#!/bin/bash # services/security-dashboard.sh — Security dashboard: Asterisk failed-connection # log + CrowdSec decisions (view/unban/ASN-exempt management), Authelia-protected. # Part of the modular post-install system (sourced by setup.sh). # # Can also be run standalone on any machine: # sudo bash security-dashboard.sh # (Docker must already be installed when run standalone — Caddy fronts this, # even though the dashboard itself runs natively on the host, not in Docker) # # Why native, not Docker: it needs to run `cscli` (a host binary — CrowdSec is # a system service, not a container, see services/crowdsec.sh) and read # Asterisk's security log directly off disk. Running natively avoids bridging # the container/host boundary entirely — no LAPI credentials to expose to a # containerized frontend, no Docker socket mount. Same reasoning as why # CrowdSec itself is a system service in this repo, not a docker-compose one. # ── Standalone bootstrap ────────────────────────────────────────────────────── if [[ "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" == "${0}" ]]; then [[ "$(id -u)" == "0" ]] || { echo "Run with sudo: sudo bash $0"; exit 1; } _SELF_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)" _COMMON="$_SELF_DIR/../lib/common.sh" if [[ -f "$_COMMON" ]]; then # shellcheck source=../lib/common.sh source "$_COMMON" else log_info() { echo -e "\033[0;34m[INFO]\033[0m $*"; } log_success() { echo -e "\033[0;32m[OK]\033[0m $*"; } log_warning() { echo -e "\033[1;33m[WARN]\033[0m $*"; } log_error() { echo -e "\033[0;31m[ERROR]\033[0m $*" >&2; } prompt_text() { local _q="$1" _def="$2" _var="$3" _r [[ "${UNATTENDED:-false}" == "true" ]] && { eval "$_var='$_def'"; return; } read -r -p " $_q " _r eval "$_var='${_r:-$_def}'" } prompt_yn() { local _q="$1" _def="$2" _var="$3" _r [[ "${UNATTENDED:-false}" == "true" ]] && { eval "$_var='$_def'"; return; } read -r -p " $_q " _r eval "$_var='${_r:-$_def}'" } write_readme() { local _dir="$1"; shift mkdir -p "$_dir" cat > "$_dir/README.md" } fi ACTUAL_USER="${ACTUAL_USER:-${SUDO_USER:-$USER}}" ACTUAL_HOME="$(getent passwd "$ACTUAL_USER" 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f6 || echo "${HOME:-/root}")" DOCKER_DIR="${DOCKER_DIR:-$ACTUAL_HOME/docker}" DRY_RUN="${DRY_RUN:-false}" UNATTENDED="${UNATTENDED:-false}" SITE_DOMAIN="${SITE_DOMAIN:-example.com}" register_service() { :; } _RUN_STANDALONE=1 fi # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── register_service security-dashboard homelab "Security dashboard: Asterisk failed-connections + extension/trunk management + CrowdSec bans (Authelia-protected)" 8092 install_security-dashboard() { local APP_DIR="/opt/security-dashboard" local DASHBOARD_PORT=8092 local SVC_USER="secdash" # Either install layout works — prefer ~/docker/asterisk-digital-ocean # (a droplet from before that service was merged into `asterisk`) if both # happen to exist, matching services/pstn-trunk.sh's own preference order # for consistency. local ASTERISK_EA_DIR="" if [ -d "$DOCKER_DIR/asterisk-digital-ocean" ]; then ASTERISK_EA_DIR="$DOCKER_DIR/asterisk-digital-ocean" elif [ -d "$DOCKER_DIR/asterisk" ]; then ASTERISK_EA_DIR="$DOCKER_DIR/asterisk" fi local ASTERISK_LOG_DIR="${ASTERISK_EA_DIR:+$ASTERISK_EA_DIR/logs}" local ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR="${ASTERISK_EA_DIR:+$ASTERISK_EA_DIR/config/asterisk}" # categories.conf/rooms.conf live in a SEPARATE directory from # pjsip.conf — see vendor/easy-asterisk/easy-asterisk-v0.10.0.sh's own # CATEGORIES_FILE/ROOMS_FILE constants (/etc/easy-asterisk/*, not # /etc/asterisk/*). ASTERISK_EA_CONTAINER names the actual container to # `docker exec` into for the Extensions tab's device writes/CLI calls # (ea_* functions) — "easy-asterisk", or "easy-asterisk-do" for a droplet # set up before the two Asterisk services merged, matching whichever # container_name services/asterisk.sh actually used there. local ASTERISK_EA_CONFIG_DIR="${ASTERISK_EA_DIR:+$ASTERISK_EA_DIR/config/easy-asterisk}" local ASTERISK_EA_CONTAINER="" if [[ "$ASTERISK_EA_DIR" == *asterisk-digital-ocean ]]; then ASTERISK_EA_CONTAINER="easy-asterisk-do" elif [ -n "$ASTERISK_EA_DIR" ]; then ASTERISK_EA_CONTAINER="easy-asterisk" fi echo "" echo "┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐" echo "│ SECURITY DASHBOARD │" echo "│ Asterisk failed-connection log + one Extensions tab (devices, │" echo "│ categories, rooms, groups, PSTN tiers, DIDs) + CrowdSec bans, │" echo "│ one page. Runs natively on the host (not Docker) so it can call │" echo "│ cscli and read Asterisk's files directly. Authelia-protected. │" echo "└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘" echo "" if [ -z "$ASTERISK_EA_DIR" ]; then log_warning "No Asterisk install detected." log_warning "The Security Log and Extensions tabs will just be empty — CrowdSec's tab" log_warning "still works fine." fi if [ "$DRY_RUN" = true ]; then echo "[DRY-RUN] Would create system user $SVC_USER" echo "[DRY-RUN] Would write $APP_DIR/app.py" echo "[DRY-RUN] Would write /etc/sudoers.d/security-dashboard (scoped cscli/systemctl/set-asn-exempt.sh only)" echo "[DRY-RUN] Would write a systemd unit and start it on 0.0.0.0:$DASHBOARD_PORT (firewalled via UFW, not interface binding)" echo "[DRY-RUN] Would grant read/write access to the detected Asterisk config dir (for the Extensions tab)" echo "[DRY-RUN] Would configure Caddy + Authelia for a domain you'll be prompted for" return 0 fi if [ -f "$APP_DIR/app.py" ]; then local MODE="" prompt_reinstall_mode MODE 2>/dev/null || { # prompt_reinstall_mode isn't defined in the standalone stub — fall # back to a plain yes/no when run outside the full repo. local _r="" prompt_yn " Security dashboard already exists at $APP_DIR — reconfigure? (y/n):" "n" _r [ "$_r" = "y" ] || [ "$_r" = "Y" ] && MODE="fresh" || MODE="cancel" } case "$MODE" in update) log_info "Refreshing app code + sudoers rule + systemd unit (no Caddy/domain changes)..." _secdash_grant_asterisk_access "$SVC_USER" "$ASTERISK_LOG_DIR" "$ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR" "$ASTERISK_EA_CONFIG_DIR" _secdash_write_app "$APP_DIR" _secdash_write_asn_helper "$APP_DIR" _secdash_write_sudoers "$SVC_USER" "$ASTERISK_EA_CONTAINER" _secdash_write_systemd_unit "$APP_DIR" "$SVC_USER" "$DASHBOARD_PORT" "$ASTERISK_LOG_DIR" "$ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR" "$ASTERISK_EA_CONFIG_DIR" "$ASTERISK_EA_CONTAINER" systemctl restart security-dashboard 2>/dev/null \ && log_success "security-dashboard restarted" \ || log_warning "Restart failed — check: systemctl status security-dashboard" echo "" local _reconf="" prompt_yn "Reconfigure this dashboard's Caddy protection (Authelia domain, or add/rotate an independent Basic Auth layer)? (y/n):" "n" _reconf if [[ "$_reconf" =~ ^[Yy]$ ]]; then _secdash_remove_caddy_block "$DASHBOARD_PORT" _secdash_configure_caddy "$DASHBOARD_PORT" fi return 0 ;; cancel) log_info "Leaving the existing install as-is." return 0 ;; fresh) ;; esac fi # ── System user (no login, no home directory needed) ──────────────────── if ! id "$SVC_USER" &>/dev/null; then useradd --system --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin "$SVC_USER" log_success "Created system user $SVC_USER" fi _secdash_grant_asterisk_access "$SVC_USER" "$ASTERISK_LOG_DIR" "$ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR" "$ASTERISK_EA_CONFIG_DIR" mkdir -p "$APP_DIR" _secdash_write_app "$APP_DIR" chown -R "$SVC_USER:$SVC_USER" "$APP_DIR" _secdash_write_asn_helper "$APP_DIR" _secdash_write_sudoers "$SVC_USER" "$ASTERISK_EA_CONTAINER" _secdash_write_systemd_unit "$APP_DIR" "$SVC_USER" "$DASHBOARD_PORT" "$ASTERISK_LOG_DIR" "$ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR" "$ASTERISK_EA_CONFIG_DIR" "$ASTERISK_EA_CONTAINER" systemctl daemon-reload systemctl enable security-dashboard >/dev/null 2>&1 if systemctl restart security-dashboard; then log_success "security-dashboard started on port $DASHBOARD_PORT (all interfaces — UFW scopes actual access)" else log_warning "Failed to start — check: systemctl status security-dashboard" fi # ── Caddy + Authelia (+ optional independent Basic Auth) ──────────────── # This is deliberately more insistent about auth than most services — it # can delete active CrowdSec bans, so an unauthenticated exposure here is # a real security hole, not just an inconvenience. Factored into # _secdash_configure_caddy so "update" mode can also offer to reconfigure # it later (e.g. to add Basic Auth to an already-deployed dashboard) # without duplicating this logic — see that function for the rest. _secdash_configure_caddy "$DASHBOARD_PORT" write_readme "$APP_DIR" << README_MD # Security Dashboard Asterisk failed-connection log + CrowdSec ban management, one Authelia- protected page. Runs natively on the host (systemd service \`security-dashboard\`), not in Docker — it needs to call \`cscli\` and read Asterisk's log directly. ## Tabs Three tabs: **Security Log**, **Extensions**, **CrowdSec**. The first two are always there (they only need Asterisk itself, detected once at install time); CrowdSec checks its own live install state on every page load and hides its nav button if \`cscli\` isn't found. Extensions used to be three separate tabs — *Asterisk Admin*, *Extensions* and *PSTN Trunk* — which between them listed the same extensions three times: once as devices with a category/status, once as a row of messaging checkboxes, and once as permission tiers. They're now one tab with one extensions table, and each capability adds columns and cards to it instead of a nav button of its own. That means the page still scales from a bare LAN Asterisk box up to a full droplet with a trunk, without ever showing a control for something that isn't set up — you just don't have to remember which tab a given extension's settings live on. - **Security Log** — parses \`$ASTERISK_LOG_DIR/full\` for SIP auth failures (wrong password, unknown extension, etc.) with timestamp/account/remote IP, sortable per column (click a header to sort, click again to reverse). - **Extensions** — one row per extension, merged from \`pjsip.conf\` (which always works) and, when the Easy Asterisk container is reachable, its own device list. Columns: Ext, Name, then Category/Status/Transport if that container is present, then **PSTN** + **Whitelist** if a trunk dialplan is installed, then Messaging (always: internal SIP texting has no PSTN dependency at all — no cost, no carrier, no DID). Each extension has one whitelist and a mode saying which direction(s) it applies to: **No PSTN**, **Unrestricted**, **Restrict outbound** (may only dial the list, anyone can call in), **Restrict inbound** (may dial anywhere, only the list can call in), or **Restrict both**. The whitelist field greys out for the two modes that don't use one. Internal extension-to-extension calling and ring groups are never gated by any of this. Name and Category are edited **in place**; every cell feeds one batched save. Rows you've touched get a highlight and a left rail, a sticky bar reports how many are edited, and **Save changes** commits just those rows — routing each change to the endpoint it needs (rename/category through the container; tier + approved numbers + messaging through the permissions file, or the messaging-only endpoint when there's no trunk). **Discard** reverts to what's on disk, and closing the page with edits pending warns first. Delete keeps its own control per row, since it's destructive and must not ride along with a batch. Everything below the table — Categories, Rooms, Groups, Concurrent-call caps, Personal numbers — is a collapsed section with an item count in its header, so the tab opens on the extensions table rather than on six expanded cards. Long explanations sit behind "what this means" disclosures for the same reason. The table scrolls horizontally inside its own card, so the page never scrolls sideways on a phone. - **Extensions** — add/rename/delete a SIP extension, reassign its category; live registered/unregistered status per device. This is a native reimplementation of Easy Asterisk's own vendored web admin (\`vendor/easy-asterisk/easy-asterisk-v0.10.0.sh\`'s device/category/room management), not a link or an iframe to that separate process — one page, one login. Reads \`pjsip.conf\`/\`categories.conf\`/\`rooms.conf\` directly (same formats the vendor's own \`easy-asterisk --rebuild-dialplan\` CLI still generates the dialplan from); writes go through \`docker exec ... tee\` (root, sudo-gated) instead of a direct host-side file write, since Easy Asterisk's container writes these as its own internal user and a host-side write would just be fighting that ownership again on the next restart. Every write reloads PJSIP and/or rebuilds the dialplan automatically, the same way the vendored admin's own actions do. - **Categories** — device profiles (an auto-answer default + description). - **Rooms** — ring groups/paging groups; add/remove members per room. - **Groups** — name a set of extensions and bulk-enable/disable messaging for all of them at once. A management convenience only, not a runtime concept: applying an action just writes the same per-extension \`pstn-permissions.conf\` key each member's own checkbox would, and membership changes never retroactively affect anything already applied. (A group owning a personal DID *is* evaluated live against current membership, though — see below.) - **Concurrent-call caps** and **Personal numbers** appear only once \`services/pstn-trunk.sh\`'s dialplan is actually installed (\`pstn-trunk-dialplan.conf\` present), so the page never shows a real-looking-but-unenforced editor. Caps are the outbound/inbound concurrent-call limits; personal numbers map a DID to an owner extension or group, additive to the shared trunk DID. Writes go directly to \`pstn-limits.conf\` / \`pstn-permissions.conf\` / \`pstn-personal-dids.conf\`, which the dialplan reads fresh on every call. The spend-cap kill-switch and international-calling allow-list are deliberately **not** managed here — CLI-only, via \`sudo ./setup.sh pstn-trunk\` — since both are more security-sensitive than what this tab already exposes. - **CrowdSec** — its nav button only appears once \`cscli\` is detected on this host. Current bans (\`cscli decisions list\`), a delete/unban button per entry, carrier/ASN + country columns (sortable per column), and management of the ASN-exempt Asterisk brute-force scenarios (see \`services/crowdsec.sh\`'s "Exempt specific carrier ASNs" option) without SSHing in: - **Currently-exempt ASNs** are listed with carrier name (resolved from current bans, falling back to alert history for ASNs with no active ban right now) regardless of when they were added. - **Unwhitelist** removes an ASN from the exemption list — future Asterisk auth failures from it are evaluated normally again. - **Unwhitelist + Ban** does that *and* immediately bans (24h) every IP CrowdSec has ever recorded for that ASN, for accidental-whitelist cases where you don't want to wait for it to misbehave again. ## Manage \`\`\` sudo systemctl status security-dashboard sudo systemctl restart security-dashboard sudo journalctl -u security-dashboard -f \`\`\` ## Security notes - Runs as a dedicated, unprivileged system user (\`secdash\`), not root. - Sudo access is scoped to exact commands via \`/etc/sudoers.d/security-dashboard\` — nothing else. CrowdSec: \`cscli decisions delete --id \`, \`cscli decisions list -o json\`, \`cscli alerts list -o json\` (read-only, used to label ASN exemptions with a carrier name from past alerts and to find known offending IPs for the "Ban" action), \`cscli decisions add --ip --duration --type ban --reason \` (used only by "Ban"), \`systemctl restart crowdsec\`, and \`set-asn-exempt.sh\` (root:root, mode 700, installed alongside \`app.py\` — the one thing that edits CrowdSec's Asterisk-scenario YAMLs, since \`secdash\` has no write access to those root-owned files directly and shouldn't). Extension/device management (only added if an Asterisk install is detected): \`docker exec -i tee\` against exactly \`pjsip.conf\`/\`categories.conf\`/\`rooms.conf\`, plus \`asterisk -rx "module reload res_pjsip.so"\`, \`asterisk -rx "pjsip show endpoints"\`, and \`easy-asterisk --rebuild-dialplan\` — all scoped to the one Asterisk container actually installed on this box, none of it a wildcard. - Listens on all interfaces (Caddy reaches it via \`host.docker.internal\`, a Docker bridge IP — a loopback-only bind refuses that). Access is scoped by UFW instead, allowed only from Caddy's internal network, not the internet. - **This page can delete active security bans.** It's protected by Authelia (or a remote instance) by default, and the installer offers a second, independent HTTP Basic Auth layer in front of that — a request must pass Basic Auth *and* Authelia before it ever reaches the app, so an Authelia bug or misconfiguration alone isn't enough to expose this page. Re-run the installer ("update" mode → reconfigure Caddy protection) to add, rotate, or remove that Basic Auth layer later. README_MD echo "" echo " Local access: http://localhost:$DASHBOARD_PORT" echo " README: $APP_DIR/README.md" echo "" } # Grants secdash execute-only traversal (via a POSIX ACL, not chmod) on # every ancestor directory between the filesystem root and _leaf, stopping # early once an ancestor is already reachable. Needed because DOCKER_DIR can # be /root/docker (any root-run droplet — a fully supported setup, not a # mistake) and some cloud images ship /root at a bare 700: no matter what # access the LEAF directory itself grants, secdash (a non-root system user) # can never reach through a blocking ancestor to get there. setfacl here # grants ONLY the ability to pass through a path already known in advance — # it does not grant listing that directory's contents or reading anything # else inside it. _secdash_grant_ancestor_traversal() { local _svc_user="$1" _leaf="$2" command -v setfacl >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 0 local _dir _dir="$(dirname "$_leaf")" while [[ "$_dir" != "/" && -n "$_dir" ]]; do sudo -u "$_svc_user" test -x "$_dir" 2>/dev/null && break setfacl -m "u:${_svc_user}:x" "$_dir" 2>/dev/null || true _dir="$(dirname "$_dir")" done } # Grants secdash read/write access to wherever Asterisk's config lives # without running the dashboard as root or the actual user. Separate # function, called from both "update" and fresh-install, so a PSTN trunk # installed *after* this dashboard (or an asterisk-digital-ocean/asterisk # swap) reaches an existing install on its next update instead of silently # only applying to new ones. # # Uses POSIX ACLs (setfacl), not chmod + group membership. Confirmed live: # the Asterisk container's own entrypoint runs `chown -R asterisk:asterisk # /etc/asterisk` on every container start/restart — and the numeric UID/GID # that resolves to inside the container can coincidentally collide with # unrelated system accounts on the host (observed: config/asterisk ending up # owned by messagebus:uuidd, neither of which secdash has any relationship # to), silently reverting whatever group grant was applied at install time. # `chown` does not touch ACL entries (only `chmod` recalculates the ACL # mask, and nothing in this flow calls chmod after install) — so an # ACL-based grant survives that reset instead of quietly breaking again on # the next container restart. `-d` (default ACL) makes new files/directories # created later (a regenerated dialplan file, a fresh personal-DID entry) # inherit the same grant automatically. Falls back to the old chmod/group # approach with a warning if the `acl` package isn't installed for some # reason (should always be present — installed below). _secdash_grant_asterisk_access() { local _svc_user="$1" _log_dir="$2" _config_dir="$3" _ea_config_dir="${4:-}" command -v setfacl >/dev/null 2>&1 || run_cmd apt-get install -y acl >/dev/null 2>&1 local _have_acl=false command -v setfacl >/dev/null 2>&1 && _have_acl=true [ "$_have_acl" = true ] || log_warning "Package 'acl' unavailable — falling back to group-based access, which can silently break again whenever the Asterisk container re-chowns its own config directory. Install 'acl' and re-run to fix that properly." local _dir for _dir in "$_log_dir" "$_config_dir" "$_ea_config_dir"; do [ -n "$_dir" ] && [ -d "$_dir" ] || continue _secdash_grant_ancestor_traversal "$_svc_user" "$_dir" if [ "$_have_acl" = true ]; then setfacl -R -m "u:${_svc_user}:rX" "$_dir" 2>/dev/null || true setfacl -R -d -m "u:${_svc_user}:rX" "$_dir" 2>/dev/null || true else local _group _group="$(stat -c '%G' "$_dir" 2>/dev/null || echo "$ACTUAL_USER")" usermod -aG "$_group" "$_svc_user" 2>/dev/null || true chmod 750 "$_dir" 2>/dev/null || true fi done # pstn-permissions.conf/pstn-limits.conf/pstn-personal-dids.conf need # WRITE access on the containing directory too (configparser writes a # fresh temp file then renames it into place) — only on the config dir, # not the log dir (no reason for secdash to ever create files there). # _ea_config_dir (categories.conf/rooms.conf) deliberately stays # read-only — the Extensions tab writes those through # `docker exec ... tee` instead (see the ea_* functions), not a direct # host-side write, so there's no reason to grant it write access at all. if [ -n "$_config_dir" ] && [ -d "$_config_dir" ]; then if [ "$_have_acl" = true ]; then setfacl -m "u:${_svc_user}:rwx" "$_config_dir" 2>/dev/null || true setfacl -d -m "u:${_svc_user}:rwx" "$_config_dir" 2>/dev/null || true else chmod 770 "$_config_dir" 2>/dev/null || true fi fi } # Systemd unit — separate function so "update" mode can refresh it too # (Environment= vars and ReadWritePaths depend on which Asterisk flavor is # detected, which can change between installs — e.g. a PSTN trunk or a # different Asterisk flavor installed after this dashboard's first setup). # ProtectSystem=strict makes the whole filesystem read-only for this unit # except the paths explicitly listed below, regardless of Unix permissions — # both layers (this AND the group access above) need to agree, or writes # fail even when Unix permissions alone would have allowed them. _secdash_write_systemd_unit() { local _app_dir="$1" _svc_user="$2" _port="$3" _log_dir="$4" _config_dir="$5" _ea_config_dir="${6:-}" _ea_container="${7:-}" local _read_only_paths="" _read_write_paths="/etc/crowdsec/scenarios" [ -n "$_log_dir" ] && _read_only_paths="$_log_dir" [ -n "$_ea_config_dir" ] && _read_only_paths="$_read_only_paths $_ea_config_dir" [ -n "$_config_dir" ] && _read_write_paths="$_read_write_paths $_config_dir" cat > /etc/systemd/system/security-dashboard.service << SDSVC [Unit] Description=Security dashboard (Asterisk security log + CrowdSec decisions + PSTN trunk permissions + Asterisk admin) After=network.target [Service] Type=simple User=$_svc_user Group=$_svc_user Environment=DASHBOARD_PORT=$_port Environment=ASTERISK_LOG=${_log_dir:+$_log_dir/full} Environment=ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR=$_config_dir Environment=ASTERISK_EA_CONFIG_DIR=$_ea_config_dir Environment=ASTERISK_EA_CONTAINER=$_ea_container ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 $_app_dir/app.py Restart=on-failure RestartSec=3 NoNewPrivileges=false ProtectSystem=strict ReadOnlyPaths=$_read_only_paths ReadWritePaths=$_read_write_paths [Install] WantedBy=multi-user.target SDSVC } # Scoped sudo — only the exact commands the app needs, nothing else. Numeric- # only glob on the decision ID; Python subprocess calls always pass args as a # list (no shell=True anywhere), so there's no shell-metachar injection # surface even before sudoers' own pattern match kicks in — the server-side # ID validation (must be all-digits) happens before this is ever reached, # this is defense in depth, not the only check. Separate function, called # from both "update" and fresh-install, so adding a new permission later # (like alerts list, added after ASN-exempt entries with no currently-active # ban had no carrier name to show) reaches existing installs on their next # update instead of silently only applying to new ones. _secdash_write_sudoers() { local _svc_user="$1" _ea_container="${2:-}" local _ea_lines="" # Extensions tab device management (ea_* functions) — every write goes through # `docker exec -i tee ` instead of a direct # host-side file write (see _secdash_grant_asterisk_access's comment on # why), plus the two Asterisk CLI calls needed after a change and the # live registration-status check. All seven are exact commands, no # wildcards, scoped to the one container actually installed on this box. # The last line (docker restart) backs the Extensions tab's "Commit # Changes" button — see restart_asterisk_container()'s comment for why # that exists (AST_CONFIG() live-reads not always picking up dashboard # edits without a full container restart). if [ -n "$_ea_container" ]; then _ea_lines="$_svc_user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/docker exec -i $_ea_container tee /etc/asterisk/pjsip.conf $_svc_user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/docker exec -i $_ea_container tee /etc/easy-asterisk/rooms.conf $_svc_user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/docker exec $_ea_container asterisk -rx module\ reload\ res_pjsip.so $_svc_user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/docker exec $_ea_container asterisk -rx pjsip\ show\ endpoints $_svc_user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/docker exec $_ea_container /usr/local/bin/easy-asterisk --rebuild-dialplan $_svc_user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/docker restart $_ea_container" fi cat > /etc/sudoers.d/security-dashboard << SUDOERS $_svc_user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/cscli decisions delete --id [0-9]* $_svc_user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/cscli decisions list -o json $_svc_user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/cscli alerts list -o json $_svc_user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/cscli decisions add --ip * --duration * --type ban --reason * $_svc_user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/systemctl restart crowdsec $_svc_user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /opt/security-dashboard/set-asn-exempt.sh * ${_ea_lines} SUDOERS chmod 440 /etc/sudoers.d/security-dashboard visudo -c -f /etc/sudoers.d/security-dashboard >/dev/null 2>&1 \ && log_success "Sudoers rule installed and validated" \ || { log_error "Sudoers rule failed validation — removing it (dashboard's CrowdSec tab won't work until fixed)"; rm -f /etc/sudoers.d/security-dashboard; } } # Caddy + Authelia (+ optional independent Basic Auth) for the dashboard. # Separate function so "update" mode can call _secdash_remove_caddy_block + # this to reconfigure an already-deployed dashboard (e.g. to add Basic Auth # retroactively) using the exact same code path as a fresh install, instead # of hand-patching a live Caddyfile block in place. _secdash_configure_caddy() { local DASHBOARD_PORT="$1" echo "" if ! command -v docker &>/dev/null || ! docker ps --format '{{.Names}}' 2>/dev/null | grep -q "^caddy$"; then log_info "Caddy not running — dashboard stays on http://localhost:$DASHBOARD_PORT until you set it up." return 0 fi local _default_domain="" if [ -n "${SITE_DOMAIN:-}" ] && [ "$SITE_DOMAIN" != "example.com" ]; then _default_domain="security.${SITE_DOMAIN}" fi local SD_DOMAIN="" prompt_text " Domain for the dashboard (e.g. security.yourdomain.com), you'll need to point DNS at this droplet yourself [${_default_domain:-required}]:" "$_default_domain" SD_DOMAIN if [ -z "$SD_DOMAIN" ]; then log_warning "No domain entered — dashboard stays on http://localhost:$DASHBOARD_PORT only (not reachable from outside this box)." return 0 fi local EXTRA_BLOCK="" if [ -d "$DOCKER_DIR/authelia" ]; then EXTRA_BLOCK=" import authelia" log_info "Local Authelia detected — protecting with it." else log_warning "No local Authelia found. This dashboard can delete active security" log_warning "bans — strongly recommend protecting it before exposing it publicly." local _use_remote="" prompt_yn " Protect with a remote Authelia instance (e.g. on a homelab)? (y/n):" "y" _use_remote if [[ "$_use_remote" =~ ^[Yy]$ ]]; then local _remote_authelia="" prompt_text " Remote Authelia address (bare host:port on a private network, or a full https:// URL on its own public domain+TLS):" "" _remote_authelia if [ -n "$_remote_authelia" ]; then # See services/asterisk-digital-ocean.sh for why # X-Forwarded-Host must be a literal domain here, not # the {host} placeholder — confirmed live that the # placeholder still evaluates to the upstream # Authelia's own hostname for a scheme-qualified # remote upstream, not the original site's. EXTRA_BLOCK=" forward_auth ${_remote_authelia} { uri /api/authz/forward-auth copy_headers Remote-User Remote-Groups Remote-Name Remote-Email header_up X-Forwarded-Method {method} header_up X-Forwarded-Proto {scheme} header_up X-Forwarded-Host ${SD_DOMAIN} header_up X-Forwarded-Uri {uri} }" fi fi fi # ── Independent Basic Auth layer (defense-in-depth on top of Authelia) ── # Authelia already gates this page, but it's still one piece of software # this dashboard trusts completely — this repo already hit one real # Authelia forward_auth header bypass (see services/authelia.sh's # header_up X-Forwarded-Host fix). This dashboard can delete active # security bans, so it's worth a second, genuinely independent gate that # doesn't depend on Authelia (or its session store, or its config) at # all. basicauth is written before EXTRA_BLOCK below, so a request must # clear it before ever reaching Authelia's forward_auth call. local BASICAUTH_BLOCK="" local _use_basicauth="" prompt_yn " Add an independent Basic Auth login in front of Authelia, as a second, separate layer? (y/n):" "y" _use_basicauth if [[ "$_use_basicauth" =~ ^[Yy]$ ]]; then local BA_USER="" BA_PASS="" BA_HASH="" prompt_text " Basic Auth username [admin]:" "admin" BA_USER BA_PASS="$(generate_password 20)" log_info "Generating Basic Auth password hash (via the running Caddy container)..." BA_HASH="$(docker exec caddy caddy hash-password --plaintext "$BA_PASS" 2>/dev/null)" if [ -z "$BA_HASH" ]; then log_warning "Could not generate the Basic Auth hash — skipping this layer. Authelia alone will protect the dashboard." else BASICAUTH_BLOCK=" basicauth { ${BA_USER} ${BA_HASH} } " log_success "Basic Auth username: ${BA_USER}" log_success "Basic Auth password: ${BA_PASS}" log_warning "Save that password now — only the bcrypt hash is written to the Caddyfile, it is not stored anywhere in plaintext." fi fi if [ -z "$EXTRA_BLOCK" ] && [ -z "$BASICAUTH_BLOCK" ]; then log_error "Proceeding WITHOUT any auth protection — anyone who finds this domain" log_error "can view and delete active security bans. Strongly reconsider." local _confirm_unsafe="" prompt_yn " Really continue without auth protection? (y/n):" "n" _confirm_unsafe if [[ ! "$_confirm_unsafe" =~ ^[Yy]$ ]]; then log_info "Skipping Caddy setup. Re-run this installer once Authelia is available." return 0 fi fi local CADDY_FILE="$DOCKER_DIR/caddy/Caddyfile" if [ -f "$CADDY_FILE" ] && ! grep -q "^${SD_DOMAIN} {" "$CADDY_FILE"; then cat >> "$CADDY_FILE" << CADDYBLOCK # Security Dashboard ${SD_DOMAIN} { ${BASICAUTH_BLOCK}${EXTRA_BLOCK} reverse_proxy host.docker.internal:${DASHBOARD_PORT} header { Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload" X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" X-Frame-Options "DENY" Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" } log { output file /var/log/caddy/${SD_DOMAIN}.log format json } } CADDYBLOCK docker exec caddy caddy fmt --overwrite /etc/caddy/Caddyfile 2>/dev/null || true docker compose -f "$DOCKER_DIR/caddy/docker-compose.yml" restart caddy 2>/dev/null \ && log_success "Caddy restarted — dashboard at https://${SD_DOMAIN}" \ || log_warning "Restart Caddy manually: cd $DOCKER_DIR/caddy && docker compose restart" elif [ -f "$CADDY_FILE" ]; then log_warning "$SD_DOMAIN already in Caddyfile — leaving the existing entry alone." fi # This port never needs to be open to the internet — only Caddy (local, # via host.docker.internal) ever needs to reach it. if command -v ufw &>/dev/null; then ufw delete allow "${DASHBOARD_PORT}/tcp" 2>/dev/null || true if declare -f ufw_allow_from_caddy_net >/dev/null 2>&1; then ufw_allow_from_caddy_net "${DASHBOARD_PORT}" fi fi } # Removes the dashboard's existing Caddyfile site block (found via its # unique reverse_proxy line, walking backward to the nearest " {" # open and forward to the matching unindented "}" close) so # _secdash_configure_caddy can regenerate it fresh on "update" mode's # reconfigure path, rather than trying to surgically patch a live Caddyfile # in place — a whole-block delete-and-regenerate is much harder to get # subtly wrong than in-place editing of a file this security-critical. _secdash_remove_caddy_block() { local port="$1" local caddy_file="$DOCKER_DIR/caddy/Caddyfile" [ -f "$caddy_file" ] || return 0 local marker=" reverse_proxy host.docker.internal:${port}" local marker_line domain_line end_line marker_line="$(grep -nF "$marker" "$caddy_file" | head -1 | cut -d: -f1)" if [ -z "$marker_line" ]; then return 0 # nothing deployed yet — fine, the fresh flow will just append fi domain_line="$(head -n "$marker_line" "$caddy_file" | grep -nE '^[^[:space:]#].* \{$' | tail -1 | cut -d: -f1)" if [ -z "$domain_line" ]; then log_warning "Could not find the start of the existing dashboard Caddy block — leaving it as-is." return 1 fi # Pull in the "# Security Dashboard" comment line right above it too, if present if [ "$domain_line" -gt 1 ] && sed -n "$((domain_line - 1))p" "$caddy_file" | grep -qx '# Security Dashboard'; then domain_line=$((domain_line - 1)) fi end_line="$(tail -n "+$marker_line" "$caddy_file" | grep -nx '}' | head -1 | cut -d: -f1)" if [ -z "$end_line" ]; then log_warning "Could not find the end of the existing dashboard Caddy block — leaving it as-is." return 1 fi end_line=$((marker_line + end_line - 1)) sed -i "${domain_line},${end_line}d" "$caddy_file" log_info "Removed the existing dashboard Caddy block (regenerating it fresh)." } # Root-owned helper for editing CrowdSec's Asterisk-scenario YAMLs — the # secdash service user (--shell /usr/sbin/nologin, no special file grants) # cannot write /etc/crowdsec/scenarios/*.yaml directly (root:root, mode # 644): confirmed live, a direct write from app.py failed with "[Errno 13] # Permission denied". Rather than loosen those files' own permissions, # route the edit through this one whitelisted root helper via sudo — same # pattern every other CrowdSec-touching action here already uses (cscli via # run_sudo), just for a plain file edit instead of a cscli subcommand. # Mode 700 root:root: secdash can still invoke it (sudoers grants running # it AS root regardless of the file's own permission bits), but nothing # else on the box can execute it directly. _secdash_write_asn_helper() { local _app_dir="$1" cat > "$_app_dir/set-asn-exempt.sh" << 'ASNHELPER' #!/bin/bash # Auto-generated by services/security-dashboard.sh — do not edit directly, # re-run the installer instead. Invoked ONLY via sudo, by app.py's # set_asn_exempt() (see /etc/sudoers.d/security-dashboard for the exact # grant). Args are ASN numbers (already validated by the caller, but # re-validated here too since this runs as root — never trust the caller # alone for a root-executed script). set -uo pipefail SCENARIO_FILES=( /etc/crowdsec/scenarios/local-asterisk_bf.yaml /etc/crowdsec/scenarios/local-asterisk_user_enum.yaml ) clean_asns=() for a in "$@"; do [[ "$a" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] && clean_asns+=("$a") done expr="" sep="" for a in "${clean_asns[@]}"; do expr="${expr}${sep}'${a}'" sep=", " done found=0 for f in "${SCENARIO_FILES[@]}"; do if [[ -f "$f" ]]; then found=1 sed -i "s/ASNNumber in \[[^]]*\])/ASNNumber in [${expr}])/" "$f" || exit 1 fi done if [[ "$found" != "1" ]]; then echo "No CrowdSec scenario files found to update" >&2 exit 1 fi # Self-healing: the hub-original crowdsecurity/asterisk_bf / # asterisk_user_enum scenarios have no ASN awareness at all, so if they're # still enabled alongside the exempt forks above, they independently ban # the same traffic regardless of anything just written — the exemption # above would silently do nothing. crowdsec.sh's original install is # supposed to disable them (--force, since they're crowdsecurity/asterisk # collection members), but an install from before that fix shipped (or one # where that step failed silently) would still have them active. Re-assert # it on every save rather than trusting it was ever done correctly once — # confirmed live: an install where this step had silently failed kept # banning an exempted ASN under the hub-original scenario name. cscli scenarios remove crowdsecurity/asterisk_bf crowdsecurity/asterisk_user_enum --force 2>/dev/null || true if ! systemctl restart crowdsec; then echo "Wrote ASN list but failed to restart CrowdSec" >&2 exit 2 fi echo "OK" ASNHELPER chown root:root "$_app_dir/set-asn-exempt.sh" chmod 700 "$_app_dir/set-asn-exempt.sh" } # Writes the Python app. Separate function so "update" mode (refresh code, # keep config) and fresh installs share one copy instead of drifting apart. _secdash_write_app() { local _app_dir="$1" mkdir -p "$_app_dir" cat > "$_app_dir/app.py" << 'PYAPP' #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Security dashboard: Asterisk failed-connection log + CrowdSec decisions. Stdlib only, deliberately — this runs on a small droplet alongside Asterisk, Caddy, and CrowdSec, and shouldn't add a framework's worth of RAM overhead. """ import configparser import json import os import re import subprocess from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer PORT = int(os.environ.get("DASHBOARD_PORT", "8092")) ASTERISK_LOG = os.environ.get("ASTERISK_LOG", "") ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR = os.environ.get("ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR", "") ASN_SCENARIO_FILES = [ "/etc/crowdsec/scenarios/local-asterisk_bf.yaml", "/etc/crowdsec/scenarios/local-asterisk_user_enum.yaml", ] # Root-owned helper for the one write (edit + crowdsec restart) — this # service user (--shell /usr/sbin/nologin) has no write access to # ASN_SCENARIO_FILES (root:root, mode 644) and shouldn't; see # _secdash_write_asn_helper in services/security-dashboard.sh for why this # goes through sudo instead of loosening those files' permissions. ASN_HELPER_SCRIPT = "/opt/security-dashboard/set-asn-exempt.sh" TS_RE = re.compile(r"^\[([^\]]+)\]") KV_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)="([^"]*)"') ASN_FILTER_RE = re.compile(r"ASNNumber in \[([^\]]*)\]\)") ID_RE = re.compile(r"^\d+$") ASN_RE = re.compile(r"^\d+$") IP_RE = re.compile(r"^\d{1,3}(\.\d{1,3}){3}$") DEVICE_MARKER_RE = re.compile(r"^; === Device: (.+?)(?:\s*\[AA:(?:yes|no)\])?\s*\((.+?)\)\s*===\s*$") EXT_HEADER_RE = re.compile(r"^\[(\d+)\]") EXTEN_RE = re.compile(r"^\d+$") TIER_RE = re.compile(r"^(internal|restricted|full)$") NUMBER_RE = re.compile(r"^\d{11}$") NUMBER_RE_10 = re.compile(r"^\d{10}$") def _normalize_nanp_number(token): """Accepts a bare 10-digit NANP number (the natural way to type a US number), an already-11-digit one (leading "1" country code), or either of those with a leading "+" (the natural way to paste a number straight out of a phone's call log) and returns the canonical 11-digit, digits-only form allowed_numbers is always stored in - REGEX() comparisons against CALLERID(num) require an exact digit-count match, and this used to silently DROP a plain 10-digit entry instead of normalizing it, the admin-input-side twin of the bug that was also failing inbound calls whose Caller-ID itself arrived without a leading "1", or arrived "+E.164" style with a leading "+" Asterisk never stripped (see PSTN_CALLERID_NORM / PSTN_CID_RAW in pstn-trunk.sh).""" token = token.lstrip("+") if NUMBER_RE_10.match(token): return "1" + token if NUMBER_RE.match(token): return token return None SECURITY_LOG_TAIL_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024 # comfortably enough for 5000 lines def parse_security_log(limit=200): """Tail ASTERISK_LOG and return the most recent SecurityEvent lines, newest first, as dicts. Missing file / no lines -> empty list, never an error — this is a convenience view, not load-bearing. Reads only a bounded byte window from the END of the file, not the whole thing — this log is Asterisk's unrotated console/security output and can grow to multiple GB. The previous version did f.readlines() (loads the ENTIRE file into memory) before slicing the last 5000 lines, and this tab polls every 30 seconds from the browser. Confirmed live: on a 1GB-RAM droplet with a 1.4GB log file, that ballooned this "stdlib only, deliberately lightweight" process to 677MB RSS / 1.8GB peak swap, which left CrowdSec unable to even start (boot timeout) and contributed directly to the droplet becoming unresponsive. Bounding this to a fixed ~2MB window keeps memory use constant regardless of how large the log file grows. """ if not ASTERISK_LOG or not os.path.isfile(ASTERISK_LOG): return [] events = [] try: with open(ASTERISK_LOG, "rb") as f: f.seek(0, os.SEEK_END) size = f.tell() start = max(0, size - SECURITY_LOG_TAIL_BYTES) f.seek(start) data = f.read() except OSError: return [] text = data.decode("utf-8", errors="replace") lines = text.splitlines() if start > 0 and lines: lines = lines[1:] # first line is likely truncated mid-line lines = lines[-5000:] for line in lines: if "SecurityEvent=" not in line: continue ts_match = TS_RE.match(line) fields = dict(KV_RE.findall(line)) if not fields.get("SecurityEvent"): continue events.append({ "timestamp": ts_match.group(1) if ts_match else "", "event": fields.get("SecurityEvent", ""), "severity": fields.get("Severity", ""), "account": fields.get("AccountID", ""), "remote": fields.get("RemoteAddress", ""), "reason": fields.get("SecurityEvent", ""), }) events.reverse() return events[:limit] def run_sudo(args, timeout=15, input_text=None): """Runs a whitelisted sudo command. Always list-form args, never shell=True — no shell metacharacter interpretation is possible regardless of what's in the arguments, on top of the sudoers-side restriction. input_text feeds stdin (e.g. for `docker exec -i ... tee ` writes — see the ea_* Easy Asterisk admin functions) instead of a command-line argument, so file content never has to survive sudoers pattern matching.""" try: result = subprocess.run( ["sudo"] + args, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, input=input_text ) return result.returncode == 0, result.stdout, result.stderr except (subprocess.TimeoutExpired, OSError) as e: return False, "", str(e) def crowdsec_installed(): """True if cscli is actually present on this host — mirrors pstn_installed()'s approach of checking for the real thing rather than a stored flag, so the CrowdSec tab tracks live state without needing this dashboard reinstalled after CrowdSec is added or removed.""" return os.path.isfile("/usr/bin/cscli") def get_decisions(): ok, out, err = run_sudo(["/usr/bin/cscli", "decisions", "list", "-o", "json"]) if not ok or not out.strip(): return [] try: data = json.loads(out) except json.JSONDecodeError: return [] decisions = [] for alert in data or []: # AS number/name and country live on the parent alert's "source" # object, not on the individual decision — confirmed against real # output (source.as_number, source.as_name, source.cn) rather than # guessed, after getting evt.Enriched.ASNNumber's type wrong earlier # tonight for the same underlying data. source = alert.get("source") or {} for d in alert.get("decisions") or []: decisions.append({ "id": d.get("id"), "value": d.get("value"), "scenario": d.get("scenario"), "duration": d.get("duration"), "origin": d.get("origin"), "as_number": source.get("as_number", ""), "as_name": source.get("as_name", ""), "country": source.get("cn", ""), }) return decisions def delete_decision(decision_id): if not ID_RE.match(str(decision_id)): return False, "Invalid decision ID" ok, out, err = run_sudo(["/usr/bin/cscli", "decisions", "delete", "--id", str(decision_id)]) return ok, (err or out or ("deleted" if ok else "failed")) def get_alert_history_names(): """ASN -> as_name map built from historical alerts (cscli alerts list, unlike decisions list, includes expired/resolved ones). A successfully exempted ASN (e.g. T-Mobile once its bans stop firing) has no *active* decision left to source a name from — this is the fallback that still finds one, from the alert that was raised before the exemption took effect.""" ok, out, err = run_sudo(["/usr/bin/cscli", "alerts", "list", "-o", "json"]) if not ok or not out.strip(): return {} try: data = json.loads(out) except json.JSONDecodeError: return {} names = {} for alert in data or []: source = alert.get("source") or {} asn = source.get("as_number") name = source.get("as_name") if asn and name: names.setdefault(str(asn), name) return names def get_asn_exempt(known_names=None): """known_names: optional {asn: as_name} lookup, built from current decisions, to label already-exempt ASNs that aren't actively generating bans right now (and so wouldn't otherwise have a name available).""" known_names = known_names or {} asns = set() for path in ASN_SCENARIO_FILES: try: with open(path) as f: content = f.read() except OSError: continue m = ASN_FILTER_RE.search(content) if m: for tok in m.group(1).split(","): tok = tok.strip().strip("'").strip('"') if tok: asns.add(tok) ordered = sorted(asns, key=lambda x: int(x) if x.isdigit() else 0) return [{"asn": a, "name": known_names.get(a, "")} for a in ordered] def set_asn_exempt(asn_list): # Empty is valid and means "no ASNs exempted" — ASNNumber in [] is valid # expr-language and always evaluates false, so the exclusion filter # !(... in []) is always true and every Asterisk auth failure is # evaluated normally again. Needed so removing the last remaining # exempt ASN (the "unwhitelist" action) can actually reach zero instead # of being stuck refusing an empty save. clean = sorted(set(a.strip() for a in asn_list if ASN_RE.match(a.strip()))) # Editing ASN_SCENARIO_FILES directly from this process used to fail # with "[Errno 13] Permission denied" (root:root, mode 644, this # service user has no write grant) — every ASN whitelist attempt was # silently a no-op as far as CrowdSec was concerned. Routed through the # sudoers-whitelisted root helper instead, same pattern every other # CrowdSec-touching action here already uses. ok, out, err = run_sudo([ASN_HELPER_SCRIPT] + clean) if not ok: return False, "Failed updating ASN exemption: %s" % (err or out or "unknown error") if not clean: return True, "Cleared — no ASNs exempted, all Asterisk traffic is evaluated normally again." return True, "Updated: %s" % ", ".join(clean) def get_asn_source_ips(asn): """Every source IP CrowdSec has ever recorded for a given ASN, from alert history (includes expired/resolved alerts) — used so "ban" can act on previously-seen offenders immediately, not just future ones.""" ok, out, err = run_sudo(["/usr/bin/cscli", "alerts", "list", "-o", "json"]) if not ok or not out.strip(): return [] try: data = json.loads(out) except json.JSONDecodeError: return [] ips = set() for alert in data or []: source = alert.get("source") or {} if str(source.get("as_number", "")) == str(asn): ip = source.get("ip") if ip and IP_RE.match(ip): ips.add(ip) return sorted(ips) def ban_ip(ip, reason, duration="24h"): if not IP_RE.match(ip): return False, "Invalid IP" ok, out, err = run_sudo([ "/usr/bin/cscli", "decisions", "add", "--ip", ip, "--duration", duration, "--type", "ban", "--reason", reason, ]) return ok, (err or out or ("banned" if ok else "failed")) def ban_asn(asn): """For an accidental whitelist: drop the ASN from the exempt list (so future traffic from it is evaluated normally again) and immediately ban every IP CrowdSec has on record for it, so the response isn't limited to "wait for it to misbehave again.""" asn = str(asn).strip() if not ASN_RE.match(asn): return {"ok": False, "message": "Invalid ASN"} current = [d["asn"] for d in get_asn_exempt()] if asn in current: remaining = [a for a in current if a != asn] unexempt_ok, unexempt_message = set_asn_exempt(remaining) else: unexempt_ok, unexempt_message = True, "ASN was not currently exempt" banned, failed = [], [] for ip in get_asn_source_ips(asn): ok, _msg = ban_ip(ip, "manual: AS%s exemption removed, known offender re-banned" % asn) (banned if ok else failed).append(ip) return { "ok": unexempt_ok, "unexempt_message": unexempt_message, "banned_ips": banned, "failed_ips": failed, } def list_extensions(): """Extension numbers + display names, parsed from pjsip.conf the same way Easy Asterisk's own rebuild_dialplan() finds them: a "; === Device: NAME (category) ===" comment immediately followed (once other lines are skipped) by that device's "[extnum]" section header. Read-only, best-effort — an unparseable/missing file just means an empty list, not an error, same convention as parse_security_log.""" if not ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR: return [] path = os.path.join(ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR, "pjsip.conf") if not os.path.isfile(path): return [] try: with open(path, "r", errors="replace") as f: lines = f.readlines() except OSError: return [] extensions = [] pending_name = None for line in lines: line = line.rstrip("\n") m = DEVICE_MARKER_RE.match(line) if m: pending_name = m.group(1).strip() continue m = EXT_HEADER_RE.match(line) if m and pending_name is not None: extensions.append({"ext": m.group(1), "name": pending_name}) pending_name = None return extensions def _write_ini_cp(path, header, cp): """Shared temp-write-then-rename for every live-editable PSTN conf file — one copy of the atomic-write/error-handling logic instead of repeating it per file. Returns (ok, error_message_or_None).""" if not path: return False, "No Asterisk install detected on this box" tmp_path = path + ".tmp" try: with open(tmp_path, "w") as f: f.write(header) cp.write(f) os.replace(tmp_path, path) except OSError as e: try: os.remove(tmp_path) except OSError: pass return False, "Failed writing %s: %s" % (path, e) return True, None PERMISSIONS_HEADER = ( "; PSTN permissions. Each extension has ONE whitelist (allowed_numbers)\n" "; and a 'restrict' mode saying which direction(s) it applies to:\n" "; full / restricted (both ways) / internal - the original tiers - plus\n" "; restricted-in (whitelist gates incoming only) and restricted-out\n" "; (whitelist gates outgoing only).\n" "; restrict + allowed_numbers are the authored pair; tier_out/allowed_out\n" "; and tier_in/allowed_in are DERIVED from them and are what the dialplan\n" "; reads; 'tier' is a rollback mirror for a pre-split pstn-trunk.sh.\n" "; PLUS two\n" "; independent per-extension axes: messaging (internal SIP MESSAGE\n" "; texting) and personal_did (outbound Caller-ID override; inbound\n" "; routing for personal DIDs lives in pstn-personal-dids.conf).\n" "; Read LIVE by the dialplan on every call (AST_CONFIG()) - no\n" "; Asterisk restart needed. Managed here (Security Dashboard); also\n" "; safe to edit by hand. 'sudo ./setup.sh pstn-trunk' update mode\n" "; never touches this file, only a fresh reinstall does.\n" "; Any extension not listed here is internal-only (no PSTN) by default.\n\n" ) PERSONAL_DIDS_HEADER = ( "; Personal DID -> owner-extension mapping. Read LIVE by the dialplan\n" "; (AST_CONFIG()) on every inbound call - no restart needed. Managed here\n" "; (Security Dashboard); also safe to edit by hand. Kept in sync with\n" "; pstn-permissions.conf's personal_did= field automatically by\n" "; write_personal_did()/remove_personal_did() below - editing this file\n" "; by hand also requires updating that field yourself to match.\n" "; 'sudo ./setup.sh pstn-trunk' update mode never touches this file, only\n" "; a fresh reinstall does.\n\n" ) def _permissions_path(): return os.path.join(ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR, "pstn-permissions.conf") if ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR else None def _read_permissions_cp(): cp = configparser.ConfigParser(delimiters=("=",)) path = _permissions_path() if path and os.path.isfile(path): try: cp.read(path) except configparser.Error: pass return cp RESTRICT_RE = re.compile(r"^(internal|restricted|full|restricted-in|restricted-out)$") def _derive_restrict(tier_out, tier_in): """Infer the authored mode from the derived per-direction tiers. Only needed for a config written before 'restrict' existed. Fails toward the more restrictive reading: anything that isn't clearly open in a direction is treated as restricted or none, never widened.""" if tier_out == "full" and tier_in == "full": return "full" if tier_out == "restricted" and tier_in == "restricted": return "restricted" if tier_out == "restricted": return "restricted-out" if tier_in == "restricted": return "restricted-in" return "internal" def get_all_permissions(): """{ext: {"restrict", "allowed_numbers", "messaging"}} for every extension with a non-default record. Each extension has ONE whitelist and a mode saying which direction(s) it applies to: the original internal / restricted / full, plus restricted-in (whitelist gates incoming, dials anywhere) and restricted-out (whitelist gates outgoing, anyone may call in). That authored pair is what this returns and what the UI edits; the dialplan reads the derived tier_out/allowed_out/tier_in/allowed_in that write_permission keeps in step with it. Older configs are read by deriving the mode from whatever they do have — the per-direction tiers, or the pre-split single 'tier' — so the UI is correct even on a box where services/pstn-trunk.sh hasn't been re-run. Extensions with no section are implicitly no-PSTN/messaging-disabled: the dialplan's AST_CONFIG() lookup treats a missing section as denied the same way, so there's nothing to return for them; the UI fills in defaults for any known extension not present here.""" cp = _read_permissions_cp() result = {} for section in cp.sections(): if not EXTEN_RE.match(section): continue legacy_tier = cp.get(section, "tier", fallback="internal") legacy_nums = cp.get(section, "allowed_numbers", fallback="") restrict = cp.get(section, "restrict", fallback="") if not RESTRICT_RE.match(restrict): restrict = _derive_restrict( cp.get(section, "tier_out", fallback=legacy_tier), cp.get(section, "tier_in", fallback=legacy_tier), ) numbers = legacy_nums if not numbers: numbers = (cp.get(section, "allowed_out", fallback="") or cp.get(section, "allowed_in", fallback="")) result[section] = { "restrict": restrict, "allowed_numbers": numbers, "messaging": cp.getboolean(section, "messaging", fallback=False), } return result # Which per-direction tiers each authored mode compiles down to. The dialplan # only ever reads the compiled keys; this table is the single place the # mapping is defined. # The first three are the original tiers, unchanged. restricted-in and # restricted-out are the halves: the whitelist gates one direction while the # other stays wide open. _RESTRICT_TIERS = { "internal": ("internal", "internal"), "full": ("full", "full"), "restricted": ("restricted", "restricted"), "restricted-in": ("full", "restricted"), "restricted-out": ("restricted", "full"), } def _set_or_clear(cp, ext, key, value): if value: cp.set(ext, key, value) elif cp.has_option(ext, key): cp.remove_option(ext, key) def write_permission(ext, restrict, numbers_raw, messaging_enabled=False): """Saves one extension's PSTN restriction mode, its single whitelist, and its messaging flag in one action. One list, not two: the whitelist is "the numbers this extension deals with", and the mode says whether that constrains dialling out, being called, or both. Modes are internal / restricted / full (the original tiers) plus restricted-in and restricted-out. Writes three layers, all derived from those two authored values: restrict, allowed_numbers what a human edits (and what this reads back) tier_out/allowed_out, tier_in/allowed_in what the dialplan reads tier, allowed_numbers rollback mirror for a pre-split installer Messaging is an independent axis (see pstn-trunk.sh's file-level comment: an extension can have no PSTN at all and still be messaging-enabled, or vice versa), so it's set/cleared regardless of the mode. Numbers normalize to a pipe-separated list of 11-digit US numbers (a bare 10-digit entry gains a leading "1" rather than being dropped — see _normalize_nanp_number). Pipe, not comma, because the dialplan uses the value directly as a REGEX() alternation — see services/pstn-trunk.sh on why untrusted call data is always the string being tested, never interpolated into the pattern side.""" if not ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR: return False, "No Asterisk install detected on this box" ext = str(ext).strip() if not EXTEN_RE.match(ext): return False, "Invalid extension" if not RESTRICT_RE.match(restrict or ""): return False, "Invalid restriction mode" tokens = re.split(r"[,\s|]+", (numbers_raw or "").strip()) clean = [n for n in (_normalize_nanp_number(t) for t in tokens if t) if n] numbers = "|".join(clean) tier_out, tier_in = _RESTRICT_TIERS[restrict] cp = _read_permissions_cp() if restrict == "internal": # Clear the PSTN keys only, never the whole section — messaging and # personal_did are independent and must survive. (Removing the # section here was a real, confirmed bug in an earlier version.) if cp.has_section(ext): for key in ("restrict", "allowed_numbers", "tier_out", "allowed_out", "tier_in", "allowed_in", "tier"): if cp.has_option(ext, key): cp.remove_option(ext, key) else: if not cp.has_section(ext): cp.add_section(ext) cp.set(ext, "restrict", restrict) _set_or_clear(cp, ext, "allowed_numbers", numbers if restrict != "full" else "") cp.set(ext, "tier_out", tier_out) cp.set(ext, "tier_in", tier_in) _set_or_clear(cp, ext, "allowed_out", numbers if tier_out == "restricted" else "") _set_or_clear(cp, ext, "allowed_in", numbers if tier_in == "restricted" else "") cp.set(ext, "tier", tier_out) if messaging_enabled: if not cp.has_section(ext): cp.add_section(ext) cp.set(ext, "messaging", "yes") elif cp.has_section(ext) and cp.has_option(ext, "messaging"): cp.remove_option(ext, "messaging") # Drop the section entirely once nothing is left in it — only reachable # when the mode is internal, messaging is off, and no personal_did was # ever assigned. if cp.has_section(ext) and not cp.options(ext): cp.remove_section(ext) ok, err = _write_ini_cp(_permissions_path(), PERMISSIONS_HEADER, cp) if not ok: return False, err if restrict not in ("internal", "full") and not clean: return True, ("Saved, but the whitelist is EMPTY — with this mode that means no PSTN " "number is permitted in the restricted direction yet.") return True, "Saved" def write_messaging(ext, enabled): """Sets/clears just the messaging flag for one extension, leaving any tier/allowed_numbers/personal_did untouched. This is the write path for the Extensions tab's Messaging column when there's no PSTN trunk to save alongside — messaging works whether or not one has been installed — messaging has no dependency on one (no cost, no carrier, no DID), unlike the calling-permissions table this dashboard otherwise gates behind pstn_installed(). Creates pstn-permissions.conf from scratch if it doesn't exist yet.""" if not ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR: return False, "No Asterisk install detected on this box" ext = str(ext).strip() if not EXTEN_RE.match(ext): return False, "Invalid extension" cp = _read_permissions_cp() if enabled: if not cp.has_section(ext): cp.add_section(ext) cp.set(ext, "messaging", "yes") elif cp.has_section(ext) and cp.has_option(ext, "messaging"): cp.remove_option(ext, "messaging") if cp.has_section(ext) and not cp.options(ext): cp.remove_section(ext) ok, err = _write_ini_cp(_permissions_path(), PERMISSIONS_HEADER, cp) if not ok: return False, err return True, "Saved" GROUP_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_ -]{1,40}$") GROUPS_HEADER = ( "; Named extension groups - a management convenience only, NEVER read by\n" "; the dialplan itself (which only ever looks at per-extension keys in\n" "; pstn-permissions.conf - see that file). Applying a group action (e.g.\n" "; \"enable messaging\") writes those same per-extension keys for every\n" "; CURRENT member, exactly as if each had been checked individually - it's\n" "; a one-time bulk write, not an ongoing binding. Editing membership here\n" "; does not retroactively change anything already applied to former\n" "; members, and adding someone to a group does not automatically apply\n" "; the group's settings - use the dashboard's \"Enable/Disable\" actions\n" "; for that, any time membership changes.\n\n" ) def _groups_path(): return os.path.join(ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR, "pstn-groups.conf") if ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR else None def _read_groups_cp(): cp = configparser.ConfigParser(delimiters=("=",)) path = _groups_path() if path and os.path.isfile(path): try: cp.read(path) except configparser.Error: pass return cp def list_groups(): """[{"name": ..., "members": [ext, ...]}], sorted by name.""" cp = _read_groups_cp() result = [] for section in cp.sections(): members_raw = cp.get(section, "members", fallback="") members = [m.strip() for m in members_raw.split(",") if m.strip()] result.append({"name": section, "members": members}) result.sort(key=lambda g: g["name"].lower()) return result def write_group(name, members): if not ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR: return False, "No Asterisk install detected on this box" name = str(name).strip() if not GROUP_NAME_RE.match(name): return False, "Group name must be 1-40 characters (letters, digits, spaces, - or _)" clean_members = sorted(set(str(m).strip() for m in members if EXTEN_RE.match(str(m).strip()))) cp = _read_groups_cp() if not cp.has_section(name): cp.add_section(name) cp.set(name, "members", ",".join(clean_members)) ok, err = _write_ini_cp(_groups_path(), GROUPS_HEADER, cp) if not ok: return False, err return True, "Saved group '%s' with %d member(s)" % (name, len(clean_members)) def delete_group(name): if not ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR: return False, "No Asterisk install detected on this box" name = str(name).strip() cp = _read_groups_cp() if cp.has_section(name): cp.remove_section(name) ok, err = _write_ini_cp(_groups_path(), GROUPS_HEADER, cp) if not ok: return False, err return True, "Deleted group '%s' (members' own settings were not changed)" % name def apply_group_messaging(name, enabled): """Sets messaging= for every CURRENT member of the group, one at a time via write_messaging() - the exact same write path an individual checkbox uses. Returns a summary of how many succeeded.""" groups = {g["name"]: g["members"] for g in list_groups()} if name not in groups: return False, "Group not found" members = groups[name] if not members: return True, "Group '%s' has no members - nothing to change" % name failed = [] for ext in members: ok, _msg = write_messaging(ext, enabled) if not ok: failed.append(ext) if failed: return False, "Applied to %d/%d member(s) - failed: %s" % ( len(members) - len(failed), len(members), ", ".join(failed)) return True, "Messaging %s for all %d member(s) of '%s'" % ( "enabled" if enabled else "disabled", len(members), name) LIMIT_RE = re.compile(r"^\d+$") def pstn_installed(): """True only once services/pstn-trunk.sh has actually wired the dialplan in (pstn-trunk-dialplan.conf existing), not just because base Asterisk is present — pjsip.conf/extensions.conf exist either way, so extension names alone can't tell us this. Without this check the Extensions tab would show tier columns and a default-but-unenforced 10/10 cap even when there is no PSTN trunk at all.""" if not ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR: return False return os.path.isfile(os.path.join(ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR, "pstn-trunk-dialplan.conf")) def get_limits(): """Current outbound/inbound concurrent-call caps. Defaults (10/10) match what the dialplan itself falls back to (via AST_CONFIG()+IF()) if this file is missing or a key is absent, so a display here is never wrong even before pstn-limits.conf exists.""" if not ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR: return {"max_outbound": 10, "max_inbound": 10} path = os.path.join(ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR, "pstn-limits.conf") cp = configparser.ConfigParser(delimiters=("=",)) if os.path.isfile(path): try: cp.read(path) except configparser.Error: pass return { "max_outbound": cp.getint("limits", "max_outbound", fallback=10), "max_inbound": cp.getint("limits", "max_inbound", fallback=10), } def write_limits(max_outbound, max_inbound): if not ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR: return False, "No Asterisk install detected on this box" max_outbound, max_inbound = str(max_outbound).strip(), str(max_inbound).strip() if not LIMIT_RE.match(max_outbound) or not LIMIT_RE.match(max_inbound): return False, "Both caps must be whole numbers" path = os.path.join(ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR, "pstn-limits.conf") tmp_path = path + ".tmp" try: with open(tmp_path, "w") as f: f.write( "; PSTN concurrent-call caps, both directions.\n" "; Read LIVE by the dialplan on every call (AST_CONFIG()) - no Asterisk\n" "; restart needed. Managed here (Security Dashboard); also safe to edit\n" "; by hand. 'sudo ./setup.sh pstn-trunk' update mode never touches this\n" "; file, only a fresh reinstall does.\n\n" "[limits]\n" "max_outbound=%s\n" "max_inbound=%s\n" % (max_outbound, max_inbound) ) os.replace(tmp_path, path) except OSError as e: try: os.remove(tmp_path) except OSError: pass return False, "Failed writing %s: %s" % (path, e) return True, "Saved" PERSONAL_DID_RE = re.compile(r"^\d{10}$") PERSONAL_DID_RE_11 = re.compile(r"^1\d{10}$") def _normalize_personal_did_input(did): """write_personal_did()'s DID field is hand-typed, same footgun as allowed_numbers - accept the canonical bare 10-digit form, an 11-digit one with the NANP "1" prefix, or either with a leading "+" (pasted straight from a call log), returning the canonical 10-digit form either way instead of rejecting a plainly-valid entry.""" did = did.lstrip("+") if PERSONAL_DID_RE.match(did): return did if PERSONAL_DID_RE_11.match(did): return did[1:] return None def _personal_dids_path(): return os.path.join(ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR, "pstn-personal-dids.conf") if ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR else None def _read_personal_dids_cp(): cp = configparser.ConfigParser(delimiters=("=",)) path = _personal_dids_path() if path and os.path.isfile(path): try: cp.read(path) except configparser.Error: pass return cp def list_personal_dids(): """[{"did": ..., "owner": ...}] for every currently-assigned personal DID, sorted by DID.""" cp = _read_personal_dids_cp() result = [] for section in cp.sections(): if not PERSONAL_DID_RE.match(section): continue result.append({"did": section, "owner": cp.get(section, "owner", fallback="")}) result.sort(key=lambda d: d["did"]) return result def write_personal_did(did, owner): """Assigns did -> owner, keeping pstn-personal-dids.conf (inbound routing, read by the dialplan) and pstn-permissions.conf's personal_did= (outbound Caller-ID override) in sync. One owner has at most one personal_did (AST_CONFIG() returns a single value per key), so reassigning a DID to a new owner drops the previous owner's claim on it, and giving an extension a new personal DID drops whichever one it had before — this always leaves a clean 1:1 mapping in both files, rather than requiring the caller to clean up the old assignment itself. owner may also be a group reference, written as "@GroupName" (the '@' makes it unambiguous against a same-named numeric extension - group names are free text and could otherwise collide, e.g. a group literally named "201"). A group-owned DID rings every CURRENT member whose own tier/approved-numbers authorize the caller, computed fresh on every call (see pstn-personal-group-ring.sh) rather than baked in at assignment time - membership changes take effect immediately, unlike the Groups card's other bulk actions. Group ownership has no single extension to hang an outbound Caller-ID override on, so it never touches pstn-permissions.conf the way a single-extension owner does.""" if not ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR: return False, "No Asterisk install detected on this box" did = str(did).strip() owner = str(owner).strip() norm_did = _normalize_personal_did_input(did) if norm_did is None: return False, "DID must be a 10-digit US number (11-digit with a leading 1 also accepted)" did = norm_did is_group = owner.startswith("@") group_name = owner[1:] if is_group else "" if is_group: if not group_name or not _read_groups_cp().has_section(group_name): return False, "Group '%s' not found" % group_name elif not EXTEN_RE.match(owner): return False, "Invalid owner extension" dids_cp = _read_personal_dids_cp() perms_cp = _read_permissions_cp() if not is_group: for section in perms_cp.sections(): if section != owner and perms_cp.get(section, "personal_did", fallback="") == did: perms_cp.remove_option(section, "personal_did") if not perms_cp.options(section): perms_cp.remove_section(section) for section in list(dids_cp.sections()): if section != did and dids_cp.get(section, "owner", fallback="") == owner: dids_cp.remove_section(section) if not dids_cp.has_section(did): dids_cp.add_section(did) dids_cp.set(did, "owner", owner) ok, err = _write_ini_cp(_personal_dids_path(), PERSONAL_DIDS_HEADER, dids_cp) if not ok: return False, err if is_group: return True, "Assigned %s to group %s" % (did, group_name) if not perms_cp.has_section(owner): perms_cp.add_section(owner) perms_cp.set(owner, "personal_did", did) ok, err = _write_ini_cp(_permissions_path(), PERMISSIONS_HEADER, perms_cp) if not ok: return False, err owner_tier = perms_cp.get(owner, "tier", fallback="internal") if owner_tier not in ("full", "restricted"): return True, "Assigned %s to extension %s - note: %s is internal-tier, so it won't actually receive calls on this DID until you also grant it full or restricted tier." % (did, owner, owner) return True, "Assigned %s to extension %s" % (did, owner) def remove_personal_did(did): if not ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR: return False, "No Asterisk install detected on this box" did = str(did).strip() if not PERSONAL_DID_RE.match(did): return False, "Invalid DID" dids_cp = _read_personal_dids_cp() perms_cp = _read_permissions_cp() if dids_cp.has_section(did): dids_cp.remove_section(did) for section in perms_cp.sections(): if perms_cp.get(section, "personal_did", fallback="") == did: perms_cp.remove_option(section, "personal_did") if not perms_cp.options(section): perms_cp.remove_section(section) ok, err = _write_ini_cp(_personal_dids_path(), PERSONAL_DIDS_HEADER, dids_cp) if not ok: return False, err ok, err = _write_ini_cp(_permissions_path(), PERMISSIONS_HEADER, perms_cp) if not ok: return False, err return True, "Removed %s" % did # ── Easy Asterisk device management (devices, categories, rooms/ring-groups) ── # Full reimplementation of vendor/easy-asterisk/easy-asterisk-v0.10.0.sh's # vendored web admin (its own separate process, normally reached via its own # port/domain) as native code here instead — one tab, one process, no # separate app to proxy or embed. Keeps writing the EXACT same file formats # (pjsip.conf's "; === Device: Name (category) [AA:yes/no] ===" comment + # bracket-section convention, categories.conf/rooms.conf's pipe-delimited # rows) the vendor's own `easy-asterisk --rebuild-dialplan` CLI still reads # to generate the dialplan — this is a new front door onto the same # underlying config, not a fork of dialplan generation itself. # # Reads go straight through the host-side bind-mounted files (same as # list_extensions() already does for pjsip.conf) — cheap, and this dashboard # already has working read access there. WRITES go through `docker exec ... # tee` instead of writing the host-side file directly: Easy Asterisk's own # container writes these files as ITS OWN internal user, and a host-side # write here would be fighting that ownership — liable to silently break # again the next time the container restarts and re-asserts it. Routing # through docker exec (root, via a narrowly scoped sudoers entry — see # _secdash_write_sudoers) sidesteps the host/container UID mismatch # entirely, the same way this file already does for CrowdSec's cscli. ASTERISK_EA_CONFIG_DIR = os.environ.get("ASTERISK_EA_CONFIG_DIR", "") ASTERISK_EA_CONTAINER = os.environ.get("ASTERISK_EA_CONTAINER", "") EA_PJSIP_CONTAINER_PATH = "/etc/asterisk/pjsip.conf" EA_ROOMS_CONTAINER_PATH = "/etc/easy-asterisk/rooms.conf" EA_EXT_RE = re.compile(r"^\d{1,10}$") def ea_installed(): return bool(ASTERISK_EA_CONTAINER) def _ea_pjsip_host_path(): return os.path.join(ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR, "pjsip.conf") if ASTERISK_CONFIG_DIR else None def _ea_rooms_host_path(): return os.path.join(ASTERISK_EA_CONFIG_DIR, "rooms.conf") if ASTERISK_EA_CONFIG_DIR else None def ea_docker_write(container_path, content): """Writes content to a file INSIDE the Easy Asterisk container via `docker exec -i tee ` (root, sudo-gated) — see the module-level comment above for why this isn't a direct host-side write.""" ok, _out, err = run_sudo( ["docker", "exec", "-i", ASTERISK_EA_CONTAINER, "tee", container_path], input_text=content, ) return ok, ("" if ok else (err or "Write failed")) def ea_reload_pjsip(): run_sudo(["docker", "exec", ASTERISK_EA_CONTAINER, "asterisk", "-rx", "module reload res_pjsip.so"]) def ea_rebuild_dialplan(): run_sudo(["docker", "exec", ASTERISK_EA_CONTAINER, "/usr/local/bin/easy-asterisk", "--rebuild-dialplan"]) def restart_asterisk_container(): """Restarts the Easy Asterisk container - the "Commit Changes" button on the Extensions tab. Confirmed live: dashboard writes to pstn-permissions.conf/pstn-groups.conf/pstn-personal-dids.conf land on disk immediately (readable via a plain `cat` right after saving), but AST_CONFIG() in the dialplan sometimes kept returning a stale value until the container was fully restarted - not just a `dialplan reload` or `module reload`, an actual container restart. Root cause not fully understood (contradicts AST_CONFIG's whole "reads fresh every call, no restart needed" design premise, which this codebase otherwise relies on throughout), but the restart reliably clears it, so this button exists instead of requiring every admin to rediscover "just restart it" the hard way. Uses the same ASTERISK_EA_CONTAINER/run_sudo mechanism as the Extensions tab's own docker exec calls - no new sudoers scope needed beyond the one line added for this.""" if not ASTERISK_EA_CONTAINER: return False, "No Asterisk container detected on this box" ok, _out, err = run_sudo(["docker", "restart", ASTERISK_EA_CONTAINER], timeout=30) return ok, ("" if ok else (err or "Restart failed")) def ea_get_status(): """Registered/unregistered per extension — same 'pjsip show endpoints' parsing as the vendored get_registered_endpoints().""" ok, out, _err = run_sudo(["docker", "exec", ASTERISK_EA_CONTAINER, "asterisk", "-rx", "pjsip show endpoints"]) if not ok: return {} endpoints = {} current = None for line in out.split("\n"): m = re.match(r"\s*Endpoint:\s+(\d+)/", line) if m: current = m.group(1) endpoints[current] = "offline" if current and "Contact:" in line and ("Avail" in line or "NonQual" in line): endpoints[current] = "online" return endpoints def ea_list_devices(): """Same comment+bracket parsing as the vendored get_devices() so this reads pjsip.conf identically regardless of which admin wrote it.""" path = _ea_pjsip_host_path() devices = [] if not path or not os.path.isfile(path): return devices with open(path) as f: lines = f.readlines() dev_name = dev_cat = dev_aa = None for line in lines: line = line.strip() if "; === Device:" in line: temp = line.split("; === Device:")[1].split("===")[0].strip() dev_aa = None if "[AA:yes]" in temp: dev_aa = "yes" temp = temp.replace("[AA:yes]", "").strip() elif "[AA:no]" in temp: dev_aa = "no" temp = temp.replace("[AA:no]", "").strip() if "(" in temp and ")" in temp: dev_cat = temp[temp.rfind("(") + 1:temp.rfind(")")] dev_name = temp[:temp.rfind("(")].strip() else: dev_name = temp dev_cat = "unknown" elif dev_name and re.match(r"^\[(\d+)\]$", line): ext = re.match(r"^\[(\d+)\]$", line).group(1) devices.append({"name": dev_name, "category": dev_cat, "extension": ext, "auto_answer": dev_aa, "transport": "udp", "encryption": "no"}) dev_name = dev_cat = dev_aa = None elif devices and line.startswith("transport=transport-"): devices[-1]["transport"] = line.split("transport-")[1] elif devices and line.startswith("media_encryption="): val = line.split("=")[1] if val in ("sdes", "dtls"): devices[-1]["encryption"] = val if devices[-1]["transport"] == "udp": devices[-1]["transport"] = "tls" elif val != "no": devices[-1]["encryption"] = val return devices def _ea_generate_password(length=16): import secrets import string chars = string.ascii_letters + string.digits return "".join(secrets.choice(chars) for _ in range(length)) def ea_add_device(name, category, extension, conn_type="lan", auto_answer=None): path = _ea_pjsip_host_path() if not path: return False, "No Asterisk install detected on this box" extension = str(extension).strip() if not EA_EXT_RE.match(extension): return False, "Invalid extension" name = (name or "").strip() if not name: return False, "Name required" if not os.path.isfile(path): return False, "Config file not found" with open(path) as f: current = f.read() if "[%s]" % extension in current: return False, "Extension already exists" password = _ea_generate_password(16) if conn_type == "fqdn": transport = "transport=transport-tls" encryption = "media_encryption=sdes" ice = "ice_support=yes" else: transport = "transport=transport-udp" encryption = "media_encryption=no" ice = "" aa_tag = "" if auto_answer == "yes": aa_tag = "[AA:yes] " elif auto_answer == "no": aa_tag = "[AA:no] " keepalive = "" if category == "mobile": keepalive = "rtp_keepalive=15\nrtp_timeout=120\nrtp_timeout_hold=120" # Built as a filtered line list, not positional %s blanks — keepalive and # ice are both empty for a plain non-mobile LAN device, and leaving them # as literal blank template lines produces TWO consecutive blank lines # inside the endpoint stanza instead of one. ea_delete_device/ # ea_rename_device/ea_change_device_category all use "blank line ends # this device's block" as their boundary heuristic (matching the # vendored admin's own logic) — an extra internal blank line there is a # latent bug inherited from the vendor template, confirmed live against # a synthetic fixture (delete_device left an orphaned tail of lines # behind). Filtering empty lines out entirely avoids it regardless of # which optional pieces are present. endpoint_lines = [ "type=endpoint", "context=intercom", transport, "disallow=all", "allow=opus", "allow=ulaw", "allow=alaw", "allow=g722", encryption, "direct_media=no", "rtp_symmetric=yes", "force_rport=yes", "rewrite_contact=yes", ] if keepalive: endpoint_lines.append(keepalive) if ice: endpoint_lines.append(ice) endpoint_lines += [ "auth=%s" % extension, "aors=%s" % extension, 'callerid="%s" <%s>' % (name, extension), ] device_config = "\n; === Device: %s (%s) %s===\n[%s]\n%s\n\n[%s]\ntype=auth\nauth_type=userpass\nusername=%s\npassword=%s\n\n[%s]\ntype=aor\nmax_contacts=5\nremove_existing=yes\nqualify_frequency=30\n" % ( name, category, aa_tag, extension, "\n".join(endpoint_lines), extension, extension, password, extension, ) ok, err = ea_docker_write(EA_PJSIP_CONTAINER_PATH, current + device_config) if not ok: return False, err ea_reload_pjsip() ea_rebuild_dialplan() return True, { "extension": extension, "password": password, "name": name, "transport": "tls" if conn_type == "fqdn" else "udp", "port": 5061 if conn_type == "fqdn" else 5060, } def ea_delete_device(extension): """Same block-removal logic as the vendored delete_device().""" path = _ea_pjsip_host_path() if not path or not os.path.isfile(path): return False, "Config file not found" with open(path) as f: lines = f.readlines() new_lines = [] found = False skip = False pending_comment = None for line in lines: stripped = line.strip() if stripped.startswith("; === Device:"): pending_comment = line continue if re.match(r"^\[%s\]$" % re.escape(extension), stripped): if pending_comment: found = True skip = True pending_comment = None continue elif found: skip = True continue if pending_comment: new_lines.append(pending_comment) pending_comment = None if skip and stripped == "": skip = False continue if not skip: new_lines.append(line) if not found: return False, "Device not found" ok, err = ea_docker_write(EA_PJSIP_CONTAINER_PATH, "".join(new_lines)) if not ok: return False, err ea_reload_pjsip() ea_rebuild_dialplan() return True, "Device deleted" def ea_rename_device(extension, new_name): """Same comment+callerid rewrite as the vendored rename_device().""" path = _ea_pjsip_host_path() if not path or not os.path.isfile(path): return False, "Config file not found" new_name = (new_name or "").strip() if not new_name: return False, "Name required" with open(path) as f: lines = f.readlines() new_lines = [] found = False in_device = False pending_comment = None for line in lines: stripped = line.strip() if stripped.startswith("; === Device:"): temp = stripped.split("; === Device:")[1].split("===")[0].strip() aa_tag = "" if "[AA:yes]" in temp: aa_tag = " [AA:yes]" temp = temp.replace("[AA:yes]", "").strip() elif "[AA:no]" in temp: aa_tag = " [AA:no]" temp = temp.replace("[AA:no]", "").strip() cat = temp[temp.rfind("(") + 1:temp.rfind(")")] if "(" in temp else "unknown" pending_comment = (line, cat, aa_tag) continue if pending_comment: m = re.match(r"^\[(\d+)\]$", stripped) if m and m.group(1) == extension: _old_line, cat, aa_tag = pending_comment new_lines.append("; === Device: %s (%s)%s ===\n" % (new_name, cat, aa_tag)) new_lines.append(line) found = True in_device = True pending_comment = None continue else: new_lines.append(pending_comment[0]) pending_comment = None if in_device and stripped.startswith("callerid="): new_lines.append('callerid="%s" <%s>\n' % (new_name, extension)) continue if in_device and stripped == "": in_device = False new_lines.append(line) if not found: return False, "Device not found" ok, err = ea_docker_write(EA_PJSIP_CONTAINER_PATH, "".join(new_lines)) if not ok: return False, err ea_reload_pjsip() ea_rebuild_dialplan() return True, "Device renamed" def ea_change_device_category(extension, new_category): """Same comment-line category rewrite as the vendored change_device_category().""" path = _ea_pjsip_host_path() if not path or not os.path.isfile(path): return False, "Config file not found" new_category = (new_category or "").strip() if not new_category: return False, "Category required" with open(path) as f: lines = f.readlines() new_lines = [] found = False pending_comment = None for line in lines: stripped = line.strip() if stripped.startswith("; === Device:"): pending_comment = (line, stripped) continue if pending_comment: m = re.match(r"^\[(\d+)\]$", stripped) if m and m.group(1) == extension: cm = re.match(r"^; === Device: (.+?) \(([^)]+)\)(.*?)===", pending_comment[1]) if cm: dev_name, _old_cat, rest = cm.group(1), cm.group(2), cm.group(3) new_lines.append("; === Device: %s (%s)%s===\n" % (dev_name, new_category, rest)) found = True else: new_lines.append(pending_comment[0]) new_lines.append(line) pending_comment = None continue else: new_lines.append(pending_comment[0]) pending_comment = None new_lines.append(line) if not found: return False, "Device not found" ok, err = ea_docker_write(EA_PJSIP_CONTAINER_PATH, "".join(new_lines)) if not ok: return False, err ea_reload_pjsip() ea_rebuild_dialplan() return True, "Category changed" def ea_list_rooms(): path = _ea_rooms_host_path() rooms = [] if not path or not os.path.isfile(path): return rooms with open(path) as f: for line in f: line = line.strip() if line and not line.startswith("#"): parts = line.split("|") if len(parts) >= 5: rooms.append({"extension": parts[0], "name": parts[1], "members": parts[2], "timeout": parts[3], "type": parts[4]}) return rooms def ea_create_room(extension, name, room_type="ring", timeout="60"): path = _ea_rooms_host_path() if not path: return False, "No Asterisk install detected on this box" extension = str(extension).strip() name = (name or "").strip() if not EA_EXT_RE.match(extension): return False, "Invalid extension" if not name: return False, "Name required" current = "" if os.path.isfile(path): with open(path) as f: current = f.read() else: current = "# Format: ext|name|members|timeout|type(ring/page)\n" for line in current.splitlines(): line = line.strip() if line and not line.startswith("#") and line.split("|")[0] == extension: return False, "Room extension already exists" if not current.endswith("\n"): current += "\n" new_content = current + "%s|%s||%s|%s\n" % (extension, name, timeout, room_type) ok, err = ea_docker_write(EA_ROOMS_CONTAINER_PATH, new_content) if not ok: return False, err ea_rebuild_dialplan() return True, "Room created" def ea_delete_room(extension): path = _ea_rooms_host_path() if not path or not os.path.isfile(path): return False, "Rooms file not found" with open(path) as f: lines = f.readlines() new_lines = [] found = False for line in lines: stripped = line.strip() if stripped and not stripped.startswith("#") and stripped.split("|")[0] == extension: found = True continue new_lines.append(line) if not found: return False, "Room not found" ok, err = ea_docker_write(EA_ROOMS_CONTAINER_PATH, "".join(new_lines)) if not ok: return False, err ea_rebuild_dialplan() return True, "Room deleted" def ea_rename_room(extension, new_name): path = _ea_rooms_host_path() if not path or not os.path.isfile(path): return False, "Rooms file not found" new_name = (new_name or "").strip() if not new_name: return False, "Name required" with open(path) as f: lines = f.readlines() new_lines = [] found = False for line in lines: stripped = line.strip() if stripped and not stripped.startswith("#"): parts = stripped.split("|") if len(parts) >= 5 and parts[0] == extension: parts[1] = new_name new_lines.append("|".join(parts) + "\n") found = True continue new_lines.append(line) if not found: return False, "Room not found" ok, err = ea_docker_write(EA_ROOMS_CONTAINER_PATH, "".join(new_lines)) if not ok: return False, err ea_rebuild_dialplan() return True, "Room renamed" def _ea_update_room_members(extension, new_members): path = _ea_rooms_host_path() if not path or not os.path.isfile(path): return False, "Rooms file not found" with open(path) as f: lines = f.readlines() new_lines = [] found = False for line in lines: stripped = line.strip() if stripped and not stripped.startswith("#"): parts = stripped.split("|") if len(parts) >= 5 and parts[0] == extension: parts[2] = new_members new_lines.append("|".join(parts) + "\n") found = True continue new_lines.append(line) if not found: return False, "Room not found" ok, err = ea_docker_write(EA_ROOMS_CONTAINER_PATH, "".join(new_lines)) if not ok: return False, err ea_rebuild_dialplan() return True, "Room members updated" def ea_add_room_member(room_ext, device_ext): for room in ea_list_rooms(): if room["extension"] == room_ext: members = [m for m in room["members"].split(",") if m] if device_ext in members: return False, "Device already in room" members.append(device_ext) return _ea_update_room_members(room_ext, ",".join(members)) return False, "Room not found" def ea_remove_room_member(room_ext, device_ext): for room in ea_list_rooms(): if room["extension"] == room_ext: members = [m for m in room["members"].split(",") if m] if device_ext not in members: return False, "Device not in room" members.remove(device_ext) return _ea_update_room_members(room_ext, ",".join(members)) return False, "Room not found" INDEX_HTML = """ Security Dashboard

Security Dashboard

Recent Asterisk SIP security events, newest first. Errors/warnings are real auth failures; informational lines are normal registration traffic.

Time Event Account Remote Severity
""" class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def _json(self, obj, status=200): body = json.dumps(obj).encode() self.send_response(status) self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json") self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body))) self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(body) def _html(self, html, status=200): body = html.encode() self.send_response(status) self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8") self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body))) # The page is inlined into this file, so a dashboard update changes # the HTML at a URL that never changes. Without this a browser can # keep serving the previous UI after an upgrade, which looks exactly # like the upgrade having silently failed. self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store, must-revalidate") self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(body) def do_GET(self): if self.path == "/" or self.path == "": html = INDEX_HTML self._html(html) elif self.path == "/api/security-events": self._json(parse_security_log()) elif self.path == "/api/decisions": self._json(get_decisions()) elif self.path == "/api/asn-exempt": decisions = get_decisions() known_names = {d["as_number"]: d["as_name"] for d in decisions if d.get("as_number")} for asn, name in get_alert_history_names().items(): known_names.setdefault(asn, name) self._json({"asns": get_asn_exempt(known_names)}) elif self.path == "/api/pstn-permissions": perms = get_all_permissions() extensions = [] for e in list_extensions(): p = perms.get(e["ext"], {"restrict": "internal", "allowed_numbers": "", "messaging": False}) extensions.append({"ext": e["ext"], "name": e["name"], "restrict": p["restrict"], "allowed_numbers": p["allowed_numbers"], "messaging": p["messaging"]}) self._json({"extensions": extensions}) elif self.path == "/api/pstn-limits": self._json(get_limits()) elif self.path == "/api/pstn-personal-dids": names = {e["ext"]: e["name"] for e in list_extensions()} dids = [dict(d, owner_name=names.get(d["owner"], "")) for d in list_personal_dids()] self._json({"dids": dids}) elif self.path == "/api/pstn-status": self._json({"installed": pstn_installed()}) elif self.path == "/api/pstn-groups": self._json({"groups": list_groups()}) elif self.path == "/api/crowdsec-status": self._json({"installed": crowdsec_installed()}) elif self.path == "/api/ea-status": self._json({"installed": ea_installed()}) elif self.path == "/api/ea-devices": self._json({"devices": ea_list_devices(), "status": ea_get_status()}) elif self.path == "/api/ea-rooms": self._json({"rooms": ea_list_rooms()}) else: self._json({"error": "not found"}, 404) def do_POST(self): length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", 0)) raw = self.rfile.read(length) if length else b"{}" try: payload = json.loads(raw or b"{}") except json.JSONDecodeError: payload = {} if self.path == "/api/decisions/delete": ok, message = delete_decision(payload.get("id", "")) self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message}) elif self.path == "/api/asn-exempt": ok, message = set_asn_exempt(payload.get("asns", [])) self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message}) elif self.path == "/api/asn-exempt/ban": self._json(ban_asn(payload.get("asn", ""))) elif self.path == "/api/pstn-permissions": ok, message = write_permission( payload.get("ext", ""), payload.get("restrict", ""), payload.get("allowed_numbers", ""), bool(payload.get("messaging", False)), ) self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message}) elif self.path == "/api/pstn-limits": ok, message = write_limits(payload.get("max_outbound", ""), payload.get("max_inbound", "")) self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message}) elif self.path == "/api/pstn-personal-dids": ok, message = write_personal_did(payload.get("did", ""), payload.get("owner", "")) self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message}) elif self.path == "/api/pstn-personal-dids/delete": ok, message = remove_personal_did(payload.get("did", "")) self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message}) elif self.path == "/api/pstn-messaging": ok, message = write_messaging(payload.get("ext", ""), bool(payload.get("enabled", False))) self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message}) elif self.path == "/api/pstn-groups": ok, message = write_group(payload.get("name", ""), payload.get("members", [])) self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message}) elif self.path == "/api/pstn-groups/delete": ok, message = delete_group(payload.get("name", "")) self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message}) elif self.path == "/api/pstn-groups/apply-messaging": ok, message = apply_group_messaging(payload.get("name", ""), bool(payload.get("enabled", False))) self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message}) elif self.path == "/api/asterisk-restart": ok, message = restart_asterisk_container() self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message}) elif self.path == "/api/ea-devices": ok, result = ea_add_device( payload.get("name", ""), payload.get("category", ""), payload.get("extension", ""), payload.get("conn_type", "lan"), payload.get("auto_answer") ) if ok: self._json({"ok": True, "data": result}) else: self._json({"ok": False, "message": result}) elif self.path == "/api/ea-devices/delete": ok, message = ea_delete_device(payload.get("extension", "")) self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message}) elif self.path == "/api/ea-devices/rename": ok, message = ea_rename_device(payload.get("extension", ""), payload.get("name", "")) self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message}) elif self.path == "/api/ea-devices/category": ok, message = ea_change_device_category(payload.get("extension", ""), payload.get("category", "")) self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message}) elif self.path == "/api/ea-rooms": ok, message = ea_create_room( payload.get("extension", ""), payload.get("name", ""), payload.get("type", "ring"), payload.get("timeout", "60") ) self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message}) elif self.path == "/api/ea-rooms/delete": ok, message = ea_delete_room(payload.get("extension", "")) self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message}) elif self.path == "/api/ea-rooms/rename": ok, message = ea_rename_room(payload.get("extension", ""), payload.get("name", "")) self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message}) elif self.path == "/api/ea-rooms/members/add": ok, message = ea_add_room_member(payload.get("room", ""), payload.get("device", "")) self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message}) elif self.path == "/api/ea-rooms/members/remove": ok, message = ea_remove_room_member(payload.get("room", ""), payload.get("device", "")) self._json({"ok": ok, "message": message}) else: self._json({"error": "not found"}, 404) def log_message(self, fmt, *args): pass # systemd journal captures stdout/stderr already; keep it quiet def main(): ThreadingHTTPServer.allow_reuse_address = True # 0.0.0.0, not 127.0.0.1: Caddy runs in a container and reaches this via # host.docker.internal (a Docker bridge gateway IP, not localhost) — a # loopback-only bind refuses that connection outright. Confirmed live: # "dial tcp 172.17.0.1:8092: connect: connection refused" even though # curl from the host itself worked fine on 127.0.0.1. Access is scoped by # UFW (see install_security-dashboard), not by which interface this binds # to — same pattern every other host-network service in this repo uses. with ThreadingHTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", PORT), Handler) as httpd: print(f"Security dashboard running on 0.0.0.0:{PORT}") httpd.serve_forever() if __name__ == "__main__": main() PYAPP } [[ "${_RUN_STANDALONE:-0}" == 1 ]] && install_security-dashboard