when run outside the full repo.
|
|
local _r=""
|
|
prompt_yn " Security dashboard already exists at $APP_DIR — reconfigure? (y/n):" "n" _r
|
|
[ "$_r" = "y" ] || [ "$_r" = "Y" ] && MODE="fresh" || MODE="cancel"
|
|
}
|
|
case "$MODE" in
|
|
update)
|
|
log_info "Refreshing app code only (no config/domain changes)..."
|
|
_secdash_write_app "$APP_DIR"
|
|
systemctl restart security-dashboard 2>/dev/null \
|
|
&& log_success "security-dashboard restarted" \
|
|
|| log_warning "Restart failed — check: systemctl status security-dashboard"
|
|
return 0
|
|
;;
|
|
cancel)
|
|
log_info "Leaving the existing install as-is."
|
|
return 0
|
|
;;
|
|
fresh) ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# ── System user (no login, no home directory needed) ────────────────────
|
|
if ! id "$SVC_USER" &>/dev/null; then
|
|
useradd --system --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin "$SVC_USER"
|
|
log_success "Created system user $SVC_USER"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Read access to the Asterisk security log without running as root or the
|
|
# actual user — add secdash to the group that owns the log files instead.
|
|
if [ -d "$ASTERISK_LOG_DIR" ]; then
|
|
local _log_group
|
|
_log_group="$(stat -c '%G' "$ASTERISK_LOG_DIR" 2>/dev/null || echo "$ACTUAL_USER")"
|
|
usermod -aG "$_log_group" "$SVC_USER" 2>/dev/null || true
|
|
chmod 750 "$ASTERISK_LOG_DIR" 2>/dev/null || true
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
mkdir -p "$APP_DIR"
|
|
_secdash_write_app "$APP_DIR"
|
|
chown -R "$SVC_USER:$SVC_USER" "$APP_DIR"
|
|
|
|
# ── Scoped sudo — only the exact commands the app needs, nothing else ───
|
|
# Numeric-only glob on the decision ID; Python subprocess calls always pass
|
|
# args as a list (no shell=True anywhere), so there's no shell-metachar
|
|
# injection surface even before sudoers' own pattern match kicks in — the
|
|
# server-side ID validation (must be all-digits) happens before this is
|
|
# ever reached, this is defense in depth, not the only check.
|
|
cat > /etc/sudoers.d/security-dashboard << SUDOERS
|
|
$SVC_USER ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/cscli decisions delete --id [0-9]*
|
|
$SVC_USER ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/cscli decisions list -o json
|
|
$SVC_USER ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/systemctl restart crowdsec
|
|
SUDOERS
|
|
chmod 440 /etc/sudoers.d/security-dashboard
|
|
visudo -c -f /etc/sudoers.d/security-dashboard >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|
|
&& log_success "Sudoers rule installed and validated" \
|
|
|| { log_error "Sudoers rule failed validation — removing it (dashboard's CrowdSec tab won't work until fixed)"; rm -f /etc/sudoers.d/security-dashboard; }
|
|
|
|
# ── systemd unit ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
cat > /etc/systemd/system/security-dashboard.service << SDSVC
|
|
[Unit]
|
|
Description=Security dashboard (Asterisk security log + CrowdSec decisions)
|
|
After=network.target
|
|
|
|
[Service]
|
|
Type=simple
|
|
User=$SVC_USER
|
|
Group=$SVC_USER
|
|
Environment=DASHBOARD_PORT=$DASHBOARD_PORT
|
|
Environment=ASTERISK_LOG=$ASTERISK_LOG_DIR/full
|
|
Environment=ASTERISK_ADMIN_URL=$ASTERISK_ADMIN_URL
|
|
ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 $APP_DIR/app.py
|
|
Restart=on-failure
|
|
RestartSec=3
|
|
NoNewPrivileges=false
|
|
ProtectSystem=strict
|
|
ReadOnlyPaths=$ASTERISK_LOG_DIR
|
|
ReadWritePaths=/etc/crowdsec/scenarios
|
|
|
|
[Install]
|
|
WantedBy=multi-user.target
|
|
SDSVC
|
|
|
|
systemctl daemon-reload
|
|
systemctl enable security-dashboard >/dev/null 2>&1
|
|
if systemctl restart security-dashboard; then
|
|
log_success "security-dashboard started on port $DASHBOARD_PORT (all interfaces — UFW scopes actual access)"
|
|
else
|
|
log_warning "Failed to start — check: systemctl status security-dashboard"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# ── Caddy + Authelia ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
# This is deliberately more insistent about Authelia than most services —
|
|
# it can delete active CrowdSec bans, so an unauthenticated exposure here
|
|
# is a real security hole, not just an inconvenience.
|
|
echo ""
|
|
if command -v docker &>/dev/null && docker ps --format '{{.Names}}' 2>/dev/null | grep -q "^caddy$"; then
|
|
local _default_domain=""
|
|
if [ -n "${SITE_DOMAIN:-}" ] && [ "$SITE_DOMAIN" != "example.com" ]; then
|
|
_default_domain="security.${SITE_DOMAIN}"
|
|
fi
|
|
local SD_DOMAIN=""
|
|
prompt_text " Domain for the dashboard (e.g. security.yourdomain.com), you'll need to point DNS at this droplet yourself [${_default_domain:-required}]:" "$_default_domain" SD_DOMAIN
|
|
|
|
if [ -z "$SD_DOMAIN" ]; then
|
|
log_warning "No domain entered — dashboard stays on http://localhost:$DASHBOARD_PORT only (not reachable from outside this box)."
|
|
else
|
|
local EXTRA_BLOCK=""
|
|
if [ -d "$DOCKER_DIR/authelia" ]; then
|
|
EXTRA_BLOCK=" import authelia"
|
|
log_info "Local Authelia detected — protecting with it."
|
|
else
|
|
log_warning "No local Authelia found. This dashboard can delete active security"
|
|
log_warning "bans — strongly recommend protecting it before exposing it publicly."
|
|
local _use_remote=""
|
|
prompt_yn " Protect with a remote Authelia instance (e.g. on a homelab)? (y/n):" "y" _use_remote
|
|
if [[ "$_use_remote" =~ ^[Yy]$ ]]; then
|
|
local _remote_authelia=""
|
|
prompt_text " Remote Authelia address (bare host:port on a private network, or a full https:// URL on its own public domain+TLS):" "" _remote_authelia
|
|
if [ -n "$_remote_authelia" ]; then
|
|
# See services/asterisk-digital-ocean.sh for why
|
|
# X-Forwarded-Host must be a literal domain here, not
|
|
# the {host} placeholder — confirmed live that the
|
|
# placeholder still evaluates to the upstream
|
|
# Authelia's own hostname for a scheme-qualified
|
|
# remote upstream, not the original site's.
|
|
EXTRA_BLOCK=" forward_auth ${_remote_authelia} {
|
|
uri /api/authz/forward-auth
|
|
copy_headers Remote-User Remote-Groups Remote-Name Remote-Email
|
|
header_up X-Forwarded-Method {method}
|
|
header_up X-Forwarded-Proto {scheme}
|
|
header_up X-Forwarded-Host ${SD_DOMAIN}
|
|
header_up X-Forwarded-Uri {uri}
|
|
}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ -z "$EXTRA_BLOCK" ]; then
|
|
log_error "Proceeding WITHOUT Authelia protection — anyone who finds this domain"
|
|
log_error "can view and delete active security bans. Strongly reconsider."
|
|
local _confirm_unsafe=""
|
|
prompt_yn " Really continue without auth protection? (y/n):" "n" _confirm_unsafe
|
|
if [[ ! "$_confirm_unsafe" =~ ^[Yy]$ ]]; then
|
|
log_info "Skipping Caddy setup. Re-run this installer once Authelia is available."
|
|
SD_DOMAIN=""
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ -n "$SD_DOMAIN" ]; then
|
|
local CADDY_FILE="$DOCKER_DIR/caddy/Caddyfile"
|
|
if [ -f "$CADDY_FILE" ] && ! grep -q "^${SD_DOMAIN} {" "$CADDY_FILE"; then
|
|
cat >> "$CADDY_FILE" << CADDYBLOCK
|
|
|
|
# Security Dashboard
|
|
${SD_DOMAIN} {
|
|
${EXTRA_BLOCK}
|
|
reverse_proxy host.docker.internal:${DASHBOARD_PORT}
|
|
|
|
header {
|
|
Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload"
|
|
X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
|
|
X-Frame-Options "DENY"
|
|
Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log {
|
|
output file /var/log/caddy/${SD_DOMAIN}.log
|
|
format json
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
CADDYBLOCK
|
|
docker exec caddy caddy fmt --overwrite /etc/caddy/Caddyfile 2>/dev/null || true
|
|
docker compose -f "$DOCKER_DIR/caddy/docker-compose.yml" restart caddy 2>/dev/null \
|
|
&& log_success "Caddy restarted — dashboard at https://${SD_DOMAIN}" \
|
|
|| log_warning "Restart Caddy manually: cd $DOCKER_DIR/caddy && docker compose restart"
|
|
elif [ -f "$CADDY_FILE" ]; then
|
|
log_warning "$SD_DOMAIN already in Caddyfile — leaving the existing entry alone."
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Port 8092 never needs to be open to the internet — only Caddy
|
|
# (local, via host.docker.internal) ever needs to reach it.
|
|
if command -v ufw &>/dev/null; then
|
|
ufw delete allow "${DASHBOARD_PORT}/tcp" 2>/dev/null || true
|
|
if declare -f ufw_allow_from_caddy_net >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
ufw_allow_from_caddy_net "${DASHBOARD_PORT}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
log_info "Caddy not running — dashboard stays on http://localhost:$DASHBOARD_PORT until you set it up."
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
write_readme "$APP_DIR" << README_MD
|
|
# Security Dashboard
|
|
|
|
Asterisk failed-connection log + CrowdSec ban management, one Authelia-
|
|
protected page. Runs natively on the host (systemd service \`security-dashboard\`),
|
|
not in Docker — it needs to call \`cscli\` and read Asterisk's log directly.
|
|
|
|
## Tabs
|
|
- **Security Log** — parses \`$ASTERISK_LOG_DIR/full\` for SIP auth failures
|
|
(wrong password, unknown extension, etc.) with timestamp/account/remote IP.
|
|
- **CrowdSec** — current bans (\`cscli decisions list\`), a delete/unban button
|
|
per entry, and a way to add/remove ASNs from the ASN-exempt Asterisk
|
|
brute-force scenarios (see \`services/crowdsec.sh\`'s "Exempt specific carrier
|
|
ASNs" option) without SSHing in.
|
|
- Link to the Asterisk web admin itself (doesn't embed it, just links out).
|
|
|
|
## Manage
|
|
\`\`\`
|
|
sudo systemctl status security-dashboard
|
|
sudo systemctl restart security-dashboard
|
|
sudo journalctl -u security-dashboard -f
|
|
\`\`\`
|
|
|
|
## Security notes
|
|
- Runs as a dedicated, unprivileged system user (\`secdash\`), not root.
|
|
- Sudo access is scoped to exactly three commands via
|
|
\`/etc/sudoers.d/security-dashboard\`: \`cscli decisions delete --id <digits>\`,
|
|
\`cscli decisions list -o json\`, and \`systemctl restart crowdsec\`. Nothing else.
|
|
- Listens on all interfaces (Caddy reaches it via \`host.docker.internal\`, a
|
|
Docker bridge IP — a loopback-only bind refuses that). Access is scoped by
|
|
UFW instead, allowed only from Caddy's internal network, not the internet.
|
|
- **This page can delete active security bans.** Don't run it without Authelia
|
|
(or equivalent) in front of it.
|
|
README_MD
|
|
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo " Local access: http://localhost:$DASHBOARD_PORT"
|
|
echo " README: $APP_DIR/README.md"
|
|
echo ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Writes the Python app. Separate function so "update" mode (refresh code,
|
|
# keep config) and fresh installs share one copy instead of drifting apart.
|
|
_secdash_write_app() {
|
|
local _app_dir="$1"
|
|
mkdir -p "$_app_dir"
|
|
cat > "$_app_dir/app.py" << 'PYAPP'
|
|
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
|
"""Security dashboard: Asterisk failed-connection log + CrowdSec decisions.
|
|
|
|
Stdlib only, deliberately — this runs on a small droplet alongside Asterisk,
|
|
Caddy, and CrowdSec, and shouldn't add a framework's worth of RAM overhead.
|
|
"""
|
|
import json
|
|
import os
|
|
import re
|
|
import subprocess
|
|
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
|
|
|
|
PORT = int(os.environ.get("DASHBOARD_PORT", "8092"))
|
|
ASTERISK_LOG = os.environ.get("ASTERISK_LOG", "")
|
|
ASTERISK_ADMIN_URL = os.environ.get("ASTERISK_ADMIN_URL", "")
|
|
ASN_SCENARIO_FILES = [
|
|
"/etc/crowdsec/scenarios/local-asterisk_bf.yaml",
|
|
"/etc/crowdsec/scenarios/local-asterisk_user_enum.yaml",
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
TS_RE = re.compile(r"^\[([^\]]+)\]")
|
|
KV_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)="([^"]*)"')
|
|
ASN_FILTER_RE = re.compile(r"ASNNumber in \[([^\]]*)\]\)")
|
|
ID_RE = re.compile(r"^\d+$")
|
|
ASN_RE = re.compile(r"^\d+$")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def parse_security_log(limit=200):
|
|
"""Tail ASTERISK_LOG and return the most recent SecurityEvent lines,
|
|
newest first, as dicts. Missing file / no lines -> empty list, never an
|
|
error — this is a convenience view, not load-bearing."""
|
|
if not ASTERISK_LOG or not os.path.isfile(ASTERISK_LOG):
|
|
return []
|
|
events = []
|
|
try:
|
|
with open(ASTERISK_LOG, "r", errors="replace") as f:
|
|
lines = f.readlines()[-5000:] # cap how much we ever scan
|
|
except OSError:
|
|
return []
|
|
for line in lines:
|
|
if "SecurityEvent=" not in line:
|
|
continue
|
|
ts_match = TS_RE.match(line)
|
|
fields = dict(KV_RE.findall(line))
|
|
if not fields.get("SecurityEvent"):
|
|
continue
|
|
events.append({
|
|
"timestamp": ts_match.group(1) if ts_match else "",
|
|
"event": fields.get("SecurityEvent", ""),
|
|
"severity": fields.get("Severity", ""),
|
|
"account": fields.get("AccountID", ""),
|
|
"remote": fields.get("RemoteAddress", ""),
|
|
"reason": fields.get("SecurityEvent", ""),
|
|
})
|
|
events.reverse()
|
|
return events[:limit]
|
|
|
|
|
|
def run_sudo(args, timeout=15):
|
|
"""Runs a whitelisted sudo command. Always list-form args, never
|
|
shell=True — no shell metacharacter interpretation is possible regardless
|
|
of what's in the arguments, on top of the sudoers-side restriction."""
|
|
try:
|
|
result = subprocess.run(
|
|
["sudo"] + args, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout
|
|
)
|
|
return result.returncode == 0, result.stdout, result.stderr
|
|
except (subprocess.TimeoutExpired, OSError) as e:
|
|
return False, "", str(e)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def get_decisions():
|
|
ok, out, err = run_sudo(["/usr/bin/cscli", "decisions", "list", "-o", "json"])
|
|
if not ok or not out.strip():
|
|
return []
|
|
try:
|
|
data = json.loads(out)
|
|
except json.JSONDecodeError:
|
|
return []
|
|
decisions = []
|
|
for alert in data or []:
|
|
for d in alert.get("decisions") or []:
|
|
decisions.append({
|
|
"id": d.get("id"),
|
|
"value": d.get("value"),
|
|
"scenario": d.get("scenario"),
|
|
"duration": d.get("duration"),
|
|
"origin": d.get("origin"),
|
|
})
|
|
return decisions
|
|
|
|
|
|
def delete_decision(decision_id):
|
|
if not ID_RE.match(str(decision_id)):
|
|
return False, "Invalid decision ID"
|
|
ok, out, err = run_sudo(["/usr/bin/cscli", "decisions", "delete", "--id", str(decision_id)])
|
|
return ok, (err or out or ("deleted" if ok else "failed"))
|
|
|
|
|
|
def get_asn_exempt():
|
|
asns = set()
|
|
for path in ASN_SCENARIO_FILES:
|
|
try:
|
|
with open(path) as f:
|
|
content = f.read()
|
|
except OSError:
|
|
continue
|
|
m = ASN_FILTER_RE.search(content)
|
|
if m:
|
|
for tok in m.group(1).split(","):
|
|
tok = tok.strip().strip("'").strip('"')
|
|
if tok:
|
|
asns.add(tok)
|
|
return sorted(asns, key=lambda x: int(x) if x.isdigit() else 0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def set_asn_exempt(asn_list):
|
|
clean = [a.strip() for a in asn_list if ASN_RE.match(a.strip())]
|
|
if not clean:
|
|
return False, "No valid (numeric) ASNs provided"
|
|
expr = ", ".join("'%s'" % a for a in clean)
|
|
for path in ASN_SCENARIO_FILES:
|
|
try:
|
|
with open(path) as f:
|
|
content = f.read()
|
|
except OSError:
|
|
continue
|
|
new_content = ASN_FILTER_RE.sub("ASNNumber in [%s])" % expr, content)
|
|
try:
|
|
with open(path, "w") as f:
|
|
f.write(new_content)
|
|
except OSError as e:
|
|
return False, "Failed writing %s: %s" % (path, e)
|
|
ok, out, err = run_sudo(["/usr/bin/systemctl", "restart", "crowdsec"])
|
|
if not ok:
|
|
return False, "Wrote ASN list but failed to restart CrowdSec: %s" % (err or out)
|
|
return True, "Updated: %s" % ", ".join(clean)
|
|
|
|
|
|
INDEX_HTML = """<!doctype html>
|
|
<html><head><meta charset="utf-8">
|
|
<title>Security Dashboard</title>
|
|
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
|
|
<style>
|
|
body { font-family: system-ui, sans-serif; margin: 0; background: #0f1115; color: #e6e6e6; }
|
|
header { padding: 1rem 1.5rem; background: #171a21; border-bottom: 1px solid #2a2e38; display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 1rem; }
|
|
header h1 { font-size: 1.1rem; margin: 0; flex: 1; }
|
|
nav button { background: none; border: none; color: #9aa4b2; padding: 0.6rem 1rem; cursor: pointer; font-size: 0.95rem; border-bottom: 2px solid transparent; }
|
|
nav button.active { color: #fff; border-bottom-color: #4f8cff; }
|
|
main { padding: 1.5rem; max-width: 1100px; margin: 0 auto; }
|
|
table { width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; font-size: 0.85rem; }
|
|
th, td { text-align: left; padding: 0.5rem 0.6rem; border-bottom: 1px solid #23262f; }
|
|
th { color: #9aa4b2; font-weight: 600; }
|
|
.sev-Error { color: #ff6b6b; }
|
|
.sev-Warning { color: #f5b342; }
|
|
.sev-Informational { color: #7fbf7f; }
|
|
button.action { background: #2a2e38; color: #e6e6e6; border: 1px solid #3a3f4b; border-radius: 4px; padding: 0.3rem 0.7rem; cursor: pointer; }
|
|
button.action:hover { background: #3a3f4b; }
|
|
.card { background: #171a21; border: 1px solid #2a2e38; border-radius: 8px; padding: 1rem; margin-bottom: 1rem; }
|
|
input[type=text] { background: #0f1115; border: 1px solid #3a3f4b; color: #e6e6e6; padding: 0.4rem 0.6rem; border-radius: 4px; width: 100%; box-sizing: border-box; }
|
|
.row { display: flex; gap: 0.5rem; align-items: center; }
|
|
.muted { color: #9aa4b2; font-size: 0.85rem; }
|
|
a { color: #4f8cff; }
|
|
#msg { margin-top: 0.5rem; font-size: 0.85rem; }
|
|
</style>
|
|
</head>
|
|
<body>
|
|
<header>
|
|
<h1>Security Dashboard</h1>
|
|
<nav>
|
|
<button class="tab-btn active" data-tab="security">Security Log</button>
|
|
<button class="tab-btn" data-tab="crowdsec">CrowdSec</button>
|
|
</nav>
|
|
<a id="admin-link" href="#" target="_blank" style="display:none">Asterisk Web Admin ↗</a>
|
|
</header>
|
|
<main>
|
|
<div id="tab-security">
|
|
<div class="card">
|
|
<p class="muted">Recent Asterisk SIP security events, newest first. Errors/warnings are real auth failures; informational lines are normal registration traffic.</p>
|
|
<table id="sec-table"><thead><tr><th>Time</th><th>Event</th><th>Account</th><th>Remote</th><th>Severity</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table>
|
|
</div>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<div id="tab-crowdsec" style="display:none">
|
|
<div class="card">
|
|
<h3 style="margin-top:0">Active bans</h3>
|
|
<table id="dec-table"><thead><tr><th>IP/Range</th><th>Scenario</th><th>Duration</th><th>Origin</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<div class="card">
|
|
<h3 style="margin-top:0">Asterisk brute-force ASN exemptions</h3>
|
|
<p class="muted">Carrier ASNs exempted from the Asterisk brute-force scenarios only — SSH/web/geo protection is unaffected. See CLAUDE.md / services/crowdsec.sh for background.</p>
|
|
<div class="row">
|
|
<input type="text" id="asn-input" placeholder="e.g. 21928, 14593">
|
|
<button class="action" id="asn-save">Save</button>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<div id="msg"></div>
|
|
</div>
|
|
</div>
|
|
</main>
|
|
<script>
|
|
function esc(s) { return (s || "").replace(/[&<>"]/g, c => ({"&":"&","<":"<",">":">",'"':"""}[c])); }
|
|
|
|
document.querySelectorAll(".tab-btn").forEach(btn => {
|
|
btn.addEventListener("click", () => {
|
|
document.querySelectorAll(".tab-btn").forEach(b => b.classList.remove("active"));
|
|
btn.classList.add("active");
|
|
document.getElementById("tab-security").style.display = btn.dataset.tab === "security" ? "" : "none";
|
|
document.getElementById("tab-crowdsec").style.display = btn.dataset.tab === "crowdsec" ? "" : "none";
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
async function loadSecurity() {
|
|
const res = await fetch("/api/security-events");
|
|
const events = await res.json();
|
|
const tbody = document.querySelector("#sec-table tbody");
|
|
tbody.innerHTML = events.map(e => `<tr>
|
|
<td>${esc(e.timestamp)}</td>
|
|
<td>${esc(e.event)}</td>
|
|
<td>${esc(e.account)}</td>
|
|
<td>${esc(e.remote)}</td>
|
|
<td class="sev-${esc(e.severity)}">${esc(e.severity)}</td>
|
|
</tr>`).join("") || "<tr><td colspan=5 class=muted>No events found.</td></tr>";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function loadDecisions() {
|
|
const res = await fetch("/api/decisions");
|
|
const decisions = await res.json();
|
|
const tbody = document.querySelector("#dec-table tbody");
|
|
tbody.innerHTML = decisions.map(d => `<tr>
|
|
<td>${esc(d.value)}</td>
|
|
<td>${esc(d.scenario)}</td>
|
|
<td>${esc(d.duration)}</td>
|
|
<td>${esc(d.origin)}</td>
|
|
<td><button class="action" onclick="unban(${d.id})">Unban</button></td>
|
|
</tr>`).join("") || "<tr><td colspan=5 class=muted>No active bans.</td></tr>";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function unban(id) {
|
|
if (!confirm("Unban decision #" + id + "?")) return;
|
|
const res = await fetch("/api/decisions/delete", {method: "POST", headers: {"Content-Type": "application/json"}, body: JSON.stringify({id: id})});
|
|
const data = await res.json();
|
|
alert(data.message || (data.ok ? "Unbanned" : "Failed"));
|
|
loadDecisions();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function loadAsnExempt() {
|
|
const res = await fetch("/api/asn-exempt");
|
|
const data = await res.json();
|
|
document.getElementById("asn-input").value = (data.asns || []).join(", ");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
document.getElementById("asn-save").addEventListener("click", async () => {
|
|
const raw = document.getElementById("asn-input").value;
|
|
const asns = raw.split(",").map(s => s.trim()).filter(Boolean);
|
|
const res = await fetch("/api/asn-exempt", {method: "POST", headers: {"Content-Type": "application/json"}, body: JSON.stringify({asns: asns})});
|
|
const data = await res.json();
|
|
document.getElementById("msg").textContent = data.message || (data.ok ? "Saved" : "Failed");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const adminUrl = "__ASTERISK_ADMIN_URL__";
|
|
if (adminUrl) {
|
|
const link = document.getElementById("admin-link");
|
|
link.href = adminUrl;
|
|
link.style.display = "";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
loadSecurity();
|
|
loadDecisions();
|
|
loadAsnExempt();
|
|
setInterval(loadSecurity, 30000);
|
|
setInterval(loadDecisions, 30000);
|
|
</script>
|
|
</body></html>
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
|
|
def _json(self, obj, status=200):
|
|
body = json.dumps(obj).encode()
|
|
self.send_response(status)
|
|
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
|
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
|
|
self.end_headers()
|
|
self.wfile.write(body)
|
|
|
|
def _html(self, html, status=200):
|
|
body = html.encode()
|
|
self.send_response(status)
|
|
self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
|
|
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
|
|
self.end_headers()
|
|
self.wfile.write(body)
|
|
|
|
def do_GET(self):
|
|
if self.path == "/" or self.path == "":
|
|
html = INDEX_HTML.replace("__ASTERISK_ADMIN_URL__", ASTERISK_ADMIN_URL)
|
|
self._html(html)
|
|
elif self.path == "/api/security-events":
|
|
self._json(parse_security_log())
|
|
elif self.path == "/api/decisions":
|
|
self._json(get_decisions())
|
|
elif self.path == "/api/asn-exempt":
|
|
self._json({"asns": get_asn_exempt()})
|
|
else:
|
|
self._json({"error": "not found"}, 404)
|
|
|
|
def do_POST(self):
|
|
length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", 0))
|
|
raw = self.rfile.read(length) if length else b"{}"
|
|
try:
|
|
payload = json.loads(raw or b"{}")
|
|
except json.JSONDecodeError:
|
|
payload = {}
|
|
|
|
if self.path == "/api/decisions/delete":
|
|
ok, message = delete_decision(payload.get("id", ""))
|
|
self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message})
|
|
elif self.path == "/api/asn-exempt":
|
|
ok, message = set_asn_exempt(payload.get("asns", []))
|
|
self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message})
|
|
else:
|
|
self._json({"error": "not found"}, 404)
|
|
|
|
def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
|
|
pass # systemd journal captures stdout/stderr already; keep it quiet
|
|
|
|
|
|
def main():
|
|
ThreadingHTTPServer.allow_reuse_address = True
|
|
# 0.0.0.0, not 127.0.0.1: Caddy runs in a container and reaches this via
|
|
# host.docker.internal (a Docker bridge gateway IP, not localhost) — a
|
|
# loopback-only bind refuses that connection outright. Confirmed live:
|
|
# "dial tcp 172.17.0.1:8092: connect: connection refused" even though
|
|
# curl from the host itself worked fine on 127.0.0.1. Access is scoped by
|
|
# UFW (see install_security-dashboard), not by which interface this binds
|
|
# to — same pattern every other host-network service in this repo uses.
|
|
with ThreadingHTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", PORT), Handler) as httpd:
|
|
print(f"Security dashboard running on 0.0.0.0:{PORT}")
|
|
httpd.serve_forever()
|
|
|
|
|
|
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
|
main()
|
|
PYAPP
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
[[ "${_RUN_STANDALONE:-0}" == 1 ]] && install_security-dashboard
|