---
###############################################################################
# Authelia configuration
#
#  - File-based user database (no LDAP)
#  - SQLite local storage (no Redis, no MySQL/Postgres)
#  - Filesystem notifier (writes "emails" to /config/notifications/...)
#  - Argon2id password hashing
#  - Per-domain access policies under access_control.rules
#
# Secrets are NOT in this file. They are loaded from files mounted at
# /secrets via the AUTHELIA_*_FILE env vars in docker-compose.yml.
#
# Your domain comes from the DOMAIN variable in .env -- no manual
# find-and-replace needed. Authelia 4.38+ processes this file as a Go
# template, so {{ env "DOMAIN" }} is substituted at startup.
#
# After editing, validate before restarting:
#   docker compose run --rm authelia authelia validate-config --config /config/configuration.yml
###############################################################################

theme: 'dark'

server:
  address: 'tcp://0.0.0.0:9091'
  buffers:
    read: 8192
    write: 8192

log:
  level: 'info'
  format: 'text'             # fail2ban filter expects text format -- don't change to json
  file_path: '/config/authelia.log'
  keep_stdout: true          # also log to stdout for `docker logs`

identity_validation:
  reset_password:
    jwt_lifespan: '5 minutes'
    jwt_algorithm: 'HS256'
    # jwt_secret loaded via AUTHELIA_IDENTITY_VALIDATION_RESET_PASSWORD_JWT_SECRET_FILE

totp:
  disable: false
  issuer: '{{ env "DOMAIN" }}'   # shown in your authenticator app
  algorithm: 'sha1'
  digits: 6
  period: 30

authentication_backend:
  password_change:
    disable: false
  password_reset:
    disable: false
  refresh_interval: '5 minutes'
  file:
    path: '/config/users_database.yml'
    password:
      algorithm: 'argon2'
      argon2:
        variant: 'argon2id'
        iterations: 3
        memory: 65536
        parallelism: 4
        key_length: 32
        salt_length: 16

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Access control
#
# default_policy: deny -- every domain Caddy forward_auths here must have
# an explicit rule. Domains with no `import authelia` in Caddy never reach
# Authelia at all, so the deny doesn't apply to them.
#
# Policies:
#   bypass      Authelia waves the request through (used for the portal)
#   one_factor  password only
#   two_factor  password + TOTP
#
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# WHICH SITES NEED A RULE HERE?
#
# CASE 1 -- App has NO built-in auth (e.g. Pi doorbell PTT page).
#   -> Rule required + `import authelia` in Caddy.
#   -> Authelia is the ONLY login. Use two_factor for hardware-control pages.
#
# CASE 2 -- App has built-in auth AND supports trusted-header proxy auth
#           (Frigate 0.14+, Grafana, Gitea, Nextcloud, Home Assistant ...).
#   -> Rule required + `import authelia` in Caddy + disable the app's login
#      form in its own config (see README.md per-app instructions).
#   -> Single Authelia login covers both access AND the app's user/role
#      mapping via Remote-User / Remote-Groups headers.
#
# CASE 3 -- App has built-in auth and CANNOT switch to proxy auth, but you
#           still want a 2FA gate in front of it (extra security layer).
#   -> Rule required + `import authelia` in Caddy.
#   -> User logs into Authelia (2FA) THEN into the app's own login form.
#      Two separate logins -- the app auth is unchanged.
#   -> Useful for: router admin pages, NAS UIs, any legacy app.
#
# CASE 4 -- App handles its own auth and you don't want Authelia involved.
#   -> NO rule here + NO `import authelia` in Caddy.
#   -> Traffic skips Authelia entirely; the app handles everything.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
access_control:
  default_policy: 'deny'
  rules:

    # The Authelia portal itself is always bypass.
    - domain: 'auth.{{ env "DOMAIN" }}'
      policy: 'bypass'

    # -------------------------------------------------------------------
    # CASE 1: No app auth -- Authelia is the only gate.
    # The Pi doorbell PTT page has no built-in authentication.
    # two_factor is appropriate -- this URL controls a speaker in your house.
    # -------------------------------------------------------------------
    # - domain: 'doorbell.{{ env "DOMAIN" }}'
    #   policy: 'two_factor'

    # -------------------------------------------------------------------
    # CASE 2: App supports trusted-header proxy auth -- replace app login.
    # Frigate: set auth.enabled: False and configure proxy: in
    # frigate_config/config.yml (see README.md). Authelia handles login
    # and passes Remote-User/Remote-Groups to Frigate for role mapping.
    # -------------------------------------------------------------------
    # - domain: 'cam.{{ env "DOMAIN" }}'
    #   policy: 'two_factor'

    # -------------------------------------------------------------------
    # CASE 3: App keeps its own auth; Authelia adds a 2FA gate in front.
    # User authenticates with Authelia (2FA) then with the app itself.
    # Add entries for any extra-gated domains here.
    # -------------------------------------------------------------------
    # - domain: 'nas.{{ env "DOMAIN" }}'
    #   policy: 'two_factor'

    # CASE 4: No rule here, no `import authelia` in Caddy. App handles auth.

session:
  # secret loaded via AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET_FILE
  cookies:
    - name: 'authelia_session'
      domain: '{{ env "DOMAIN" }}'
      authelia_url: 'https://auth.{{ env "DOMAIN" }}'
      default_redirection_url: 'https://{{ env "DOMAIN" }}'
      expiration: '1 hour'
      inactivity: '5 minutes'
      remember_me: '1 month'
      same_site: 'lax'

# In-app rate limiting. Locks the user account after repeated failures.
# fail2ban is the second line of defense: it bans the source IP.
# Together: Authelia locks the *user*, fail2ban bans the *IP*.
regulation:
  max_retries: 3
  find_time: '2 minutes'
  ban_time: '5 minutes'

storage:
  # encryption_key loaded via AUTHELIA_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_FILE
  local:
    path: '/config/db.sqlite3'

# Filesystem notifier -- password reset / new device emails get written to
# a file you can `tail -f`. Swap to `smtp:` when you wire up a real
# transactional sender (see README.md "Switching the notifier to SMTP").
notifier:
  disable_startup_check: false
  filesystem:
    filename: '/config/notifications/notification.txt'