Claude
1b4c9298e1
Keeps this as a standalone authelia+fail2ban stack (no Frigate services). Changes: - docker-compose.yml: fail2ban depends_on authelia with service_healthy condition so authelia.log exists before fail2ban tries to bind-mount it; add inline note about pre-creating the log file - authelia/configuration.yml: expand access_control comment block to cover all 4 cases (added Case 3: app keeps own auth + Authelia as 2FA gate, and Case 4: app handles auth alone); clearer per-case commented rules - caddy/Caddyfile (replaces snippet.example.caddyfile): complete Caddyfile with all 4 auth-case examples; (accesslog) imported in every block so fail2ban caddy-4xx jail covers all subdomains, not just gated ones; full inline docs for enabling Frigate proxy auth - README.md: expand "Which sites" from 3 to 4 cases; add proxy-auth service compatibility table (Frigate, Grafana, Gitea, Nextcloud, HA, Portainer etc.); clarify fail2ban covers all sites via single caddy-4xx jail; add touch authelia/authelia.log to first-run; add troubleshooting entries for authelia.log bind-mount directory bug and fail2ban chain verification https://claude.ai/code/session_012eTokAaGiZo7aGt1T2W9BC
169 lines
6.4 KiB
YAML
169 lines
6.4 KiB
YAML
---
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###############################################################################
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# Authelia configuration
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#
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# - File-based user database (no LDAP)
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# - SQLite local storage (no Redis, no MySQL/Postgres)
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# - Filesystem notifier (writes "emails" to /config/notifications/...)
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# - Argon2id password hashing
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# - Per-domain access policies under access_control.rules
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#
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# Secrets are NOT in this file. They are loaded from files mounted at
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# /secrets via the AUTHELIA_*_FILE env vars in docker-compose.yml.
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#
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# After editing, validate before restarting:
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# docker compose run --rm authelia authelia validate-config --config /config/configuration.yml
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###############################################################################
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theme: 'dark'
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server:
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address: 'tcp://0.0.0.0:9091'
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buffers:
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read: 8192
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write: 8192
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log:
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level: 'info'
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format: 'text' # fail2ban filter expects text format -- don't change to json
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file_path: '/config/authelia.log'
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keep_stdout: true # also log to stdout for `docker logs`
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identity_validation:
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reset_password:
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jwt_lifespan: '5 minutes'
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jwt_algorithm: 'HS256'
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# jwt_secret loaded via AUTHELIA_IDENTITY_VALIDATION_RESET_PASSWORD_JWT_SECRET_FILE
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totp:
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disable: false
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issuer: 'example.com' # CHANGE: your root domain (shown in authenticator app)
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algorithm: 'sha1'
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digits: 6
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period: 30
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authentication_backend:
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password_change:
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disable: false
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password_reset:
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disable: false
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refresh_interval: '5 minutes'
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file:
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path: '/config/users_database.yml'
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password:
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algorithm: 'argon2'
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argon2:
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variant: 'argon2id'
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iterations: 3
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memory: 65536
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parallelism: 4
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key_length: 32
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salt_length: 16
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Access control
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#
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# default_policy: deny -- every domain Caddy forward_auths here must have
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# an explicit rule. Domains with no `import authelia` in Caddy never reach
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# Authelia at all, so the deny doesn't apply to them.
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#
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# Policies:
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# bypass Authelia waves the request through (used for the portal)
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# one_factor password only
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# two_factor password + TOTP
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#
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# WHICH SITES NEED A RULE HERE?
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#
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# There are four ways a site can relate to Authelia:
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#
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# CASE 1 -- App has NO built-in auth (e.g. Pi doorbell PTT page).
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# -> Rule required + `import authelia` in Caddy.
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# -> Authelia is the ONLY login. Use two_factor for hardware-control pages.
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#
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# CASE 2 -- App has built-in auth AND supports trusted-header proxy auth
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# (Frigate 0.14+, Grafana, Gitea, Nextcloud, Home Assistant ...).
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# -> Rule required + `import authelia` in Caddy + disable the app's login
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# form in its own config (see README.md per-app instructions).
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# -> Single Authelia login covers both access AND the app's user/role
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# mapping via Remote-User / Remote-Groups headers.
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#
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# CASE 3 -- App has built-in auth and CANNOT switch to proxy auth, but you
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# still want a 2FA gate in front of it (extra security layer).
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# -> Rule required + `import authelia` in Caddy.
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# -> User logs into Authelia (2FA) THEN into the app's own login form.
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# Two separate logins -- the app auth is unchanged.
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# -> Useful for: router admin pages, NAS UIs, any legacy app.
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#
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# CASE 4 -- App handles its own auth and you don't want Authelia involved.
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# -> NO rule here + NO `import authelia` in Caddy.
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# -> Traffic skips Authelia entirely; the app handles everything.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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access_control:
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default_policy: 'deny'
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rules:
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# The Authelia portal itself is always bypass.
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- domain: 'auth.example.com' # CHANGE
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policy: 'bypass'
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# -------------------------------------------------------------------
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# CASE 1: No app auth -- Authelia is the only gate.
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# The Pi doorbell PTT page has no built-in authentication.
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# two_factor is appropriate -- this URL controls a speaker in your house.
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# -------------------------------------------------------------------
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# - domain: 'doorbell.example.com' # CHANGE
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# policy: 'two_factor'
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# -------------------------------------------------------------------
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# CASE 2: App supports trusted-header proxy auth -- replace app login.
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# Frigate 0.14+: set `auth.enabled: False` and configure `proxy:` in
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# frigate_config/config.yml (see README.md "Switching Frigate to Authelia").
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# Single login: Authelia authenticates, Frigate reads Remote-User/Groups.
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# -------------------------------------------------------------------
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# - domain: 'cam.example.com' # CHANGE
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# policy: 'two_factor'
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# -------------------------------------------------------------------
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# CASE 3: App keeps its own auth; Authelia adds a 2FA gate in front.
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# The app's login form is still shown after Authelia passes the request.
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# User logs into Authelia (2FA) then into the app separately.
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# -------------------------------------------------------------------
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# - domain: 'nas.example.com' # CHANGE/REMOVE example
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# policy: 'two_factor'
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# CASE 4: No rule here, no `import authelia` in Caddy. App handles auth.
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session:
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# secret loaded via AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET_FILE
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cookies:
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- name: 'authelia_session'
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domain: 'example.com' # CHANGE: your root domain
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authelia_url: 'https://auth.example.com' # CHANGE
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default_redirection_url: 'https://example.com' # CHANGE
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expiration: '1 hour'
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inactivity: '5 minutes'
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remember_me: '1 month'
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same_site: 'lax'
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# In-app rate limiting. Locks the user account after repeated failures.
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# fail2ban is the second line of defense: it bans the source IP.
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# Together: Authelia locks the *user*, fail2ban bans the *IP*.
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regulation:
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max_retries: 3
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find_time: '2 minutes'
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ban_time: '5 minutes'
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storage:
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# encryption_key loaded via AUTHELIA_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_FILE
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local:
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path: '/config/db.sqlite3'
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# Filesystem notifier -- password reset / new device emails get written to
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# a file you can `tail -f`. Swap to `smtp:` when you wire up a real
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# transactional sender (see README.md "Switching the notifier to SMTP").
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notifier:
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disable_startup_check: false
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filesystem:
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filename: '/config/notifications/notification.txt'
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