Reworks the outbound permission model from a flat allow-list into three per-extension tiers (internal / restricted / full), addressing the ask for extensions that can only reach pre-approved numbers plus extensions with full US calling, while internal extension-to-extension dialing and ring groups stay ungated for everyone regardless of tier. Permissions now live in pstn-permissions.conf, read by the dialplan via Asterisk's AST_CONFIG() on every call instead of being baked into static dialplan text - editing that file takes effect on the next call, no Asterisk restart and no re-running the installer. "update in place" mode never touches this file (same protection this repo's update-mode convention already gives .env/firewall/Caddy config); only a "fresh" reinstall (with confirmation) or the web UI change it. Adds a "PSTN Trunk" tab to services/security-dashboard.sh: lists every extension (parsed from pjsip.conf) with its live tier and approved numbers, editable with no restart - this is what makes the tier model actually manageable day to day. Extracted the dashboard's systemd-unit writing into its own function so "update" mode refreshes it too (previously only fresh installs did), and generalized both the dashboard and the trunk service to detect either asterisk-digital-ocean or the home/LAN asterisk install. Inbound ring-group membership now checks each member's tier live per call via an unrolled per-member dialplan block (full always rings, restricted only if the caller's number is approved, internal never rings) rather than a single static Dial() string. Caught and fixed two real bugs during testing against a sandboxed vendor copy and a live instance of the (stdlib-only) Python dashboard app: - Asterisk Goto/GotoIf argument parsing: ring<ext>/skip<ext> are named priorities within the same extension (declared via "same => n(label),..."), not separate exten => entries, so jumping to them needs the single-argument Goto(label) form - the two-argument Goto(label,1) form used initially addresses a different, nonexistent extension named "label" instead. - A security-relevant REGEX() direction issue: the inbound Caller-ID check initially interpolated attacker-influenced call data into the PATTERN side of a REGEX() match rather than the tested-string side, which would let a crafted Caller-ID forge a match against an unrelated approved-numbers entry. Fixed by keeping the admin-controlled approved-list as the pattern and the live call data as the string being tested, consistently on both the outbound and inbound checks. Verified end-to-end: dialplan/pjsip generation and vendor-file patching (idempotent, syntax-checked) as before, plus the new permission-file round-trip between bash and Python, and the dashboard's new API endpoints exercised against a real running Python server (extension parsing, tier changes, number normalization, invalid-input rejection, atomic file writes).
14 KiB
PSTN Calling via VoIP.ms — Planning Notes
Research and decisions from a design discussion, saved here so the work can be picked up in a fresh chat without re-deriving the background.
Implemented — see services/pstn-trunk.sh (run sudo ./setup.sh pstn-trunk after asterisk-digital-ocean or asterisk (home/LAN) is
installed — both are supported, see the file for the static-IP caveat on the
LAN variant). Generic SIP trunk add-on that defaults to VoIP.ms but isn't
hardcoded to it — any provider supporting IP authentication works. Covers:
- IP-authenticated trunk, US/NANP-only outbound dialplan, no catch-all.
- A configurable concurrent-call cap (default 3, global not per-extension).
- Three-tier per-extension permission model:
internal(default — no PSTN at all, but can always call/receive other extensions and internal ring groups),restricted(also only pre-approved US numbers, both directions),full(also any US number). Internal extension-to-extension dialing is never gated by any tier. - Permissions are live, not baked into the dialplan. Stored in
pstn-permissions.conf, read by the dialplan via Asterisk'sAST_CONFIG()on every call — editing that file takes effect on the next call, no restart, no reinstall.services/pstn-trunk.sh's "update in place" mode deliberately never touches it (same protection this repo's update-mode convention already gives.env/firewall/Caddy config elsewhere) — only a "fresh" reinstall (with confirmation) or the web UI below change it. - A configurable inbound ring-group (one extension or several), each member's live tier/approved-numbers checked per inbound call via an unrolled per-member dialplan block (no AGI needed).
services/security-dashboard.shintegration — a "PSTN Trunk" tab lists every extension (parsed frompjsip.conf) with its live tier and approved numbers, editable with no restart. This is what makes the tier model actually manageable day-to-day instead of needing a reinstall for every roster change.- ntfy alerts on denied/rejected calls (immediate — permission denied, number not approved, or concurrency cap hit) and spend/volume thresholds (hourly check: once/month on a spend threshold, every hour on a call-burst threshold).
- Structural settings (server, DID, ring-group membership, cap, ntfy,
rate/thresholds) persist to
.pstn-trunk.envso "update in place" reapplies them without re-prompting.
services/pstn-trunk.sh's own header comment explains how the trunk/dialplan
config survives Easy Asterisk's regeneration, and why permissions are a
separate live file rather than baked in — both architectural wrinkles
discovered while implementing this, worth reading before touching either
file.
Decision so far
- Provider: VoIP.ms. Chosen for its prepaid-balance model: turn off
auto-recharge in the account's Finances settings and outbound calls simply
fail once the balance hits $0 — that's the toll-fraud backstop if the
droplet's Asterisk (
asterisk-digital-ocean) is ever compromised. This behavior wasn't verified against a live account — confirm the auto-recharge toggle still works this way at sign-up time, since billing UX can change. - Scope: US calling only, for now. No international, no premium-rate destinations. Enforce this twice — once via whatever dial-plan/prefix VoIP.ms requires for US routing, and again independently in Asterisk's own dialplan (see below), so a compromised extension can't reach anything outside the US even if the trunk itself would technically allow more later.
- Inbound: wanted. A DID is in scope, not outbound-only. Decide pay-per-minute vs. unlimited DID plan based on expected inbound volume (see cost estimate below), and decide E911 deliberately rather than skipping it by default — VoIP.ms doesn't require it, but without it 911 dialed from the line either fails or doesn't carry accurate address/location info.
Cost estimate (100 min/month each direction, US-only)
Verified against VoIP.ms's public wiki/rate pages, not a live account — confirm at sign-up since rates can change.
| Item | Rate | Monthly | Annual |
|---|---|---|---|
| DID (phone number), pay-per-minute plan | $0.85/mo flat | — | $10.20 |
| Inbound usage | $0.009/min | $0.90 | $10.80 |
| Outbound usage | $0.01/min | $1.00 | $12.00 |
| Total | ~$2.75 | ~$33 |
- Skipping the DID (outbound-only) drops this to ~$12/year.
- Adding E911 adds a $1.50 one-time fee plus $1.50/month regulatory fee (~$18/year) — pushes the total above to ~$51/year.
- Funding minimum: VoIP.ms requires a $15 minimum deposit to activate calling — a one-time balance top-up, not a recurring charge. At ~$2.75/month usage that balance lasts ~5 months before a refill is needed (longer at lower volume). Leave auto-recharge off per the toll-fraud design above.
Why this matters (toll fraud)
A compromised Asterisk box can dial premium-rate or international numbers that cost real money fast (some destinations run several $/min) before anyone notices. Two independent layers matter more than either alone:
- Trunk-side cap — prepaid balance, auto-recharge off. Limits total possible loss to whatever the balance is topped up to, but a live compromise could still burn through that balance in minutes if nothing else restricts what can be dialed.
- Dialplan-side restriction — Asterisk should refuse to route calls outside the US/NANP pattern at all, regardless of what the trunk allows. This is the first line of defense and should exist independent of the trunk's own capabilities.
Important nuance: these two layers bound different things, and neither alone bounds both. NANP-only restriction bounds cost-per-minute (a compromised box can only ever reach $0.01/min US numbers, never $2–5/min international/premium destinations) — that risk is fully closed. It does not bound how fast the prepaid balance gets burned: nothing stops a compromised box from opening many concurrent US-destination calls in parallel and draining the whole balance (e.g. $15 balance ÷ $0.01/min = 1,500 minutes total, which 20 concurrent legs could burn through in under an hour). The prepaid-balance-off-auto-recharge layer bounds the dollar ceiling; only a concurrent-call cap bounds the speed of a breach. Treat the concurrent-call cap and spend/volume alert below as required before funding a live trunk, not optional hardening.
Implemented: the concurrent-call cap in services/pstn-trunk.sh is a
global cap (configurable, default max 3 outbound legs total via the trunk,
via GROUP()/GROUP_COUNT() in the dialplan, shared across all extensions)
— not per-extension. That was the explicit ask when this got built. The
spend/volume alert is also implemented now: an hourly cron script reads a
call log the dialplan appends to directly (not Asterisk's CDR — see the
service file's own comments for why) and alerts via ntfy once per month when
estimated spend crosses a threshold, and every hour that call volume in the
last hour looks like a burst. Denied/rejected calls alert immediately,
separately from that hourly check.
What it takes technically (asterisk-digital-ocean)
- A PJSIP trunk:
endpoint/aor/identifysections in the pjsip config. Implemented with IP authentication (noauthsection, no SIP password stored anywhere) — seeservices/pstn-trunk.sh. Provider name, server hostname, and DID are all prompted at install time (VoIP.ms is only the suggested default), so any provider supporting IP auth works. - An outbound dialplan route matching US numbers only — implemented:
_1NXXNXXXXX(11-digit NANP with leading 1) and_NXXNXXXXX(10-digit, auto-prefixed with 1), both routed to the trunk. No catch-all_X.pattern. - Three-tier permission model — implemented, superseding an earlier flat
allow-list design.
internal/restricted/fullper extension, read live frompstn-permissions.confviaAST_CONFIG()rather than baked into the dialplan text — no changes needed to Easy Asterisk's own per-device pjsip.conf sections, since the gate lives entirely in files this repo already owns. Internal extension-to-extension dialing is never gated by any tier — only the two NANP patterns (outbound) and the ring-group (inbound) are. Numbers are stored pipe-separated specifically because they're used as aREGEX()alternation pattern in the dialplan — see the security note below on why the untrusted call-time value must never be interpolated into the pattern side of that check. - Inbound ring-group — implemented. A space-separated list of
extensions to ring for inbound calls (one, or several for a ring group via
Dial(PJSIP/a&PJSIP/b,20)), prompted at install. Each member's tier is checked live per inbound call (an unrolled dialplan block per member — full always rings, restricted only rings if the caller's number is on that member's approved list, internal never rings). - Security note on the REGEX() checks: an inbound Caller-ID (or an
outbound dialed number) is attacker-influenced data and must never be
interpolated into the pattern argument of
REGEX()— only ever the string being tested. Doing it backwards would let a crafted Caller-ID (e.g. containing regex metacharacters) forge a match against an unrelated approved-numbers entry. Both checks inservices/pstn-trunk.shput the admin-controlled approved-list in the pattern position and the live call data in the tested-string position — worth keeping that direction if this is ever refactored. - Web UI — implemented.
services/security-dashboard.sh's "PSTN Trunk" tab lists every extension (parsed frompjsip.conf, the same marker format Easy Asterisk's ownrebuild_dialplan()uses) with a tier dropdown and approved-numbers field, saving straight topstn-permissions.conf. Tested end-to-end with a real running instance of the (stdlib-only) Python app: extension parsing, tier changes, number normalization/ validation, and persistence all verified with actual HTTP requests against a live server in a sandboxed test — not just read through. - Provider-specific setup that isn't scriptable (user does this manually):
create the account, order a DID, decide pay-per-minute vs. unlimited DID
plan and whether to add E911, pick a server/POP, fund the prepaid balance
($15 minimum for VoIP.ms), turn off auto-recharge.
services/pstn-trunk.shprompts for the server hostname, DID, allowed extensions, ring extensions, concurrency cap, ntfy topic, and spend-alert settings at install time. - Defense-in-depth alongside the trunk:
- Implemented: a global concurrent-call cap in the dialplan
(
GROUP()/GROUP_COUNT(), configurable, default max 3 outbound legs via the trunk at once) so an unauthorized or compromised extension can't open dozens of simultaneous outbound legs. Global, not per-extension — see the note above. - Implemented: an outbound call-count/spend alert via ntfy — a
self-contained call log (not Asterisk's CDR) plus an hourly cron script.
Denied/rejected calls also alert immediately. See
services/pstn-trunk.sh's "Spend/volume alerts" README section for the exact mechanics and why CDR wasn't used. - Worth being explicit that CrowdSec's existing
asterisk_bf/asterisk_user_enumscenarios (seeservices/crowdsec.sh) cover registration brute-force, which is a different threat model from a legitimately-registered extension being used for toll fraud — nobody should assume CrowdSec alone already covers this.
- Implemented: a global concurrent-call cap in the dialplan
(
Provider landscape (for reference — not chosen)
- SIP.US — also prepaid, flat per-channel rate, built-in fraud detection. Considered, not chosen.
- Several providers (Nextiva, IDT Express) advertise AI/ML-based fraud monitoring as a second layer on top of normal billing — an extra net, not a substitute for a hard prepaid ceiling.
- Most providers don't market an explicit "spending cap" feature — the prepaid-balance + auto-recharge-off pattern is the de facto mechanism across the space, VoIP.ms included.
Open items for whoever picks this up next
Decide: newDone — separate service file, generalized to any IP-auth SIP provider (VoIP.ms is just the default).services/pstn-trunk.sh...IP auth vs. registrationDone — IP authentication, no password stored.Exact NANP dial pattern(s)Done —_1NXXNXXXXX/_NXXNXXXXX.InboundDone — rings a configurable list of extensions (ring-group supported), each checked live per-call against its own tier.Permission modelDone — superseded the original flat allow-list with a 3-tier model (internal/restricted/full) managed live viapstn-permissions.conf+ the Security Dashboard web UI, no reinstall needed to change.Generic Asterisk targetDone —services/pstn-trunk.shnow supports eitherasterisk-digital-oceanor the home/LANasteriskinstall (the latter with a static-IP caveat for the provider's IP authentication). Still unresolved: pick pay-per-minute vs. unlimited DID plan on VoIP.ms's side based on real expected volume, and decide on E911 (see cost estimate).Concurrent-call capDone — configurable, default 3, global not per-extension.Spend/volume alertDone — ntfy, hourly threshold + burst check, plus immediate alerts on denied/rejected calls.- Verify against a live VoIP.ms account: auto-recharge-off behavior at
sign-up, and that the chosen POP server's actual source IP for inbound
calls matches what
services/pstn-trunk.shresolved via DNS at install time (VoIP.ms's docs mention some redundancy/failover between servers — if inbound calls ever stop matching theidentifysection, this is the first thing to check).