Add zero-click Authelia login to Gitea and Uptime Kuma

Follow-up to Frigate's Authelia integration: both of these can also skip
their own login entirely once Authelia is doing the gating, each with a
different trust model appropriate to what the app actually supports.

- gitea: new _gitea_offer_reverse_proxy_auth(), a second Authelia
  integration alongside the existing OIDC "Sign in with Authelia" button.
  Enables Gitea's own ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION so it auto-logs
  in from a trusted Remote-User header — no click, no separate Gitea
  session to expire on its own. Trust is IP-range based
  (REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES), computed from caddy_net's real subnet
  the same way ufw_allow_from_caddy_net does; refuses to enable the
  feature at all if that can't be determined rather than fall back to a
  permissive default — Gitea's own Docker image has shipped an unscoped
  default before (GHSA-f75j-4cw6-rmx4, any IP could impersonate any user).
  Rewires Gitea onto caddy_net and re-points Caddy at gitea:3000, since it
  previously only reached Caddy via its published host port. Gitea's own
  login stays available as a fallback, so unlike Frigate there's no
  "native login off with nothing gating it" state to guard against.

- uptimekuma: sets DISABLE_AUTH=true only once Caddy's "import authelia"
  gate is confirmed in front of it. Uptime Kuma already joined caddy_net
  unconditionally, so this only needed the env var plus moving the
  Authelia-gated Caddy call earlier (before docker-compose.yml is
  written); the existing unconditional call at the end now only runs as a
  fallback when the Authelia path wasn't used or wasn't completed. Kuma's
  DISABLE_AUTH has no IP-scoping or secret check left once set — the
  strictest of the three to get the ordering right on, since a mistake
  here means wide open, not just spoofable.

Verified with a local test harness (fake Authelia/Caddy/docker-network
state): both the happy path and the "Caddy declined" safety fallback
produce the expected docker-compose.yml/.env/Caddyfile output for each
service, and Gitea's subnet-detection refusal + idempotent-rerun guard
were exercised directly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SpKTLpwAgZNooTacWeQLuc
This commit is contained in:
Claude
2026-08-21 21:07:02 +00:00
parent cd33b7ce71
commit be60f475c3
3 changed files with 206 additions and 3 deletions
+51 -3
View File
@@ -206,6 +206,9 @@ install_uptimekuma() {
if [ "$DRY_RUN" = true ]; then
echo "[DRY-RUN] Would create $UPTIME_DIR"
echo "[DRY-RUN] Would auto-scan for a free host port"
echo "[DRY-RUN] If Authelia is installed: would offer to protect Uptime Kuma with it —"
echo "[DRY-RUN] sets DISABLE_AUTH=true (Kuma's own login off) only once Caddy's"
echo "[DRY-RUN] 'import authelia' gate is actually confirmed in front of it"
return 0
fi
@@ -241,6 +244,39 @@ networks:
"
fi
# Authelia SSO — decided (and, if accepted, wired into Caddy) before
# docker-compose.yml is written, so DISABLE_AUTH only ever gets set once
# Caddy's "import authelia" gate is actually confirmed in front of Kuma.
# Unlike Frigate/Gitea, Uptime Kuma with DISABLE_AUTH=true has NO
# internal check left at all — it's not IP-scoped (Gitea) or secret-
# pinned (Frigate), just fully open to whatever reaches its port, so
# this is the one place getting the ordering wrong is worst: a login-
# disabled Kuma with nothing gating it is wide open to anyone who can
# reach the port, not just spoofable.
local UPTIME_USE_AUTHELIA="n" UPTIME_ENV_BLOCK="" _uptime_caddy_done=false
if [ -d "$DOCKER_DIR/authelia" ]; then
echo ""
prompt_yn "Protect Uptime Kuma with Authelia SSO (disables Kuma's own login entirely)? (y/n):" "y" UPTIME_USE_AUTHELIA
fi
if [[ "$UPTIME_USE_AUTHELIA" =~ ^[Yy]$ ]]; then
configure_caddy_for_service "Uptime Kuma" "uptime-kuma:3001" "uptime" " import authelia"
if [ "${CADDY_SERVICE_CONFIGURED:-false}" = true ]; then
UPTIME_ENV_BLOCK=" - DISABLE_AUTH=true"
_uptime_caddy_done=true
declare -F _authelia_scope_access >/dev/null 2>&1 && _authelia_scope_access "uptimekuma" "$CADDY_SERVICE_DOMAIN"
else
log_warning "Caddy wasn't configured — leaving Uptime Kuma's own login enabled (nothing else would be gating access)."
fi
fi
local UPTIME_ENV_SECTION=""
if [ -n "$UPTIME_ENV_BLOCK" ]; then
UPTIME_ENV_SECTION=" environment:
${UPTIME_ENV_BLOCK}
"
fi
cat > docker-compose.yml << UPTIME_COMPOSE
name: uptime-kuma
@@ -250,7 +286,7 @@ services:
container_name: uptime-kuma
hostname: uptime-kuma
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
${UPTIME_ENV_SECTION} volumes:
- ./data:/app/data
- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro
ports:
@@ -282,6 +318,15 @@ Docker containers.
If Caddy is installed, you can expose this via the prompt during install
(see configure_caddy_for_service). Default subdomain: uptime.
## Authelia SSO (optional)
If Authelia is installed, the installer offers to protect Uptime Kuma with
it instead of Kuma's own login — this sets \`DISABLE_AUTH=true\` (Kuma's own
account/login screen goes away entirely) and puts Caddy's \`import authelia\`
gate in front instead, so Authelia is the only thing checking who you are.
This only gets set once Caddy confirms it's actually fronting the domain —
never with nothing else gating access. Re-run \`sudo ./setup.sh uptimekuma\`
to add or change this later.
## Manage
\`\`\`
cd $UPTIME_DIR
@@ -291,8 +336,11 @@ docker compose logs -f # logs
\`\`\`
MD
# Configure Caddy reverse proxy before starting
configure_caddy_for_service "Uptime Kuma" "uptime-kuma:3001" "uptime"
# Configure Caddy reverse proxy before starting (skip if the Authelia
# step above already did it)
if [ "$_uptime_caddy_done" != true ]; then
configure_caddy_for_service "Uptime Kuma" "uptime-kuma:3001" "uptime"
fi
local START_UPTIME=""
prompt_yn "Start Uptime Kuma now? (y/n):" "y" START_UPTIME