Provide three tiers of the install script for both 24.04 and 26.04:
- Originals (ubuntu-post-install-24.04.sh / -26.04.sh): restored to their
true original state, with Keycloak intact, as a fallback baseline. (This
reverts the in-place Keycloak removal from the previous commit; the cleanup
now lives in the -no-keycloak variants instead.)
- -no-keycloak.sh: Keycloak fully removed, Authelia as the SSO/2FA option.
- -crowdsec.sh: builds on -no-keycloak and replaces fail2ban entirely with
CrowdSec (SSH via auth.log/sshd collection, Caddy via caddy collection + log
acquisition, firewall bouncer for enforcement, plus geo-blocking and
community IP-reputation blocklists).
Add SCRIPT-VARIANTS.md documenting the three tiers and how the Authelia /
fail2ban / CrowdSec security layers differ.
All variants pass 'bash -n'.
https://claude.ai/code/session_017eA2qqq9jfF2tNtpUYL8vK
Keycloak never reliably ran (fiddly reverse-proxy/hostname config) and the
repo has standardized on Authelia for SSO + 2FA. This rips Keycloak out
entirely:
- Delete the install block, whiptail menu entry, uninstall plumbing, and
EXISTING_SERVICES detection from both 24.04 and 26.04 scripts
- Delete docker-compose-keycloak.yml, fix-keycloak-proxy.sh, and
KEYCLOAK-SETUP-GUIDE.md
- Remove the Keycloak block from caddy-setup-helper.sh
- Update docs (CADDY-FAIL2BAN-SETUP.md, SECURITY-IMPROVEMENTS.md,
NEW-SCRIPT-STRUCTURE.md, SCRIPT-FLOW-INTRO.txt) to reference Authelia
Also documents the fail2ban/Authelia overlap: Authelia handles failed-login
regulation (per-account lockout); the Caddy fail2ban jail is complementary
firewall-level IP banning. Neither does geo-blocking — noted CrowdSec / Caddy
GeoIP as the path for that.
https://claude.ai/code/session_017eA2qqq9jfF2tNtpUYL8vK
This comprehensive update addresses multiple security and usability issues:
## Docker Directory Ownership
- Added ensure_docker_dir_ownership() helper function
- Applied to ALL 25+ services (Immich, Keycloak, ActualBudget, Jellyfin,
Emby, ARM, FileBrowser, MagicMirror, Lyrion, Mealie, Minecraft, Frigate,
ntfy, Uptime Kuma, wg-easy, Traccar, Portainer, MeshCentral, FindMyDevice,
Frigate-Notify, Watchtower, Kopia, Caddy)
- Fixed disaster recovery path (line 309) to set ownership
- Docker folders now owned by sudo user, not root
- Users can run docker commands without sudo
## Keycloak Security Improvements
- Implemented password validation with retry loop
- Password requirements: 12+ chars, alphanumeric only (no special chars)
- Auto-generate secure passwords by pressing ENTER
- Moved all credentials to .env file (no passwords in docker-compose.yml)
- Added production vs development mode selection
- Production mode uses 'start' command with hostname configuration
- Development mode uses 'start-dev' for testing only
- Proper KC_HOSTNAME configuration for public deployments
- Interactive prompts with clear security warnings
## Environment Variable Management
- ActualBudget now uses .env file for configuration
- Keycloak uses .env for admin and database passwords
- Consistent .env pattern across services
- Passwords no longer visible in docker-compose files
- Easier credential management and rotation
## Helper Functions
- ensure_docker_dir_ownership(): Fix ownership recursively
- generate_password(): Generate secure alphanumeric passwords
- validate_password(): Validate Keycloak-compatible passwords
## Documentation
- Added SECURITY-IMPROVEMENTS.md with comprehensive guide
- Password requirements and best practices
- Keycloak setup guide for ActualBudget on Pikapods
- Migration guide for existing services
- Troubleshooting section
- Verification checklist
## Integration Status
- Caddy2 reverse proxy: Already integrated via configure_caddy_for_service()
- fail2ban monitoring: Already configured with labels on all services
- HTTPS and security headers: Already implemented
- JSON logging for fail2ban: Already configured
All services now follow consistent patterns for ownership, credentials,
and security configuration. Script tested with bash -n for syntax errors.
Claude